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Abstract 
In this study, seafarers were the research target group and Seafarer 
Occupational Risk Perception was the research topic. 
This study was conducted in response to four concerns ansmg from the 
increase in frequency of pirate attacks on ships along the coast of East African 
between the year 2000 and 20 I 0. First and foremost being the lack of 
empirical research on maritime piracy in East Africa. Secondly, that seafarers 
featured in maritime piracy incident reports as mere statistics of those 
attacked, captured and released by pirate~. Thirdly, that the views of ship crew 
were not included in piracy reports; Fourthly, that studies on seafarer 
perception of pirate attacks as an occupational risk remained an uncharted 
research territory despite the fact that the maritime work environment has long 
been regarded as risky, and the crew were the targeted victims of the kidnap-
for-ransom mode of piracy in East Africa. This study was initiated in order to 
provide empirical evidence to try to explain the variations in the views of 
seafarers about maritime piracy as a risk factor, in relation to other 
occupational risks. 
By adopting a phenomenological approach, this study had as its focus, my 
interviewees' perspectives about risk in general, and their varied perception 
about the threat posed by pirate attacks in East Africa. During the fieldwork 
stage of the project in the year 2011, interviews of a diverse sample of forty-
four seafarers were carried out over a period of six months at a busy port in 
the United Kingdom. The interviewees included forty-three males and one 
female. An interview guide containing semi-structured questions and two 
vignettes was used as an aide de memoire to facilitate focused data collection 
interaction with the interviewees. Data collected was subjected to both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. From the research findings, a number of 
conclusions emerged with both empirical, methodological, policy 
implications. 
(iv) 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Notice of Submission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (i) 
Submission Declaration Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii) 
Acknowledgements . . .. . .. . .... ...... .. ... .. .. . ... . .......... . . .. .. ...... :. . ...... .. . ... ................. .. (iii) 
Abstract . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iv) 
Table of Contents ....... . ........... . ...... .. .... .. .. .... .... . ...... . ....... . ............ . ........ .. .... . .. (v) 
List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . (ix) 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ... . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ~ ·l 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW (1 ) MARITIME PIRACY TRENDS .. .. . .... . . . 6 
CAUSES AND RESPONSES 
2. 1 Introduction: Literature Review Process 
2.2 Chapter Overview 
2.3 A brief history of Water Transport and Global Maritime Trade 
2.4 Maritime Piracy: Definition, Scale, Trend and Measurement 
2.4. l Piracy Overview: Global and East Africa 
2.4.2 Piracy along the East Coast of Africa 
2.5 Piracy Reporting and Data Collection: European Union Naval Force 
2.6 Problematising Maritime Piracy Measurement 
2. 7 Critiquing Self-Reporting and Under-reporting of Maritime Piracy 
2. 7 .1 Emergence of Maritime Piracy Literature 
2.8 Impact of Maritime Piracy at Different Levels 
2.8.1 Industry/Economic Impact 
2.9 Responses to Maritime Piracy 
2.9.1 Multiple Discourses on Maritime Piracy Regulation 
(a) International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Maritime Safety 
(b) International Labour Organisation 
(c) Other International Perspectives and Legislation Provisions 
2.10 Regional and National Responses to Piracy in East Africa 
2.11 'The Missing Link ' - Seafarers' Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) 
2.12 Chapter Summary 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW (2) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . 37 
3.1 Introduction: Generation of Theoretical Propositions 
3.2 The Contested nature of risk 
3.3 Epistemological bases underpinning approaches to Risk 
3.4 Substantive debate within Risk Literature 
3.5 Risk Perception 
3.6 Cultural Theory of Risk 
3.7 The Royal Society Study Group on Risk and 'Subjective Immunity' 
3.8 Seafaring Work Environment 
(v) 
3.9 Brief Overview of the Structural Changes in the Global Shipping Industry 
3.10 Seafarer Occupational Risk Perception 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
· 4.2 The Research: Goal, Objectives and Research Questions 
4.3 Research Design 
4.4 Potential Research Fieldwork Sites 
4.5 The Research Target Group 
4.6 Data Collection 
4.6.1 Sampling Technique 
4.6.2 The Fieldwork Process 
4.6.3 Data Collection Instrument 
4.6.4 Research Access, Ethical Dilemmas and Politics of Data Collection 
4.7 Overview of Data Collection and Data Analysis 
4.7.1 The Data Collection Process 
4.7.2 The Pilot Study 
4. 7 .3 The Main Fieldwork 
(a) Data Collection 
(b) Data Recording Process and Challenges 
(c) Benefits of Audio Recording Interviews 
4.8 Preliminary Data Analysis 
4.8. l Transcription, Data Sorting and Indexing 
4.8.2 Sample Descriptive Characteristics 
(a) Age Distribution 
(b) Nationality 
(c) Marital Status 
(d) Work Experience vs ships worked on 
(e) Current Position/Rank on Ship 
(f) Type of ships worked on 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
61 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH FINDINGS .. .............. .. ..... .. . . ....... .. ... . .. . .. .. ... .. . ............ 91 
Section A: Quantitative Data Analysis 
Bivariate Analysis of Seafarer Occupational Risk Perception .... . . ..... .. .. ... . .. . .. . . ... .. .... ..... .. ... . 92 
5.1 Introduction: Chapter Overview 
5.2 Data Preparation 
5.3 Quantitative Analysis : Age, Nationality, Rank, Work Experience vs 'Top 3' risks 
5.3.1 Interviewees' Age vs 'Top 3' risk factors 
5.3.2 Nationality vs 'Top 3 ' risks 
5.3.3 Seafarer Work Experience vs 'Top 3 ' risks 
5.4 Current Position Ship vs 'Top 3' Seafarer Risk Factors 
5.5 Collapsed/Grouped Ranks vs 'Top 3' Seafaring Risk Factors 
(a) Contextualising the Rank Collapsing/Grouping 
5.6 Variations in Safety Ashore vs Safety while At Sea Offshore 
(vi) 
Section B: Qualitative Data Analysis 
Factors Influencing Variations in Seafarer Risk Perception .... .. ....... ..... ...... . ... .... . ... ..... ... .. 11 6 
5.7 Introduction: Qualitative Data Analysis Overview 
5.8 Risk Communication and Amplification: Role of Piracy Narratives and Images 
5.8.1 Piracy Risk Communication 
(a) Piracy Risk Information Sources 
(b) Content of Piracy Risk Information 
5.9 Geo-Spatial Variation of 'Risk as Image Perspective' 
(a) Variations in Perception of 'Riskiness' of some Routes and Ships 
5.10 Influence of Risk Perception on Occupational Risk Behaviour 
5.11 Influence of Family Concerns on Piracy Risk Perception 
5. 12 Influences of Broader Work Experience Factors 
5. I 2. I Influence of Ship Design vs Type of Risk 
5. I 3 Chapter Summary 
CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS............... .................. 141 
6.1 Introduction: Revisiting Research Objectives and Questions 
6.2 Summary of Research Findings 
6.3 Overview of Research Conclusions 
6.3. l Empirical Conclusions 
6.3.2 Methodological Reflections 
6.3.3 Policy Reflections: Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC.2006) 
6.3.4 Limitations of this Study 
6.4 Final Conclusion 
APPENDICES................................. .. ....... . ............... .................. ..... . .. . .. .. . . .. . .. 154 
Appendix I: Summary of Online Literature Search 
Appendix 2: Multiple Views about Piracy triggers in along the coast of East Africa 
Appendix 3: Sample Piracy and Armed Robbery Reporting Form 
Appendix 4: Maritime Labour Convention (2006) 
Appendix 5: SWOT Analysis of potential Fieldwork Sites 
Appendix 6: Sample Interview Guide 
Appendix 7: Ethical Approval Application form 
Appendix 8: Sample Consent form and Participant Information Sheet 
Appendix 8: Sample Consent form and Participant Information Sheet 
Appendix 9: Preliminary Data Analysis (Coding Schematic Index) 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 88 
(vii) 
List of Tables 
Table I: Interviewees by Geographical Region & Percentages 
Table 2: BIMCO/ISF 2010 Seafarer Manpower Update 
Table 3: A comparison of Global Seafarer Rank Distribution in three studies 
Table 4: Factors influencing perceptions of the likely occurrence of each incident type 
Table 5: Interviewees' 'Top 3' Seafaring Occupational Risks 
List of Figures 
Figure I: World Seaborne Trade 1969 - 2010 
Figure 2: Overall Situation of Piracy Activity from December 2007 to July 2010 
Figure 3: Number of ships held in captivity between January 2008 and May 2010 
Figure 4: Cumulative ransom payments in 2009 and 2010 in US$ 
Figure 5: Sample Distribution by Age 
Figure 6: Sample Distribution by Nationality 
Figure 7: Distribution of Seafarers by Marital Status 
Figure 8: Distribution of Seafarers by Work Experience 
Figure 9: Seafarer Ranks within the Sample 
Figure 10: Disaggregation of Senior and Junior Officers in the Sample 
Figure 11: Distribution of Ratings 
Figure 12: Distribution of Seafarers by current position on ship 
Figure 13: Distribution of Seafarers by previous ship worked on 
Figure 14: Cross-tabulation results of interviewee ages vs risk 'most worried' about 
Figure 15: Cross-tabulation results of interviewee ages vs risk 'a little worried' about 
Figure 16: Cross-tabulation results of interviewee ages vs risk 'least worried' about 
Figure 17: Cross-tabulation results: Nationality vs risks 'most worried' about 
Figure 18: Cross-tabulation results: Nationality vs risks 'a little worried' about 
Figure 19: Cross-tabulation results: Nationality vs risks 'least worried' about 
Figure 20: Cross-tabulation results: Seafaring work experience vs risk 'most worried' about 
Figure 21: Cross-tabulation results: Seafaring work experience vs risks 'a little worried' about 
Figure 22: Cross-tabulation results: Seafaring work experience vs risks 'least worried' about 
Figure 23: Cross-tabulation results: Senior Officers (Junior Officers-Ratings) vs risks 'most worried' about. 
Figure 24: Cross-tabulation results: Senior Officers, Junior Officers-Ratings vs risks 'a little worried' 
Figure 25: Cross-tabulation results: Senior Officers, Junior Officers-Ratings vs risks 'least worried' about 
Figure 26: All Officers, Ratings vs risks 'most worried' about 
Figure 27: All Officers, Ratings vs risks 'a little worried' about 
Figure 28: Variations in responses on 'feelings of safety' ashore 
(viii) 
List of Abbreviations 
ASIL 
SIMCO 
BMP 
EUNAVFOR 
FOC 
Foe 
GLMS 
HRAs 
ICFTU 
ICRC 
ICS 
ILO 
IMB 
IMB-PRC 
IMO 
ISF 
MARI SEC 
Marpol 
MLC.2006 
MLC (2003a) 
MSC-HOA 
MTSN 
NATO 
OECD 
OHS 
P & I Clubs 
PRC 
PTSD 
ReCAAP 
RPGs 
SIRC 
SOLAS 
STCW 
SWOT 
UK 
us 
UKMTO 
UN CLOS 
UNCTAD 
UNODCCP 
USA 
US OSHA 
VHF 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 
Baltic International Maritime Council 
Best Management Practice 
European Union Naval Force 
Flags Of Convenience 
Fear of Crime 
Global Labour Market Survey 
High Risk Areas 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
International Chamber of Shipping 
International LabourQganisation 
International Maritime Bureau 
International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre 
International Maritime Organisation 
International Shipping Federation International Transport Federation 
Maritime International Secretariat Services Ltd 
International Convention for the (Marine) Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships 
Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 . 
2013 Amendment to Maritime Labour Convention (2006) 
Maritime Security Centre for the Hom of Africa 
Maritime Transportation Security News & Views 
North Atlantic Trade Organisation 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Occupational Health and Safety 
Protection and Indemnity Clubs 
Piracy Reporting Centre 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
Rocket Propelled Grenades 
Seafarers International Research Centre 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
International Convention on Standards of Training 
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
United Kingdom 
United States 
United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
United States of America 
United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Very High Frequency (radio) 
(ix) 
 
 
1 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This study focuses on the potential risks that confront seafarers in their maritime work 
environment, and the variations in seafarer risk perception.  This study focuses on the potential 
risks confronting seafarers research report traces the emergence of maritime piracy as a seafarer 
occupational risk in East Africa in the 2000 to 2010 period during which time frequent pirate 
attacks on ships were an issue of major concern to maritime safety and shipping industry 
stakeholders. As an academic piece of work, this study focuses on the occupational risk 
landscape of the maritime environment in order to highlight the hazardous nature of working at 
sea.  Structural upheavals within the shipping industry in the decade preceding this study, and 
the impact of these changes is explained to provide an insight into some major factors that had 
resulted in the exacerbation of the vulnerability of seafarers. , Noteworthy features of the 
maritime work environment are discussed in order to provide  readers from outside the shipping 
industry with an insight into the global socio-economic context in which the variations in 
seafarers’ views about the risk of pirate attacks are socially constructed. The details included 
the following aspects: the variety of natural and man - made hazards inherent in the maritime 
environment, precarious labour in the global shipping industry and the disembedding processes 
that seafarers have to contend with as migrant labourers.  The study also discusses some of the 
factors emanating from the hazardous natural environment and structural changes in the 
shipping industry, to show their potential influence on the range of views and concerns among 
the study sample, about the risk posed by pirate attacks along the coast of East Africa during 
the research period. 
The overarching aim of this study was to explore how seafarers made sense of maritime piracy 
as a form of occupational risk amongst the range of risks experienced by seafarers. This study 
focuses on the views of seafarers about piracy as an occupational hazard that they had to 
contend with, and particularly during voyages along the coast of East Africa where frequent 
pirate attacks targeting ship’s crew was reported. The study does not dwell on maritime piracy 
as a phenomenon. This study provided an avenue for articulating seafarers' views about 
maritime piracy through empirical research. Interview data collected from a sample of forty-
four ship’s crew facilitated an exploratory study about seafarer occupational risk perception in 
general, and more specifically, how they regarded the impact of concerns about maritime piracy 
activities on their work environment. A detailed discussion of the broader evidence maritime 
piracy in East Africa has been included in the review of literature in order to provide clarity to 
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readers who may not be aware of the social context in which the respondents in this study 
constructed their views on occupational risk.  
This study had four objectives: 
• To identify, describe and analyse the levels of occupational risk perception among 
seafarers.  This involved exploring how the demographic characteristics of a sample of 
seafarers correlated with their levels of concern about the three seafarer- risk factors that 
they were most worried. The quantitative data analysis section in chapter five addressed 
this aspect.  
• To explain the factors that influenced variations observed in seafarer risk perception.  
• To examine issues within the seafarer work experience that underpinned the variations 
observed in the research interviewees’ concern about the risk of pirate attack.  
• To explore the suitability of vignettes when used as a research tool in a phenomenological 
research approach involving ship’s crew as a hard-to-reach research target group in a 
maritime and mobile workspace. 
Addressing the latter three research objectives involved exploring the broader organisational 
contextual issues that could have a bearing on seafarer risk perception through a thematic 
qualitative data analysis as discussed in the latter section of chapter five of this thesis.  
To operationalise these research objectives this study sought to answer four research questions:   
1. How do seafarers rank perceived workplace risks? 
2. How do seafarer characteristics correlate with their ranking of occupational risk?   
3. How do seafarers understand piracy in the context of the workplace and occupational risk?   
4. How useful are vignettes as an empirical research instrument in a phenomenological 
research on ship’s crew, as a hard-to-reach target group in a mobile workspace?  
 
To address these questions, a study based on forty-four interviews that collected quantifiable 
and qualitative data was undertaken. Both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods 
were employed in this study to interrogate the interview data. The quantitative data analysis 
examined the interviewees’ biographical data for any relationships that might not have been 
readily apparent. The qualitative data analysis explored some salient elements of the seafarers 
lived experience that could have a bearing in shaping the interviewees’ views about the risk of 
pirate attack. 
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This thesis contains six chapters in total. The chapter titles are: Introduction; Literature Review 
(1); Literature Review (2); Research Design and Methods; Data Analysis; Research Findings 
and Conclusions. Each chapter reports on a different aspect of the study. Chapter One lays out 
the structure of this thesis by providing a broad outline of the purpose and content of each of 
the seven chapters contained in the thesis. As a summary of this thesis, this chapter highlights 
the aims, content and conclusion of each chapter. The intention of this chapter is to give the 
reader an explanation early in the thesis, of the motivation for this study, the stages of the 
research process, the research tools used, the research setting and the research outcomes.   
Two literature review chapters have been included in this thesis as Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three.  Both these chapters provide an outline of two important sociological contexts of 
relevance to this study which form the broader social context and the conceptual framework for 
this study. The two are: The maritime piracy crisis East Africa between the years 2005 and 
2011; The global shipping industry. Focusing the literature review on these two key sociological 
contexts explains the rationale for the selection of particular literature and empirical studies that 
helped in generating specific theoretical propositions that were explored empirically through 
this study.   
Chapter Two presents a review of the research and data on maritime piracy that existed in the 
year 2010 when this study began. The purpose of the first phase of the literature review process 
was to provide the broader sociological context of this study.  This chapter provides an 
explanation of a number of factors of significance to the social context of this study. These 
include the major concerns arising from the emergence of a maritime piracy phenomenon in 
East Africa, definitions of maritime piracy, a critical review of evidence about trends maritime 
piracy incidents, the impact of piracy and responses to it at different levels. The emergence of 
piracy along the busy East Africa coast was at that point in time as an issue of concern to various 
stakeholders in the global shipping industry.  The role of the shipping in global trade is discussed 
to outline the main structural changes in the shipping industry in the decades preceding this 
study, as well as a description of the hazardous nature of the seafarer work environment. 
Subsequently, key occupational health and safety concerns were framed within the background 
information about the seafarer’s world of work that is relevant to this study.  Since seafarer 
occupational risk perception is the central issue of this study, this chapter provides bird’s eye 
view of the maritime world within which seafarers’ lived-experiences shape their social 
construction about workplace ‘risks’.   
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The third chapter provides a broad review of the risk literature and some research studies that 
provided a conceptual framework for understanding the issues of risk, occupational risk 
perception and variations in risk perception.  The chapter starts with a condensed display of the 
wider literature of risk and risk perception as a prelude and context to the particular literature 
addressed in detail. This chapter outlines the process through which the four thematic 
propositions for this study emerged from concepts derived from five studies.  These four 
concepts included Cultural Theory of Risk, Occupational Risk Perception, the concept of 
‘Subjective Immunity’, Social Amplification of Risk as ‘an Image Perspective’. For each 
concept, I identified the specific idea(s) relevant to the research, and then critically appraised 
the claims by the authors, the evidence that each study provided to support their suggestions, 
and the context in which those ideas were developed.  The reflexive approach adopted enabled 
an assessment of how each of these concepts related to the study, enabled the constructing of 
thematic propositions that would shape the two-stage data analysis documented in chapter. 
Chapter Four describes the research methodology.  It provides details about the research process 
and indicates the rationale for decisions made at each stage of the study. Detailed discussions 
provide information about research sampling, the fieldwork setting, data collection, data sorting 
and analysis processes from which the research findings emerged.  The fieldwork was carried 
out over a six-month period in the year 2011, from interviewing a diverse sample of forty-four 
seafarers at a busy port in the United Kingdom. During the interviews, a semi-structured 
interview guide served as an aide memoir.  The data were analysed in two stages: a quantitative 
data analysis and a qualitative data analysis. 
The fifth chapter reports the results of the two-stage research data analysis.  The first data 
analysis phase was a quantitative data analysis during which Cross-tabulation and Pearson’s 
Chi-square were employed to establish whether there were any links between the ‘Top 3’ risk 
factors identified and prioritised by the interviewees, and their ages, nationalities, ranks and   
the length of their work experience., then a qualitative data analysis. Test results showed that 
maritime piracy was an issue of concern to interviewees of all ranks and age groups.  There 
were variations in the interviewees' views about the risk level posed by piracy that among 
interviewees of the same age group, of the same rank and with the same length of seafaring 
career. These variations could not be adequately explained by a quantitative analysis alone. 
Therefore, a further qualitative data analysis undertaken further explored and examined the data 
for additional explanations for the variations in risk perception among the sample.  This 
variance in views was analysed through a qualitative methodology. The interrogation of 
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qualitative data involved a thematic data analysis of the interviewee responses that pointed to 
some additional work experience-related factors that further clarified the variations in piracy 
risk perception among the research sample.  Combined test results showed that the variation 
observed in the interviewees’ occupational risk perception was influenced by four main factors.  
These were the sources, content and overload of piracy information that they received and the 
cumulative effect of receiving several streams of piracy risk information over time.  These 
factors had influenced both the views about the risk posed by piracy to them as individuals, as 
well as the interviewees’ levels of concern about the potential threat of harm that piracy posed 
to their relatives and to all seafaring professionals as well. 
The final chapter enumerates the various research findings and conclusions that emerged from 
this study of forty-four seafarers.  This study found that quantitative data analysis considered 
on its own, without an additional qualitative data analysis of the interviewee responses, was not 
sufficient for making inferences from this study.  Instead, a mixed methods approach to data 
analysis was more effective in providing a fuller explanation for the variations in occupational 
risk perception within the sample.  A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was 
best suited for the identification of inter-related factors within the evolving global shipping 
industry.  Such a methodological approach provided a means to come up with a more 
comprehensive explanation of how the dynamics through which these issues influenced 
seafarers’ different views about risk.  This study also established that variations in perception 
of a pirate attack, as a seafarer occupational risk factor was a complex matter.  There was a geo-
specific pattern to the variations observed in the views among the individuals in the sample 
about the risk level associated with pirate attack and sea-robbers both ashore and at sea.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW (1)  
MARITIME PIRACY: TRENDS, CAUSES AND RESPONSES  
 
2.1 Introduction: Literature Review Process 
This chapter is first of two literature review chapters conducted for this study.  While this 
chapter dwells on literature regarding social aspects of relevance to this study, next chapter 
focuses on literature/studies that informed conceptual framework of this study.  Seafarers’ 
perception of risk was main topic of this study and seafarers research target group.  Literature 
review process reported in this chapter happened at beginning of research project in order to 
identify sociological context for framing the variations in seafarer risk perception.  Maritime 
piracy phenomenon in East Africa between years 2000 and 2010, and global shipping industry 
provided broader social contexts of relevance to this study.  The literature review covered a 
variety of academic databases, regular journals from shipping/maritime industry, books, 
research reports, documentation from industry-specific conference/seminar and workshop 
proceedings and open-source data repositories of organisations focused on seafarer welfare as 
a core-business.   
A critical appraisal of a variety of articles on piracy in East Africa provided a better 
understanding of phenomenon.  An initial literature appraisal showed that most of initial 
literature on piracy in East Africa, focused on behaviour of pirates, efforts to make it harder for 
pirates to board ships, increase in ransom figures, Operation Atalanta, risk allowances, piracy 
insurance, number of ships held hostage, different views about armed guards, and rise in piracy 
in West Africa.  Most of this initial literature available at start of this project was of little 
relevance to the study, as it did not focus on welfare of crew.  While this study was underway, 
reports began to trickle into public domain about predicament facing families of crew held 
hostage or ‘missing’.  Meanwhile, most of the hostages gained their freedom through by ransom 
payments, rather than by force.  In addition, a section of seafarers called for a boycott of voyages 
along ‘piracy hotspots’ in Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean until pirate attacks on seafarers 
stopped.  In latter stage of this study, additional literature providing more information, including 
empirical research on hardships faced by ships’ crews who had had encounters with pirates, 
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began emerging.  This latter set of articles was complimented by information obtained from 
abundant shipping industry-related publications, events and professional networks that I had 
access to by virtue of being based at a research-intensive university and research centre i.e. the 
Seafarers’ International Research Centre (SIRC), for entire research period.  
Reviewing articles relevant to this study was both useful and informative.  It provided deeper 
insight into hazardous nature of seafaring profession, and in identifying key issues and trends 
within maritime industry with the potential to influence the opinions ship crew formed about 
level of threat posed by different factors within their workplace.  These occupational hazards 
included but were not limited to piracy crisis in East Africa.  One of compelling trends described 
is structural changes within global shipping industry.  In this regard, historical transformations 
in watercraft design and increasingly longer distances travelled to link global supply chains    
combine with structural changes in globalised shipping industry to shape the maritime work 
environment.  The conditions of this mobile workspace had the inherent ability to influence 
seafarers’ perception of occupational risk.  The literature also pointed to changes in the terms 
and conditions of modern seafarers as a global, mobile professional group whose personal and 
professional characteristics, working conditions and needs were very different from those who 
manned watercraft in past.  This brief historical background was necessary to enable the reader 
to grasp magnitude of effect of convergence of these different social and workplace structural 
changes, and the force they exert in shaping characteristics of the research sample's work 
environment and views about risk.  Outlining this social context of the study served to provide 
readers from outside the shipping industry with an initial picture of the inter-relatedness 
between ripple effects emanating in these changes, and their potential effect on seafarers’ 
occupational risk perception.  
 
2.2 Chapter Overview  
This chapter begins with a brief overview of merchant shipping and key changes brought about 
with processes of economic globalisation.  Within this sociological context, maritime piracy 
stood out as a problematic global phenomenon affecting shipping.  Piracy in East Africa 
emerged as a problem at a time in history when structural transformations were already well 
entrenched in global shipping industry in a way that bred some seafarer occupational risks and 
standards of occupational health and safety on board ships.  This frames the context within 
which maritime piracy features in lives of seafarers.  
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This chapter sought to problematize piracy along coast of East Africa as the specific 
geographical research area of interest.  To this end, a discussion of the observations made after 
an assessment of texts illustrate the growing global maritime safety concern about piracy, and 
the main responses at different levels.  An elaboration of the main occupational health and 
safety issues arising from structural changes in shipping industry highlighted their potential to 
influence seafarers’ occupational risk perception.   
 
2.3 A brief history of Water Transport and Global Maritime Trade  
Maritime transport has been instrumental in movement of passengers and cargo through ages 
in different maritime environments (IMO, 1998).  In 21st century, with emerging global 
markets, sea transport became cheapest means of ferrying a variety of bulky goods over long 
distances (Cafruny, 1987, 114).  This led shipping industry to play its current central role as 
‘lifeblood of global trade’ (UNCTAD, 2002).  In the three decades preceding this study, the 
volume of international trade hauled by sea had risen to about 90% (Hoffmann & Kumar, 2002).  
Figure 1 below illustrates details of main goods comprising this global sea-freight tonnage: 
 
Figure 1: World Seaborne Trade between 1969 and 2010 
Source: Fearnley's Review   
http://www.marisec.org/shippingfacts/worldtrade/volume-world-trade-sea.php 
 
Emphasizing this new and pivotal role assumed by shipping industry in world trade, Maritime 
International Secretariat Services Ltd (MARISEC) stated that: “it would be impossible to 
conduct intercontinental trade, import and export food and manufactured good, half world 
would starve and other half would freeze!”  (MARISEC,  2006). 
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2.4 Maritime Piracy: Definition, Scale, Trend and Measurement  
 Defining maritime piracy can be problematic due to existence of different definitions of 
maritime piracy under both national and international law (Birnie, 1987).  The Internationally  
recognized official definition of piracy is that which is laid down in Article 101 of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Armed Robbery. The 
wording was laid down in Resolution A. 1025  (26)  that was adopted on 2 December 2009 at 
the 26th Assembly Session of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and hereafter 
referred to as UNCLOS.  This legal framework defined maritime piracy as follows:  
“Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed by 
individuals, for private ends against a private ship or aircraft” (Van Dyke, 1982) 
In its counter-piracy activities, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) applies the UNCLOS 
definition of maritime piracy in its interpretation of maritime piracy activities to include 
follows:  
“(The) Act of boarding any vessel with intent to commit theft or any other crime, 
and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act.”  (IMB Piracy 
Reporting Centre, 30/09/2010) 
Although it excludes petty thefts, latter definition is more comprehensive, as it covers both 
failed and successful attacks occurring when a vessel is berthed, anchored or at sea.  In order to 
distinguish maritime piracy from simple hijacking, a piracy crime requires that two vessels 
should be involved in incident.  Second requirement was that crime would have to been 
undertaken for private, and not political, purposes.  These can be important considerations when 
determining coverage under a policy of marine cargo insurance. 
Hostage taking is not a modern phenomenon, Clark (2009).  It is one of the oldest forms of 
international organized crimes (Andersen et. al., 2009), and can be traced back to the Roman 
Empire when it was used as an acceptable strategy to ensure future good behaviour of a 
conquered population (Allen, 2006).  Historical records documented the abduction in 75 B.C. 
of the young Julius Caesar by pirates until a demand of a 50 talents ransom was paid to secure 
his release (Plutarch, n.d; Valler, 2005).  However, in modern times, under United Nations 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 hostage taking and kidnapping were regarded as criminal acts 
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(ICRC, 2009).  Article 3 common to all four Conventions specifies requirement for the humane 
treatment for all who fall in the enemy’s hands, without any adverse distinction between 
combatants and civilians.  Murder, mutilation, torture, cruel, humiliating and degrading 
treatment, taking of hostages and unfair trial are prohibited, while the rescue and care for the 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked is urged (1949 Geneva Convention Article 3). 
Acts of piracy in Gulf of Aden resulted in both kidnappings and hostage taking for ransom on 
numerous occasions between the years 2000 and 2010.  During such incidents, either when the 
ship was boarded and taken over by pirates, the vessel became the stronghold where captured 
crew was confined, or the crew were taken ashore to an unknown location often including 
multiple sites to separate them from each other (O’Leary, 2010).  The crew were isolated in 
order to limit communication amongst hostages to prevent their planning of an escape before 
ransom was paid.  While in captivity, seafarers were treated like tradable commodities by 
pirates.  Unlike piracy in historical times, modern pirates operating off coast of Somalia were 
characteristically more sophisticated. They armed themselves with dangerous weapons and 
used modern and faster vessels to pursue ships.  This facilitated frequent surprise attacks on 
huge and slow moving targets.  During an attack, pirates pursued the targeted vessel using high- 
speed boats that often easily overtook huge and slow ships (Elliot, 2007) while firing automatic 
weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) at retreating vessel (BBC source a.).  Once 
pirates catch up with ship, they board it using ladders; they often gained control of vessel after 
a brief confrontation.  Thereafter, the abductors commandeered the vessel it off its charted 
course to their hideout. 
After pirates take control of hijacked vessel, as part of initial modus operandi of pirates in East 
Africa, ship and crew were to an unknown destination, somewhere along coast of Somalia 
(Spurrier, 2009).  In initial pirate mode of operation, after taking control of hijacked ship, pirates 
establish contact with ship-owner to make known amount of ransom demanded in exchange for 
release of hostages. Seafarers who survived piracy hostage ordeals often complained about the 
poor feeding and lack of adequate ventilation and about lack of updates on the progress of the 
ransom negotiations.  These conditions made the hostages susceptible to re-traumatization 
(UNODCCP, 1999, iii). Over time, however, pirates changed their mode of operation and 
instead of steering hijacked ships ashore, after boarding ship the vessel was used as a mother 
ship from which further attacks were launched further afield against other unsuspecting ships.  
During his study, reports of mother ships originating in East Africa showed that some hijacked 
vessels were commandeered off their original course. Reports indicated that some mother ships 
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hijacked vessels straying further eastwards away from Indian Ocean into international waters.  
During such long and unplanned voyages, captured male crewmembers were emasculated by 
being forced to carry out domestic chores for pirates on board. Such tasks were not within the 
remit of seafarers’ professional work and included cooking and searching for additional food 
stock through fishing activities when food supplies on board ran out (Ecoterra International, 
2011).   
 
2.4.1      Piracy Overview: Global and East Africa  
In spite of a reported rise in piracy in 30 years preceding this study, incident record keeping has 
remained sketchy with little known regular documentation of phenomenon.  While empirical 
basis of some of early pirate reports remains unclear, they provide some early evidence of piracy 
reporting and have been included here to show growing worldwide concern among different 
maritime stakeholders about re-emergence of piracy phenomenon.  For instance, Royal British 
Navy Captain Roger Villar, observed worldwide piracy trends between 1980 and 1984 and 
noted an increase in number of ships attacked along African coasts with “twelve merchant ships 
were being attacked daily” (Villar, 1985).  He later drew attention to piracy attacks particularly 
on Vietnamese boat people (Villar, 2005).  However, state of maritime piracy incidents 
remained hazy due to a lack of official record keeping and retention by maritime industry 
stakeholders.  Summarizing impact of maritime piracy, Kraska and Wilson (2008) highlighted 
macro-economic trigger effect of piracy today, by pointing out how the attacks on ships had 
affected global supply chains that were already struggling to recover from the fall in shipping 
rates occasioned by the worldwide recession. 
Drawing attention of international maritime industry stakeholders to then fast deteriorating 
global piracy trend, Michael S. McDaniel, Esq in November 2000 highlighted to Propeller Club 
of United States an emerging precipitating intensity and frequency of piracy incidences as 
evidenced by following 1998 maritime piracy incident figures: - 
◊ 15 merchant vessels hijacked by pirates;  
◊ 138 merchant vessels boarded by pirates; 
◊ 11 merchant vessels fired upon by pirates 
◊ 35 merchant crew members badly injured; 
◊ Over 400 merchant crew members taken hostage by pirates; 
◊ Over 75 merchant crewmembers murdered (McDaniel, 2000). 
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It was unclear how this data had been obtained as an average crew numbers about 20 per ship, 
and yet report states that 400 crewmembers were held hostage without indicating how many 
ships they were taken from.  McDaniel’s report illustrated the kind of piracy data presented and 
discussed by seafaring stakeholders, which painted a gloomy picture about the piracy trend, 
without providing the empirical grounding for such claims i.e. the data/evidence. 
As piracy crisis evolved, some individuals began compiling data and documenting trend.  In 
2005, Independent Researcher Mark Bruyneel compiled 149 attacks that occurred during first 
six months of year 51% of which occurred in Southeast Asian waters and 20% in African coastal 
waters.  In a weekly pirate report published online in July 2005, IMB Piracy Reporting Centre 
provided information indicating a global spread in areas of world where pirates preyed in first 
half of that year.  Out of all incidents reported in six- month period, 7% were in America, 1% 
in Asia, 4% in Far East and 17% in India.  Noteworthy attacks also occurred around 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malacca Straits, Singapore Straits, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, 
Somalia, West Africa, Brazil, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Peru (Bruyneel, 2001).  
Shashtman (2008) noted a steep rise in piracy globally between 2000 and 2006 alone, when 
2,463 actual or attempted acts of piracy were reported around world representing an annual 
average incident rate of 352.  This marked a substantial increase over mean of 209 recorded for 
period of 1994–1999. With specific reference to situation gradually unravelling in Gulf of 
Aden, Vaknin (2005) and Krane (2006) noted that piracy incidents had rose steadily in Eastern 
Africa between 2000 and 2005. 
Meanwhile, International Maritime Bureau (IMB) began regularly keeping track of growing 
number of pirate attacks through Weekly Piracy Reports generated by its Malaysia-based Piracy 
Reporting Centre (PRC).  These reports continued to regularly document attacks on ships 
worldwide.  Resurgence of maritime piracy globally in last decade is of great concern both to 
stakeholders in shipping industry and global security (Osvaldo Peçanha, 2009).  In last few 
years, ship owners and their representatives have been particularly concerned about menace of 
maritime piracy along Eastern Africa coast (Lloyds, 2008,15; ICC, 2005) making its waters 
most dangerous in world (Burnett, 2002).  IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 
Annual reports between 2000 and 2009 reveal that many categories of ships fell into hands of 
pirates during that period including oil tankers, general cargo, bulk carriers, RO RO, fishing 
vessels, sailing yachts, tug boats, chemical carriers, among others (International Maritime 
Board website).  Maritime piracy situation in East Africa at time this study commenced was 
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characterised by an increase in frequency and number of bandit attacks on ships transiting Gulf 
of Aden along East Africa coastline.  This situation cased a maritime security crisis in busy 
North West Indian Ocean shipping lane, a situation that compelled IMB to advise vessels to 
remain at least 200 nautical miles offshore when transiting past coastal regions of Somalia.  
However, as this study ended, pirate attacks in East Africa had reduced significantly.  This 
reduction is reflected in IMB reports that stated that just 15 incidents occurred off Somalia in 
2013, down from 75 in 2012 (Lloyds List, 16/1/14), and EU NAVFOR reported that there are 
currently zero vessels held by pirates and only 30 seafarer hostages in same region. 
 
2.4.2 Piracy along East Coast of Africa  
An assessment of piracy literature revealed that there were different views about main factors 
that gave rise to piracy crisis along coast of East Africa.  One school of thought pointed to 
presence of weak and failed states, chronic poverty, growth of piracy as an opportunity for 
quick financial gain, and a lack of institutional mechanisms to police piracy created a conducive 
environment for piracy to thrive.  Credible sources added another perspective about triggers to 
initial spate of piracy in Eastern Africa, by associating surge in attacks on ships, with disquiet 
among Somali fishermen (Couper, et al., 2015).  A related view was elaborated stating that  
increase in pirate attacks on ships in East Africa, was preceded by formal complaints by Somalia 
government officials  to United Nations   on encroachment into their international waters by 
large, more technologically-advanced fishing trawlers, and offshore fish laundering most 
notably from Korea, Japan, Norway, and other developed maritime nations (Clarke, 2009).  
Additional literature corroborated view that fishing had been an indigenous socio-economic 
activity in Somalia for centuries.  At turn of century, Somali fishermen still used traditional 
fishing nets to catch their only reliable indigenous source of protein.  It was a reliable source of 
food that had sustained them amidst recurrent famines, chronic internal strife and food 
insecurity over last two decades.  However, it appeared that local fishermen   regarded 
themselves as no match for foreign, technologically advanced fishing vessels that conducted 
regular forays in Somali international water, and took law into their hands after receiving no 
assistance from international community to stop overfishing in Somali waters by foreign 
trawlers.  Appendix 2 provides a sample of literature identified during literature searches that 
provided different views about trigger factors that gave rise to the piracy crisis in East Africa.  
In summary, maritime piracy in East Africa was portrayed as a retaliation  against  foreign 
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fishing vessels in sporadic attacks, aimed at deterring foreign fishing vessels from (over) fishing 
in Somali waters, and depleting local fish stocks (Couper et al, 2015).  Efforts by foreign vessels 
to repress Somali fishermen only served to provoke more-frequent attacks by local fishermen 
and the ‘pirate diaspora’.  With time, the fishermen introduced ransom payments to release 
captured ship and its crew.  This practice degenerated into current maritime mayhem off coast 
of East Africa referred to as ‘Somali Piracy’.  Early media reports and policy literature have 
been a major source of information (Dragonette, 2005; Langewiesche, 2004; Luft & Korin, 
2004) on different views on possible causes of piracy in Eastern Africa waterway.  
Prior to resurgence of piracy as a problem in period under investigation, piracy had been a major 
security challenge along Somali coast for nearly 20 years, since fall of country's last functioning 
government in 1991 and its descent into anarchy (Baldauf, 2009).  causes of state failure in 
Somalia have been well documented (Bates et al., 2003; Esty et al., 1998; Fund for Peace, 2008; 
King & Zang, 2001; Rice & Patrick,2008). In panning region, lens re-focused on chronic civil 
strife in Somalia as main culprit sustaining piracy in region.  UN Political Office for Somalia 
has identified Eastern Africa maritime environment as an offshore victim of inland distortions 
in security management and enforcement agencies in Somalia including police, army and navy.  
Years of conflict and very collapse of Somali state affected the effectiveness of these agencies.  
For last decade, control of this security sector is fragmented with AU Peace Keepers (Uganda 
and Burundi), Ethiopian forces and militias loyal to Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
struggling to create some semblance of law and order in the midst of chronic civil strife and 
insurgencies (UNPOS source).  Hastings (2009) further analyses failure of Somali state as 
providing a conducive environment for development and sustenance of more sophisticated 
piracy attacks (for ransom).  Additionally, Murphy (2008] and Ong-Webb (2007) pinpoint 
physical geography, cultural acceptance and weak or corrupt state institutions as factors that 
promote piracy attacks and provide pirate havens.   
In analysis of influence of political and economic landscapes of failed and weak states on 
maritime piracy, Hastings (2009) associates piracy with state failure and weak states.  He 
elaborates on difference between two common forms of piracy by linking state failure with less 
logistically sophisticated hijackings (kidnappings for ransom) on one hand, while identifying 
state weakness as a major factor that encourages more sophisticated attacks, such as seizure and 
sale of both ship and its cargo, on other.  Rotberg (2002) defines state failure as “being 
inherently violent, a condition where rulers do not have desire or wherewithal to provide and 
maintain security, infrastructure or a minimal standard of living for their people”.  Gros (1996) 
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on other hand, argues that “failed states do not necessarily have to be violent places, as 
sometimes central state exists primarily for security of its leaders, with citizens and even 
regional government officials largely left to fend for themselves”.  Hastings (2009) therefore 
argues that weak states in Eastern Africa region coupled with busy shipping lane in Gulf of 
Aden provide market, transportation infrastructure and a sufficiently secure political 
environment that combine to sustain piracy in Gulf of Aden.  Nevertheless, as ransoms became 
more profitable, pirates became more sophisticated, using mother ships and global positioning 
devices to venture as far as Seychelles Islands to carry out their attacks.  Additionally, 
convergence of massive increase in commercial maritime traffic combined with large number 
of ports around world has been suggested by Shaschtmann (2008) as a probable catalyst for 
increase in piracy as “this growth has provided pirates with an almost limitless range of 
tempting, high-payoff targets." 
 
2.5 Piracy Reporting and Data Collection: European Union Naval Force  
      (EU NAVFOR) 
As intensity of illegal boarding of ships in East Africa evolved, initial reports of maritime piracy 
incidents in Eastern Africa were publicised through media reports, news coverage, feature 
films, television dramas and crime fiction (Graber 1980.  These captured attention of public in 
a way that few other means can (cf. Skogan and Maxfield 1981).  Electronic and print media 
reports have potential to communicate warning signals (Innes & Fielding, 2002) to their 
audience about seafarers’ encounters with pirates, in a manner likely to cause widespread fear 
to a wider audience who do not work on ships, and who are therefore highly unlikely to come 
face to face with pirates.  Wider audience who are likely to consume such media reports and to 
fear piracy (Lasthuizen, et al., 2005, 15).  This could affect the regard for piracy among 
maritime industry stakeholders, seafarers themselves, their families, seafarer sending 
communities and public.  The capacity of the media to cause widespread public anxiety about 
crime by misrepresenting phenomenon has been a matter of general concern (Marsh and 
Melville, 2011).  This is because through powerful discourse, both the print and electronic 
media are capable of painting a distorted picture of criminal situations, either by exaggerating 
a trivial crime, or minimizing a major criminal activity/event.  
Other sources of information on pirate activities that were identified, included formal reporting 
mechanisms that emerged during period covered by this study, in response to widespread 
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concerns about increase in piracy along East Africa coast.  European Union Naval Force (EU 
NAVFOR) is one such information system that arose as main coordination authority mandated 
by European Union to monitor piracy along East Africa coast, and which carries out this 
assignment through Operation Atalanta.  This task included the deployment of an EU naval 
force and monitoring piracy trend through data collection, analysis and reporting.  EU 
NAVFOR’s reports were compiled from piracy data obtained through its Maritime Security 
Centre for Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA).  Key to EU NAVFOR’s access to timely and accurate 
information on pirate activities is MSC-HOA and Dubai-based United Kingdom Maritime 
Trade Operations (UKMTO) piracy reporting mechanism.  UKMTO was first point of contact 
for military forces and merchant vessels transiting Suez Canal.  It operates a Voluntary 
Reporting Scheme, under which merchant vessels passing through canal are encouraged to send 
regular reports, providing their position/course/ speed and ETA at their next port while 
transiting busy maritime corridor.  UKMTO then uses this information to monitor vessels’ 
movements and contact ships directly if there is any urgent piracy information that they need 
to know.  This information-sharing protocol saved time and was expected to improve pace of 
responsiveness of ships to pirate alerts, rather than use of shipping companies as conduits for 
such urgent and important information. 
Following a piracy attack or suspicious activity, a detailed incident report was sent to UKMTO 
and MSC-HOA and to IMB as well.  Report contained 42 items that had to be completed in a 
standardized format.  Form is accessible by shipping companies to provide uniformity in 
maritime piracy data provided by all ships who encountered pirates.  This standardized form is 
thus a useful maritime piracy reporting and data-collection instrument.  Guidelines on how to 
plan for pirate attacks, suggested responses by different actors involved and post-incident 
reporting was provided in widely - circulated Best Management Practices for Protection 
against Somali-Based Piracy (BMP4). 
 
2.6 Problematizing Maritime Piracy Measurement 
An assessment of crime trends requires accurate records and measurements of criminal 
activities.  Crime statistics are useful in facilitating allocation of resources, in order to gauge 
moral health of a populace, for likes of criminal justice agencies.  While there has been an 
increase in avenues for accessing information about different crimes, methods of crime data 
collection and analysis with regard to comprehensibility, integrity, relevance and coverage of 
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crime statistics present some methodological challenges to government statisticians (Maguire, 
2012).  Problematic areas include crime classification, increasing influence of political agendas 
in tailoring crime reports, and underreporting of crimes that raises possibility for sampling 
errors in large surveys (Maguire, 2012).  As a result, public are becoming more sceptical about 
published crime reports, as many now sense a disparity between crime figures reported, and 
actual state of crime and (in) security in general.  For instance, a reduction in a specific offence 
recorded by police or as presented in a crime report may not necessarily reflect the general 
opinion about criminal behaviour at a given time.  
In past crime, reports were published on an annual basis following calendar year, but today 
release of crime reports may follow financial year.  It has been extremely difficult to detect, 
measure, and analyse maritime piracy data through use of available data.  As is case with other 
crimes, it is possible that not all pirate attacks were reported and recorded.  Therefore, the 
number of piracy victims, vessels attacked and hostage duration could have been 
underestimated in official crime databases and reports.  Task of measuring piracy required 
objectively recorded piracy incident statistics.  This could have provided accurate data in a 
format subjected to rigorous statistical and/or thematic and theoretical analysis as an acceptable 
reflective empirical research practice.  Data collection and analysis methods should be indicated 
in report narrative.  Transparency in maritime piracy research methodology could make them 
more credible among researchers.  Additionally, reports could be useful in assessing 
effectiveness of interventions (Addington, 2010).  
 
At time this study was launched, there was no single maritime piracy data repository.  Although 
piracy incident reports were published online along with forms used as data collection 
instruments, much of research and analysis that went into producing reports remained unclear.  
Nonetheless, regular piracy reports available from IMB, EU NAVFOR’S, media, individuals 
and special interest groups including stakeholders in criminology and shipping fraternity 
provided a useful source of information on piracy trend emerging in East Africa.  For instance, 
an evaluation by EU NAVFOR of pirate activity in East Africa from December 2007 to July 
2010 illustrated in Figure 2 below indicated that number of successful hijackings was steady at 
about two ships per month during the 2007-2010 pirate attack-reporting periods. 
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Figure 2: Overall Situation of Piracy Activity from Dec 2007 to July 2010 
Source: European Union Naval Force EU Naval force (EU NAVFOR) source 
 
From piracy trend illustrated in Figure 2 above, overall piracy situation as of July 2010 
indicated that number of successful hijackings was steady at about two ships per month, during 
2007 to 2010 reporting period.  Based upon general crew numbers on general cargo ships during 
research period, assuming an average crew of 20 seafarers per vessel, trend portrayed in Figure 
2 above which suggested that around 24 ships, and therefore an average of 480 seafarers were 
taken hostage per year during period illustrated in diagram.  This observation of trend in 
maritime piracy situation in Gulf of Aden in 2007 and 2010 EU NAVFOR reporting period, 
established fact that piracy grew rapidly through late 2008.  As pirate activity increased, so at 
first did the probability of their success.  An overall global assessment of piracy incidents in 
Eastern Africa region between 2000 and 2009, year in which this study commenced, pointed to 
a quickly degenerating piracy trend.  The situation quickly deteriorated, reaching alarming 
proportions and causing great concern among seafarers, shipping companies, crewing agencies, 
maritime security stakeholders and families of seafarers.  With time, piracy in Eastern Africa 
matured into an organised kidnap-for-ransom criminal enterprise, from which pirates obtained 
millions of dollars in ransom money from attacking ships in North West Indian Ocean.  
However, as counter-piracy, military intervention began operating in area, and as merchant 
ships increased their level of awareness and means of defending themselves against pirates, 
success rate of pirate attacks reduced. 
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Figure 3: Number of ships held in captivity between January 2008 and May 20 
Source: European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) 
 
In July 2013, however, International Maritime Board (IMB) reported a reduction in incidents 
of piracy in East Africa to a level described as ‘its lowest since 2006’.  The opposite case 
happening in West Africa and particularly in Gulf of Guinea where an increase in number of 
pirate attacks was a growing occupational hazard for seafarers (IMB, 2013).  This trend 
gradually changed.  By 2014, some success in international counter-piracy interventions along 
coast of East Africa began to be realised through significant reduction in pirate (Sea, 
March/April 2014, 2).  However, although 2014 piracy data suggested an improved piracy 
situation, a survey by shipping news service Lloyds List that assessed future threats to maritime 
security, portrayed a sceptical view.  Survey established that in 2014, major stakeholders in 
shipping industry still regarded piracy as a significant threat, with 70% of survey sample, 
including ship owners, managers and private security companies, believing that Somalia still 
represented a risk to shipping (Sea, March/April 2014, 2). 
Formulation of strategies to mitigate seriousness of disruptive effects of maritime piracy to 
shipping industry required regular reporting of piracy incidents.  This was important in 
enhancing possibility of informed decision- making by various stakeholders who were 
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responsible for formulating counter-piracy interventions national, regional and international 
levels.  Section 5 below, contains a discussion of this aspect.  Currently two organizations that 
regularly collect and disseminate statistics on maritime piracy include International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) through its Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur and  the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London   
While IMB and ReCAAP relied on self-reporting by ships that suffer attacks or observe 
suspicious activities, IMO on other hand receives reports from member states and “international 
organizations in consultative status” (MTSN, 29/7/10).  Each of these data repositories focuses 
its piracy reports according to its specific information needs, priorities and available resources.  
Thus, an organisation may choose to focus on collecting and recording only piracy data relevant 
to their prioritised need to exclusion of other data.  IMB as focal point for combating all types 
of maritime crime and malpractice gathers information from various investigative sources and 
reports and provides its members with timely advice through a variety of communication 
avenues (ICC IMB source).   
As piracy is a major area of expertise for IMB, in 1992 bureau established Kuala Lumpur-based 
Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) to provide a 24-hour point of contact for ships to report when 
hijacked, attacked or robbed (IMB-PRC Source).  Since then, PRC serves as an in-house piracy 
self-reporting mechanism for IMB, as well as a centralised global repository for ships to report 
suspicious incidents and pirate attacks.  PRC provides an awareness-raising function to all ships 
and to International Maritime Organisation on emerging piracy threats, specific incidents and 
attacks, emerging trends posing a threat to maritime security and locations of high-risk areas.  
Supply of this information assisted various governmental and inter-governmental organisations 
and maritime law enforcement agencies in order for them to better- understand criminal 
activities at sea, so they can make more informed decisions to reduce vulnerability of crew, 
cargo and vessels to threatening situations including piracy (IMB-PRC Source).  
As a free service for seafarers, PRC provides a variety of channels of communication for its 
members to enable them to communicate piracy information in all circumstances.  These 
include a 24-hour helpline, email, telex, fax and a website with an online Piracy/Armed 
Robbery Reporting form.  A sample of Piracy Incident Report form is attached as Appendix 3.  
When a pirate attack was imminent and the Shipmaster would relay this information to PRC 
immediately he became aware of suspicious movements directed towards his ship.  IMB on its 
part carries out its own investigations, and thereafter compiles a detailed piracy incident report.  
However, there is a degree of ambiguity about identification of failed pirate attacks.  For 
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example, initially along the Malacca Straits, fast-RIB boats (Inflatable boats) seen passing close 
to oil tankers were suspected to be pirates. Instead, they found to be smugglers of contraband 
into Iran that sailed close to larger vessels to avoid detection on radar of Iranian authorities.  In 
East Africa, fishermen have also been mistaken for pirates, occasionally with fatal 
consequences (Couper et al, 2015). 
PRC acted as a conduit to disseminate information to all vessels in region where a threat was 
identified.  IMB on its part carries out its own investigations(s), and thereafter compiles a 
detailed piracy incident report.  Information contained in piracy incident report regularly 
published online by IMB, and was circulated as a Piracy/Armed Robbery Report to shipping 
companies.  Based on information gathered on incident(s), IMB compiles regular global pirate 
reports that also highlight flashpoints where there may be an increased risk of pirate attacks.  
A typical piracy report includes the following details:  
 Ports and anchorages with more than three reported incidents (emerging piracy hotspots)  
 Actual attacks, and attempts  
 location of piracy incident (or attempt) in nautical miles 
 Types of violence against crews by location (measured in number of crew members) 
including taken hostage, kidnapped, threatened, assaulted, injured, killed, and missing 
• Types of weapons (guns, knives, other, or not stated) employed – incidents broken down 
by location and number of victim ships –  by country where managed or controlled  
• Types of violence towards crews – by number of crew  
• Types of ships (33 types plus “not stated”) involved – by number of incidents  
• Flag state of ship involved – by number of incidents  
(IMB source)  
Outcome of IMB statistical analysis of piracy incidents is publicised on IMB website   and is 
freely accessible.  Reports   presented in a user-friendly and graphic format often included pie 
charts and bar graphs accompanied by a narrative report.  This documentation of piracy 
accounts that are easy to follow for a layperson not trained in data or crime trend analysis.  Such 
reports provide input for IMB’s real-time alerts, monthly reports, and database of piracy attacks 
worldwide published online on a quarterly basis that also contain narrative trend analyses 
highlighting new areas of concern.  While both ReCAAP and IMB reports are self-generated, 
Fetter, Stowe, & Owings (1984) rightly observed that an examination of quality of data 
collected is a good gauge of good research practice.  Piracy data like all other crime data are 
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sensitive information as piracy investigations often entail victim and witness identity protection 
and screening of information sources.  If this is reason for non-disclosure of raw piracy data by 
IMB, while on one hand it may be justifiable, data (source) protection may introduce data 
discrimination in self-reporting, on other.  
 
2.7     Critiquing Self-Reporting and Under - Reporting of Maritime Piracy 
 
During twentieth century, self-reporting developed as an innovative crime research method 
using specialised techniques to enhance reliability and validity of self-report data.  Cook and 
Campbell (1979) cautioned against wholesome consumption of conclusions based on self-
report data collection and analysis as respondents often provide answers that they think 
investigator wants to hear.  After the release of seafarers from pirate captivity, they were 
interviewed to document their recollections of attack, along with their hostage experiences and 
release.  The details recorded constituted raw data used to populate piracy databases.  Studies 
by Forensic Psychologists revealed that, victims with acute post-traumatic stress disorder “have 
general memory impairment and memory bias, perform worse in recognition memory due to 
impaired concentration, and may allocate their limited attention resources to detection of 
hostility in others in order to avoid being victimized again.  This produces a memory bias for 
perceived hostility even in relatively innocuous everyday interactions with others” (Paunovic, 
et al, 2002).  Thus self-generated piracy reports based on seafarers’ recollections of series of 
events during (attempted) piracy attacks should be treated with caution as their reliability can 
be tenuous (Schacter, 1999).  Furthermore, this is more so since human memory is fallible 
(Schacter, 1999) and that piracy/armed robbery reports were based on piracy victims’ 
recollections. 
As is normal practice with witness testimony, when Captains report piracy incident details to 
PRC, possibility of memory bias raises possibility of inherent bias and variance in piracy data.  
Subsequently piracy data may unintentionally produce a skewed view of piracy and cripple 
statistical analyses of piracy data (Blalock, 1974).  In absence of other piracy data to compare 
with IMO data, it is not possible to assess probability of variance error in current piracy reports 
(Salvucci, Walter, Conley, Fink, & Saba, 1997; Hart & Tomazic, 1999).  Additionally, piracy 
victims may have undergone a series of traumatic experiences during and/or after incident with 
which they then provide information to complete Piracy/Armed Robbery Reporting forms.  
From these forms, piracy reports are thereafter drawn.  However, human memory is fallible 
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(Schacter, 1999) and studies by forensic psychologists have revealed that traumatic events can 
affect retrieval of information concerning distressful events and has capacity to cause localised 
or dissociative amnesia (PsychNEt-UK, 17/7/03).  Therefore, since self-generated piracy 
reports are based on recollection by seafarers of series of events during (attempted) piracy 
attacks, reliability of such reports may sometimes be called into question (Chan, 2000).  In 
addition, there have been reports that some seafarers have been actively discouraged from 
talking about piracy.  Therefore, seafarers' fear of retribution for talking about piracy ('the P 
word') could have   hindered seafarers from reporting (attempted) pirate attacks.  
 
2.7.1 Emergence of Maritime Piracy Literature 
As maritime piracy rose to become a major nuisance to global shipping industry, a number of 
historical studies began to emerge in open sources focusing on piracy and its suppression from 
a tactical and legal perspective.  For instance, results of a literature search carried out by Mueller 
and Adler (1985) pointed to the need for criminological research on maritime crimes.  To this 
end, the report stated that:  
 
“We searched every conceivable library for an assessment of problem of crime 
on seas and for proposed solutions.  Our search yielded many interesting books 
and articles, concerned with individual cases, incidents, epochs, and episodes.  
But world literature is devoid of any book that examines criminality on oceans 
in its entirety…For reasons beyond our comprehension; explanation of crime 
has remained landlocked…  Criminologists have neglected criminality of that 
far greater portion of world called oceans….”  (Mueller and Adler 1985, pp. 
18-19).  
Criminology remains rather non-comparative in its approach and very much centred on 
sovereign nation states (through its connection with criminal law).  This study seeks to use some 
criminological concepts and approaches to explore an area of criminality in transnational 
sphere. 
 
2.8  Impact of Maritime Piracy at Different Levels 
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2.8.1 Industry/Economic Impact  
In last decade, seaborne piracy against merchant ships became a major issue of concern to both 
global shipping industry and global security agencies with significant worldwide losses 
estimated at US $13 to $16 billion per year (Luft & Korin, 2004; Dillon, 2000). While assessing 
effect of piracy on seamless integration of US Marine Corps in global waterborne transportation 
system, US Maritime Administration notes with concern three-fold ripple effect of piracy on 
maritime industry; in that when ships are in hands of pirates this affects the shipping industry 
in different ways, including the disruption of the maritime transport system, interrupting the 
global supply chain, delaying the cargo delivery schedules and endangering the lives of 
merchant mariners (MA, 23/09/10). Furthermore, due to continued heavy reliance on sea 
transport for bulky cargo, the magnitude of loss due to piracy attacks compounded with 
unpredictable nature of attacks threatens global commercial interests.  This makes maritime 
piracy a trend worth investigating, as a matter of urgency, in order to provide empirical evidence 
to facilitate informed decision making on maritime safety worldwide (STRATFOR, 2006). 
 
Evidence of economic impact of piracy on shipping industry was reflected in the sharp increase 
in shipping insurance in last few years.  Different companies provided typical three-fold 
insurance of cargo, ship (hull) and against liability of hazards like collisions with other ships.  
Current confusion over whether to categorize piracy as an act of terrorism or a war-like activity 
is causing problems in determining insurance premiums for ships passing through Gulf of Aden.  
As such, owners are now paying a US $3 million Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) fee, sold to ship 
owners for a single trip through Gulf of Aden.  Other potential costs to ship owner include 
claims by crew of a lack of sufficient security on board during piracy attacks (Amies, 2009).  
high chance of falling prey to pirates while transiting Gulf of Aden, high costs entailed in 
continuing to use same shipping lane and other added costs have prompted or even compelled 
some ships with non-time-critical cargo to take longer southward route, around Cape of Good 
Hope.  This decision entails a financial burden of an additional two to three- week trip (Amies, 
2009).   
Figure 4 below, analyses the trend in ransom premiums paid out in the 2000 to 2010 period. 
This shows a steady but accelerated increase in ransom figures demanded by pirates since start 
of 2009.  Given number of ships hijacked, this showed that average ransom fee was increasing.  
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Figure 4: Cumulative ransom payments in 2009 and 2010 in US$ 
                    Source: EU Naval Force source (EU NAVFOR) 
 
Modern piracy experienced in Eastern Africa is of a different kind from its historical equivalent.  
The ransom paid out to pirates to secure the release of captured crewmembers turned the 
phenomenon into a very lucrative business in which ship’s crew were regarded, and treated by 
pirates as commodities (Beynon and Nichols, 2006).  This element of piracy was previously 
unheard of.  While current literature abounds on current scourge of piracy in Eastern Africa, 
very little of it has focused on victims, a gap this study intends to fill.  On other hand, hostage 
taking disrupts smooth operation of shipping industry.  importance of this is that current 
globalised political economy demands ‘on time’ delivery of goods to supermarket shelves 
around world in a seamless conveyance from manufacturer to consumer in a borderless 
marketplace (Peck and Tikell, 2002; unpredictability in the cargo delivery coupled with 
possibility of falling prey to pirates have created a dilemma for shipping industry.  
However, most of current literature focuses on dramatic activities surrounding piracy attacks, 
astronomical ransom amounts, and anti-piracy mass concentration of highly specialized naval 
patrol ships in East Africa waters and their aerial support.  Despite this show-of-force, piracy 
continued for a number of years with more ships taken hostage and few incidents successfully 
averted.  Reports on actual pirate attacks in the last decade indicated that seafarers were 
subjected to physical, verbal and emotional violence through actual beatings, threats, insults, 
threats with guns, knives, and other weapons, hostage taking, (solitary) confinement, 
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excommunication from each other and from communicating with family members for 
prolonged periods.  Deaths of seafarers have also been recorded either during piracy attack, 
rescue and/or escape attempts and while being held hostage (International Maritime Board 
source).  
 
2.4 Impact of Maritime Piracy on Individuals   
 
As piracy has evolved from isolated incidents to more frequent and successful illegal boarding 
of ships in East Africa, crewmembers working on ships as they pass along coast of East Africa 
are faced with real prospect of a possible pirate attack.  In East Africa, seafarers have often been 
targets of piracy and held hostage as victims of piracy.   
The United Nations Handbook on Justice for Victims defines ‘victims’ broadly as 
 
“Persons who individually, collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial, impairment of 
their fundamental rights through acts or omissions that or violations or omissions 
that are violations of national criminal laws or of internationally recognized 
norms relating to human rights” (UNODCCP:1999, iii). 
Additionally, United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime 
and Abuse of Power through General Assembly resolution 40/34, annex urges the treatment of 
crime victims:  
“……..  with compassion and respect for their dignity and redress for harm they 
have suffered, through access to criminal Justice System, reparation and 
services to assist their recovery” (UNODCCP, 1999, iii). 
Piracy like any other crime has an impact on its victims, and modern piracy is a particularly 
ruthless and violent practice.  As a result, ex-hostages are often too traumatised to talk about 
their ordeal while in hands of pirates.  However, testimony of ex-hostages that trickle into print 
media can give one an inkling of difficult conditions that seafarers endure while being held 
hostage.  Speaking at a piracy seminar in Singapore in 1999, Captain Jayant Abhyankar, and 
Deputy Director of IMB noted dilemma of seafarers, in that: 
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“Truth is that modern piracy…is a violent, ruthless, practice…made more 
fearsome by knowledge on part of victims that they are on their own and 
absolutely defenceless and that no help is waiting just round corner”.  
(Vallar, 2005) 
Seafarers suffer both primary victimization during piracy attacks as well as secondary 
victimization thereafter.  Available piracy victim testimony points to physical and emotional 
trauma they experience individually and as a group due to harm that they were subjected to 
during piracy attacks and while held hostage.  Official piracy reports provided some details on 
encounters between crew and pirates, and indicated that pirates had often fired shots at 
retreating ships in order to compel them to stop or to slow them down to enable their illegal 
boarding.  Act of shooting at ships in itself carried a threat of injury or death to seafarers.  In 
this scenario, crew were, trapped by very nature of maritime environment of their mobile 
workspace, with nowhere to run or to escape from pirates.  
Some reports with more detailed accounts indicated that crew suffered physical pain and 
humiliation while trying to thwart pirates’ attempted illegal boarding of their ship.  Reports 
indicated that when the crew encountered pirates, whether or not they complied with the wishes 
of the attackers, they were beaten, verbally and emotionally abused, threatened, assaulted with 
blows, punches and shoving as pirates asserted their authority when taking command of ship.  
Further information indicated that that psychological abuse included the brandishing of 
weapons like knives, guns, and clubs to enforce the total domination of the crew.  Captured 
crew were kept under guard round clock.  While this research was underway, empirical 
evidence continued to trickle out providing further information detailing humiliation and 
emotional abuse of seafarers held hostage by pirates in East Africa.  These included having 
nails pulled out with pliers, being locked in freezers, punched, pushed, slapped, burned with 
cigarette butts, and being tied up in sun for hours (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013).  
Meanwhile, assistance to seafarers’ families from home governments and shipping companies 
was also reported to be erratic and unreliable.  Captured crew were held captive on board their 
ships.  In some instances, pirates to attack unsuspecting ships further afield used mother ships 
with its crew still detained aboard.  During on board captivity the crew experienced further 
psychological distress as they were forced to perform non-seafaring tasks for their captors for 
whom they were ill prepared.  These included domestic chores like cooking and fishing to 
provide meals for both their captors and themselves when food supplies ran out (Ecoterra, 
2011).  In addition, confidential documents and information made available to me by official 
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law enforcement officials involved in the on-going piracy investigations indicated that material 
forensic evidence collected from hostages on release and on ships on which they were, held 
hostage revealed that pirates had subjected some seafarers to sexual assault during captivity.  
This study considered the possibility that seafarers whose voyages passed along East African 
coast, faced the risk of criminal victimization by pirates.  This required redress within criminal 
justice system for their recovery (Beloof et al, 2010; Beloof, 1999 and Jerin, et al. 2007).   
 
2.9 Responses to Maritime Piracy 
2.9.1 Multiple Discourses on Maritime Piracy Regulation  
(a) International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Maritime Safety 
As the United Nation’s specialised agency charged with responsibility for maritime safety and 
pollution from ships, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) develops and maintains 
the regulatory framework for shipping. The scope covers maritime safety, environmental 
concerns, and legal-technical cooperation primarily through promotion of international treaties 
by its 167 member states including United Nations Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS), 
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, and International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue (ASIL: 2010: 7-Sep-10) 
Strategic counter-piracy measures to address rising threat of piracy in East Africa have included 
international and regional multi-national collaborative agreements, UN resolutions and national 
commitments to respond to phenomenon. While this study was underway, IMO spearheaded 
amendment of relevant international legislative and regulatory instruments to provide a suitable 
framework for international anti-piracy collaborative efforts, especially those in East Africa.  
These efforts included filling legal vacuum in Eastern Africa maritime security through 
adoption of Djibouti Code of Conduct. This multi-national collaborative agreement that came 
into force on the 29th of January 2009, aimed at improving information-sharing and situational 
awareness of maritime piracy among twenty-one countries located adjacent to Indian Ocean. 
Under agreement, signatory countries agreed to engage in collaborative efforts aimed at 
enhancing region’s capabilities to combat piracy and to help small navies and coast guards in 
region for improved maritime safety through a number of mechanisms. These measures 
suggested included combining maritime security personnel to patrol area, establish three 
maritime information sharing centers in region, and link Maritime Situational Awareness 
(MSA), among others (Djibouti Code of Conduct website).   
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Other measures undertaken by international community to counter rising threat of piracy 
included UN Security Council resolutions: 1816, 1838, 1846 and 1851, passed in 2008, which 
also provided an international legal umbrella authorising cooperating states and other Eastern 
Africa anti-piracy patrols and interdictions “to pursue and capture pirates in Somali waters with 
stipulation that consent must first be received from Transitional Federal Government of Somalia 
and that UN Secretary General must be notified” (Middleton, 2009, p. 3). 
IMO also initiated adoption of a policy proposing a strategy by states and maritime industry to 
prevent pirate attacks and other criminal acts of violence against U.S. vessels, persons and 
interests. On 5 October 2008, United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1838[50] 
that sanctioned use of counter-piracy military force to protect ships from pirates in East Africa. 
This UN resolution, in effect, authorized operations inside Somalia’s territorial waters to deny 
area from operating as a safe haven for pirates. In 2007, U.S. President signed a comprehensive 
and sweeping policy governing diplomatic and legal action to fight piracy, and emphasized 
collaborative strategies by states and other maritime sector stakeholders. 
(b) International Labour Organization (ILO)  
 
Using a tripartite consensus system involving governments, ship owners and seafarers, ILO has 
adopted a different regulatory framework from IMO.  ILO Maritime Labour Convention (2006), 
(hereafter referred to as MLC.2006) also referred to as ‘Bill of Rights’ for seafarers was enacted 
to protect working conditions of seafarers regardless of their nationality or flag of their vessel 
(ILO: 2009, 2007).  This bill came into force in August 2013, and was fourth in a series of 
maritime legislation addressing welfare of seafarers.  SOLAS, Marpol and STCW had preceded 
it.  MLC.2006 consolidated 68 existing ILO maritime instruments, which had been 
implemented since 1920 at national level.  On enactment of this convention, it was expected 
that it would provide minimum standards for health, safety and welfare of over 1.2 million 
seafarers serving on 69,000 ships worldwide.  MLC.2006 elaborates on recommended 
guidelines for shipping companies to provide healthcare protection for seafarers, in terms of 
their health protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection.  Convention 
suggests guidelines to ensure that risk assessments and safety meetings make an effort to 
address ‘people issues’.  This study suggests that Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) 
concern issues that affect welfare of seafarers could include addressing psycho-socio support 
for seafarers Sections 4.1 and 4.5 of convention were relevant to my discussion of policy 
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implications of this study, in concluding chapter.  Appendix 4 summarises sections of 
MLC.2006 that are of relevance to this stud  
 
(c) Other International Perspectives and Legislation Provisions   
 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 52/86 of 12 December 1997, in Section V: Victim 
Support and Assistance recommended measures for implementation at national, regional and 
international levels to improve access to justice and fair treatment, restitution, compensation, 
protection and assistance for victims of crime and abuse of power (UNODC, 2006:1).  In 
recognising enormous physical, financial and emotional toll that crime has on its victims, 
United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power (resolution 40/34, annex) further recommended specific assistance that “member states 
should provide for victims of crime including material, medical, psychological and social 
support through governmental, voluntary and local community based means” (UNODC, 
2006:17).  
Unfortunately, as Andersen et al. (2009) noted that the crime of maritime piracy was not tried 
at the International Criminal Court despite steady rise in piracy globally.  In addition, until the 
late 1980s, no law enforcement agency existed to prevent or counter piracy, until the public 
outcry by international shipping fraternity prompted IMO to act (Clark, 2009; Paritt, 1986; 
Beckman, 1999).  In response to increase in piracy attacks off coast of Somalia, in 2006 IMO 
established a Regional Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre at coastal town of Mombasa in 
neighbouring Kenya to provide a rapid response to acts of piracy and accidents at sea (IMO 
Source).  Additional international collaborative counter-piracy efforts initiated include both 
proactive anti-piracy measures and reactive counter piracy measures to deter and combat piracy 
in Gulf of Aden.  Hanson (2010) recorded that by January 2009 over 30 ships from over a dozen 
countries were already deployed as a global naval task force patrolling 2.5 million square miles 
with aerial cover too.  This support was drawn from NATO, United Kingdom, United States, 
France, Russia, China, India and European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) through 
its Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR, 2010). 
In analysing cases of modern piracy and piracy suppression in terms of varying strategic, policy, 
and operational decisions, Elleman et.  al. (2010) suggested adoption of coordinated efforts by 
states and ship owners.  It was further suggested that such an initiative by international 
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community could use a combination of counter-piracy measures to increase their cooperation 
in managing piracy.  Following are some specific practical counter-piracy actions suggested: 
 creation of a global surveillance system for international shipping;  
 Establishment of a mechanism through which ships can alert authorities if attacked; 
 Prompt reporting of piracy alerts to appropriate flag-state and port-state authorities; 
 Enforcement by maritime forces of their legal authority;  
 Enactment of domestic counter-piracy legislation to under which pirates could be tried by 
countries affected by piracy; 
 Regard for naval forces to call upon as weapon of last resort if all aforementioned measures 
failed to bring piracy under control off coast of Somalia. 
 
(d) Regional and National Responses to Piracy in East Africa 
Regional anti-piracy efforts include January 2009 signing of a memorandum of understanding 
between United States and United Kingdom with Kenya permitting handing over to Kenyan 
authorities captured pirates for prosecution using international legislation since Kenya does not 
have in place anti-piracy legislation. In same month, nine East Africa countries signed an 
agreement to cooperate in preventing ship hijackings and apprehending pirates for arrest and 
prosecution. On 10 March 2010 Saudi Arabia signed ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’. As a policing 
and regulatory framework, accord allows one signatory country to send armed forces into 
another signatory country’s territorial waters to pursue pirates. Accord also authorizes conduct 
of joint multi-country anti-piracy operations across national jurisdictions. It outlines a regional 
anti-piracy work plan that, among other things, places upon signatory countries obligation to 
criminalize maritime piracy by enacting appropriate legislation to enable arrest and appropriate 
prosecution of piracy suspects within their jurisdiction. (IMO source, 10/3/2010). 
However, most of signatory countries including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen have extremely limited capacity to deal 
with pirates and code is largely meaningless. However, since Somalia is not party to most of 
relevant international treaties, it does not have any counter-piracy legislation, and lacks a central 
political administrative authority. Somali Transitional Federal Government did concur with 16 
December 2008 UN Security Council “Hot Pursuit” Resolution that allows foreign forces to 
engage in hot pursuit of pirates onto Somali territory - both on land and sea (UNCLOS, 2008; 
UFS, 2009). Punitive measures against pirates in East Africa so far include arrests of 
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(suspected) pirates by forces attached to global naval task force and their trials, which are 
initially mainly in Kenyan courts, but can also be in Netherlands, Germany and United States.  
However, while a minority of arrested pirates have gone on trial, others have been released 
amidst confusion on right of forces to make arrests in Somali waters.  In addition, some who 
have stood trial have claimed that they are trying to stop illegal fishing.  While this study was 
in its infancy, some ship owners suggested that region's governments negotiate right for navies 
to chase pirates across national boundaries in so-called 'right of hot pursuit'.  Initially, Singapore 
and Indonesia were among first countries to negotiate limited rights.  
Although Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia recognised piracy problem, it 
was unable to police its territorial waters to contain piracy.  This inadequacy arose from decades 
of political strife and anarchy that resulted in a political administration that did not have 
complete territorial control.  Thus as piracy spiralled out of control, Transitional Federal 
Government of Somalia lacked political and military legitimacy and was constantly challenged 
by insurgencies.  Legislature (transitional parliament) in Somalia, and its committees shared 
similar jurisdictional challenges with executive.  For a number of years, attempts to restore law 
and order in different parts of Somalia, included customary (clan) leadership and authority 
overlapped with political and military rule, as well as religious radicalisation (UNPOS source).  
Such political polarization over decades of social anarchy resulted in a fragmented and 
weakened security sector that was unable to prevent or combat piracy within its offshore and 
inland jurisdiction.  
Recognising challenge that piracy posed to transitional government of Somalia and regional 
partners, both of whom lacked capacity to counter maritime piracy, United States National 
Security Council (NSC) developed interagency Countering Piracy off Horn of Africa: 
Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute 
piracy off Horn of Africa.  This strategy designed in collaboration with international and 
industry partners, encompassed actions needed to assess and update plans and to enhance 
collaboration among partners involved in countering piracy off Horn of Africa.  Action Plan 
included following capacity-building activities: - 
◊ Providing assistance to several regional countries to develop regional judicial capacity 
through initially creating an assessment tool to identify gaps in regional states’ maritime 
capabilities including judicial capacity; 
◊ Identifying nature and scope of international assistance needed  
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◊ Enhancing capacities of regional states in connection with arrest, detention, prosecution, 
and fair trial of persons accused of involvement in piracy; 
◊ Pursuing bilateral programs to provide judicial capacity-building efforts; 
◊ Providing support to regional partners for development of forensic skills in developing 
piracy cases, evidence collection and transferring piracy cases to Kenya.  
◊ Hosting piracy awareness events specifically targeting law enforcement and judges from 
countries in Horn of Africa region. 
(GOA, 2010) 
As international community increased its efforts to fill law enforcement vacuum, different 
‘target-hardening’ strategies were adopted by shipping countries to thwart pirates' attempts to 
board ships and safeguard the crew.  Such initiatives included early warning systems, placing 
of armed guards on ships as they passed along East African coast, and creation of safety 
corridors for ships along which they were escorted in convoy by naval ships, whose efforts at 
sea were enhanced by air surveillance.  International efforts to deal with piracy included 
deployment along coast of East Africa of a multi-national European Naval force (EU 
NAVFOR), with support from NATO countries (EU NAVFOR source).  As this study ended, 
concerted efforts by this multi-national collaborative initiative code-named Operation Atalanta, 
combined with other strategic and tactical efforts by a number of international, regional and 
national agencies, led to a reduction in number of pirate attacks in East Africa.  However, all 
these counter-piracy efforts focused on keeping ship safe as a target.  Such an approach placed 
less emphasis on the emotional and physical welfare of crew.  This was despite fact that 
seafarers were primary target of ‘kidnap for ransom’ mode of piracy witnessed in East Africa 
during research period. 
 
2.11  ‘Missing link’ in Seafarers' Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) 
Although initial literature searches did not find studies or publications that reflected on 
emergence of piracy as a seafarer occupational risk, as the study progressed studies by reputable 
researchers began trickling into the public domain in which the authors engaged with the threat 
of piracy as a hazard facing crews at sea (Walters and Bailey, 2013, 64).  Some studies have 
identified piracy as a threat to fishermen, citing instances when armed guards on merchant ships 
who confused them for pirates (Couper, et al., 2015, 193) killed innocent fishermen.  Whereas 
OHS of people working on board ships was given insufficient emphasis by industry, research 
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into issues that influence occupational health and safety practices in shipping industry have 
been subject of research interest.  
An earlier study, conducted among top management of shipping companies to assess safety 
culture and attitudes of maritime personnel towards safety, established that managers regarded 
safety as “a value of shipping business” (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009). The variation in values 
that different stakeholders attached to OHS was reflected in the attention that ship management 
paid to various safety-related aspects.  For instance, while charterers in tanker sector go to great 
lengths to influence health and safety outcomes on board vessels that they charter, cargo 
shippers are often more concerned about attention to safety of their cargo than they are with 
health and safety of crew.  This concern was reflected in the relatively greater prioritisation of 
the cleanliness of the cargo hold and cargo-handling equipment, in order to ensure that cargo 
arrives undamaged.  Thus, charterers in container sector make less direct, but positive, efforts 
to influence management of safety regime on board container ships that transport their goods 
(Sampson & Walters, 2013, 99).  Nonetheless, top management of shipping companies that 
participated in study on Safety Culture and Maritime Personnel’s Safety Attitudes stated that 
“safety is a value of shipping business” (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009).   
This   study has sought to establish factors that influence variations in seafarers’ risk perception.  
While recognising efforts by both ILO and IMO in encouraging efforts aimed at providing 
decent working conditions and employment opportunities, this thesis argues that informed 
decision-making to safeguard seafarers’ OHS in their perilous and borderless mobile work place 
requires an accurate and timely articulation of seafarers’ views, together with that of unions and 
employers.  In this regard, this study will attempt to establish whether coping strategies that 
seafarers could rely on to counter their workplace risks do in any way affect how they regard 
‘riskiness’ or ‘non-riskiness’ of their work environment.  
 
2.12     Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter dwelt on the pivotal role of shipping industry in global political economy.  This is 
to show that any issue hampering smooth movement of ships, in turn, affects global supply 
chains.  The emergence of maritime piracy as a seafarer occupational hazard was outlined   from 
literature reviewed, it was apparent that maritime piracy in East Africa has received 
considerable publicity as a threat to seafarer safety.  Estimates of annual incidences of 
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experiences of Somali piracy were rather frail and varied, because of a probable but 
indeterminate degree of under-reporting of crime incidents by crew.  However, it was unlikely 
that more than 44 of one million plus active seafarers in international fleet would have 
experienced piracy in any given year.  Due to moral panic and media’s amplification of risks 
posed by piracy, public perceptions of risk of falling victim to piracy could affect views about 
different seafaring risks.  This, in turn, could result in a variation in risk perception among 
individuals of same profession.  This study represents an attempt to explore variations in risk 
perception among a diverse group of seafarers through mixed methods. 
Four conclusions were deduced from the literature review process reported in this chapter: 
Firstly, that in spite of the growing concern about piracy activities along the busy East Africa 
shipping corridor, maritime piracy was still not included in the list of seafaring occupational 
risks at the time this study was carried out; Secondly, that empirical research that explains 
variations in seafarers’ views about occupational risk was lacking; thirdly, that most of piracy 
reports were for purpose of self-reporting for tactical and strategic decision-making by maritime 
security organisations (therefore data collection instruments could not be validated); and 
fourthly, that seafarers opinions were not included in few self-reports available on pirate 
attacks. This study therefore focused on providing some empirical findings that could contribute 
to understanding of seafarers’ occupational risk perception including their views on piracy, 
which is central issue of this study.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
LITERATURE REVIEW (2): THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS 
   
3.1 Introduction: Generation of the Theoretical Propositions    
The literature presented in this review serves two main purposes: Namely, to provide a broad 
understanding of how the concept of risk was deployed, and developed in different contexts; 
and to emphasize particular literature and the approach used to inform this study.  In addition 
to detailing the current state of debate on risk and in particular risk perception, the chapter 
provides a critical analysis of the work reviewed in a manner that leads to the generation of a 
number of theoretical propositions.  These propositions, in turn, provide a framework to analyse 
the interviewees' diverse views about seafaring occupational risks as presented in Chapter Five. 
It was not feasible to provide a comprehensive and detailed review of the huge body of 
academic work on risk. Rather, the strategy here was to provide a more focused review of a 
sample relevant studies that could help shape the theoretical propositions that would provide a 
framework for the later empirical analysis.  
While laying out the range of research literature that helped to establish the thematic framework 
that was applied in this empirical study, the chapter reports on key works and studies reviewed.  
These included literature on risk, risk perception, Cultural Theory of Risk and Subjective 
Immunity.  The ideas presented on seafarer occupational risk perception were shaped largely 
by empirical research findings by researchers from the Seafarers International Research Centre 
(SIRC).  These studies have helped to develop a number of theoretical propositions that then 
guided the analysis and interpretation of the empirical data relating to seafarers’ perceptions of 
a range of occupational risks, including that posed by maritime piracy.  The decision to come 
up with clear theoretical propositions prior to the data analysis phase of this study was helpful 
in three main ways: Firstly, it enabled the identification of the main concepts that this study was 
anchored, and that were relevant to this study.  Secondly, the theoretical propositions guided 
the selection of appropriate data analysis methods that were used in subsequent chapters as 
safeguards against arriving at incorrect conclusions.  Thirdly, focusing on a few main ideas was 
helpful at this point in the study in guiding the thinking of areas in which this study could 
generate meaningful findings that could bring a new understanding to seafarer occupational risk 
perception (Smyth, 2004).   
There is a wide body of literature on the topic of risk, which adopts different approaches and is 
utilised in different disciplines.  In this chapter, attention was first drawn to the contested nature 
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of the concept of risk.  Thereafter, the epistemological bases that underpin much of these 
differences in approach are discussed. The broad substantive debates within the risk literature 
are also presented. These include risk management, risk society, cultural theory of risk, before 
introducing the literature on risk perception that provides the conceptual framework for this 
study. 
  
3.2 The contested nature of risk  
 
Risk is a contested issue and theoretical concept (Kemshall, 2010, 218).  It has been associated 
with different meanings in different contexts and has evolved over time (Adams, 2014).  The 
terms risk and ‘hazard’ are used interchangeably.  Use of the term risk in maritime contexts has 
a longer history than in land-based contexts.  Sociological theorists associate the beginnings of 
the use of the term risk with the practice of maritime insurance, to denote natural disasters that 
could befall vessels during the voyage.  At that point in time, these ‘risks’ during sea voyages 
were construed as “possibilities of objective danger, an act of God, a force majeure, a tempest 
or peril at sea that could not be attributed to wrongful human conduct” (Luhmann, 1993, in 
Lupton, 1999, 5).  In the middle Ages before national, regional and international governance, 
structures were  put into place, individuals and communities faced a plethora of both natural 
and man - made hazards (Muchembled, 1985, 22).  Local communities faced violence and 
reminders of adversity as part of the daily life from witnessing public punishment of 
lawbreakers, epidemics, banditry, violence, wars and natural disasters. Although society was 
buffered against adversity by a sense of community and religion, in the absence of formal 
mechanisms for mitigating against these prevailing dangers, life, in general, was precarious 
with many uncertainties (Gerard and Petley, 2013, p. 1051).  In that historical context, the 
prevailing sense of insecurity was attributed to the inability to deal with, contain and prevent 
danger.  This general sense of insecurity made it a risky society (Gerard and Petley, 2013, 1065) 
with many threats to safety and wellbeing. 
 
A more recent, and widely accepted, account of risk is that provided by anthropologist Mary 
Douglas who stated that risk could be regarded as the perceived probability of an event 
occurring that could lead to great losses or gains (Douglas 1970; 1990, 2).  Such an event or 
occurrence was linked to a resulting effect.  A ‘hazard’, is a situation brought about by an event 
that carries a negative connotation as it was understood to have the potential of bringing about 
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a harmful effect on people and things of value.  The consequences are often unknown but 
thought to be adverse, including, physical or emotional injury, loss of life, and damage to 
property etc. (Kates & Kaperson, 1983).  This is the understanding of risk adopted in this study.   
 
3.3 Epistemological bases underpinning approaches to Risk  
 
Broadly, speaking three broad epistemological positions were adopted in conceptualizing risk.  
These include the Realist Position, the Weak Constructionist Position and the Strong 
Constructionist Position (Lupton, 1999, 17).  One of these epistemological positions underpins 
contemporary debates on risk.  The Realist position views risk as an objective threat, hazard or 
danger that exists, and that could be quantified, measured and managed through appropriate 
risk management strategies/policies (El-Karim, et al., 2017, 202).  Such mechanisms aim at 
identifying problem areas associated with a relatively higher probability of risk exposure, 
occurrence and transfer, and control of the risk factors by incorporating risk, danger, hazard as 
a factor within the project planning algorithm (Smith, 1999, 7).  The formula excludes social 
processes.  “It is also commonly applied in technical scientific perspectives applied in various 
contexts including to analyse the notion of danger, and in the engineering, statistics, 
epidemiology, economics and statistics disciplines” (Lupton, 1999, 17).  In addition, cognitive 
scientific theories such as the science of judgement and decisionmaking  based on this 
epistemological position have emerged as a multidisciplinary approach to analysing risk and 
uncertainty from the perspectives of law, medicine, economics, and business.  This latter 
approach heralded with high esteem as evidenced by the award of Nobel peace prizes to the 
work of some of its major proponents including Maurice Allais, Herbert Simon, and Daniel 
Kahneman (Reyna and Rivers, 2008, 3). 
 
Foucault (1988) uses the term risk to denote a strategy, a plan and a way of reasoning used to 
regulate power in neo-liberal Anglophone countries, and expounded a Strong Constructionist 
position associated with his notion of Governmentality.  Proponents of this concept argue that 
nothing is a risk in itself, but rather what is referred to as risk, is actually “a way of seeing, 
analysing and governing the perceived danger of some unfortunate events” by problematizing 
and calculating it (Ewald, 1991, 199).  These two tasks are facilitated by a diverse and 
interconnected network of (expert) actors and institutions with specialised knowledge and 
practice this network monitored, regulated and managed individuals within a population who 
functioned as sources of information used to understand risk factors.  The population was linked 
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through their cultural milieu, physical geography and significant life events (Foucault, 1991, 
93).  Foucauldian perspective regarded risk as a ‘moral technology’ (Lupton, 1999, 87) through 
which demographic assessments were made through the lens of Governmentality.  This in turn 
yields a classification of social groups and populations into either those who are ‘at risk’, or 
‘high risk’ and thus warranting empowerment through knowledge and interventions to mitigate 
risk, and discipline future (Ewald, 1991, 215).  A Strong Constructionist epistemological 
position underpins how risk is rationalised in the fields of insurance, public health and other 
government policy and practice.  
 
 By contrast, a Weak Constructionist position regards risk as an objective threat; a hazard was 
best interpreted within the context of its social and cultural processes.  This perspective explains 
risk from two points of view: (1) Firstly, in relation to the structural processes of late modernity 
(2) Secondly, within cultural/symbolic perspectives or functional structuralism.  The former 
point of view analyses risk as an evolving social construct with a symbiotic relationship to 
social processes.  A well-known approach based on this position includes the work of ‘Risk 
Society’ exponents Ulrick Beck (1992; 1999) and Anthony Giddens (1990; 1991).  Their views 
focused on “how risk is generated from socio-cultural changes, how this change is dealt with at 
a macro-structural level of society, the political implications for this, and the social conflicts 
that arise” (Lupton, 1999, 73 -81).  Mary Douglas, on the other hand, concentrated her work on 
a cultural/symbolic approach emphasizing the socio-cultural nature of risk.  She argued that 
prevailing socio-cultural processes wherein, risk functions as a measure of symbolic boundary 
and a lens through which some dangers were regarded with greater concern than others 
influence the meaning attached to the notion of risk.  Section 3.4 of this chapter contains a 
detailed explanation of Douglas' (1970) concept of Cultural Theory of Risk.  Psychodynamics 
and some psychological theories and schools of thought were also based on the Weak 
Constructionist epistemological position. 
 
In contemporary society, threats to security are understood to have changed as the impetus to 
control life's challenges has led to advances in the medical, science and technology fields.  The 
establishment of formal law and order, national security, hazard management and public health 
agencies have complimented this progress.  These efforts have led to a better understanding of 
the threats faced by previous generations, and an overall improvement in the quality of life.  
While this has facilitated the devising of equipment and strategies to mitigate modern threats, it 
has not eliminated the dangers faced by current generations.  Current threats include factors 
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emanating from more globalised security threats, increases in the frequency and array of 
hazardous events, migration, rapid scientific and technological advances, public health 
challenges, law and order, information explosion through the emergence of the World Wide 
Web, among others.  Thus, as human societies evolve, the meaning and use of the term risk has 
been synchronized to suit the context. 
 
The last two centuries saw a change in the nature of societal threats and this was reflected in the 
changing meaning attached to the term risk.  In order to deal with social changes and the ripple 
effects of mass urbanization, industrialization and the industrial revolution, risk became 
quantified.  This was made possible by the application of the science of probability and statistics, 
to calculate the norm and identify deviations from the norm as a means towards rationalizing, 
counting and controlling disorder” (Hacking, 1990, 16).  Thus, the term risk was used to explain 
probability estimates of a known or knowable event.  When the estimation of such probabilities 
was not feasible then the phrase ‘uncertainties’ was used as a substitute.  The insurance industry 
applied the understanding of the risk using new mathematical ideas gave risk a scientific twist 
to provide a modern understanding of risk.  This new meaning entailed a new way of viewing 
the world in which nothing was a risk in itself, and risks did not only originate in physical nature 
but also in human beings as well.  This new understanding of risk gave way to it becoming the 
central juridical definition of insurance.  While to date, risk remains the fundamental element 
of insurance, and insurance is a technology of risk through which certain elements of reality are 
rationalised, broken down, rearranged to give rise to both good and bad ‘risks’ (Ewald 1993; 
199). 
 
3.4 Substantive debates within Risk Literature 
 
In recent decades, risk has become a topic that is hard to ignore as it has become an increasingly 
- important to politicians and policymakers who have sought a better understanding of risk, its 
application and its implications in different contexts.  This interest, in turn generated multiple 
meanings of risk as it was applied in different contexts and disciplines.  Other factors that have 
given a new impetus to the study of the concept of risk includes a politicization of the term 
arising from the globalization of security threats, new and life-threatening medical conditions, 
migration, genetic modification of crops, risky sports, pollution, economic speculation, among 
others.  Unfortunately, cost-benefit analyses led to the application of the concept of risk being 
mainly to negative, undesirable outcomes while potentially positive and profitable outcomes are 
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often ignored.  Instead, negative outcomes are usually emphasized on most occasions, and 
subsequently, when the term risk was used in lay peoples' language, it tended to have a negative 
connotation associated with a negative outcome such as a threat, a hazard or other harmful 
effects.  With time, the use of the terms risk, uncertainty and hazard were used interchangeably 
indicate a possibility of “deviations from the norm, misfortune and frightening events” (Lupton, 
1999, 3). 
 
Major social changes including globalization, migration, modernization and post-modernization 
have transformed communities and the context in which meanings were ascribed to the notion 
of risk.  These social changes have given rise to new identities, a breakdown of (traditional) 
norms, traditions, the social fabric, and the formation of new social relationships.  It has been 
suggested that this fast-evolving social milieu has brought with it greater uncertainty, 
complexity, ambivalence, disorder, distrust of social institutions and traditional authorities in 
ways that have led to a growing sense of insecurity.  Social theorists Mary Douglas, Ulrich Beck 
and Anthony Giddens expounded on risk in modern sociological views about risk by illuming 
the link between social change, and risk.  Section 3.4 of this chapter covers Douglas’ Cultural 
Theory of Risk in the discussion of perception of risk.  
 
Beck's (1992) work was important in pointing out the main difference between modern ‘risks' 
faced in modern society and the dangers that society faced in the past.  He portrayed modern 
risks are as a continuation of the industrial (capitalist) society by showing three main 
characteristics of risk in modern times.  Firstly, modern risks were invisible and was located 
industrial/class modernity operating in the spheres of physics and chemistry industrial 
production processes.  Secondly, the distribution of ‘risks’ is orchestrated by big corporations 
who use the media to structure knowledge (research and power) to perpetuate a risk modernity.  
Thirdly, that science and technology are out of control and threatens alienation, death and 
destruction as ‘risks' with the capacity to jeopardise all forms of life on earth (Caplan, 2000, 3).  
Beck also highlighted the advent of a new global order in the distribution of bad ‘risks' is 
deliberately planned to affect some people more than it does other people.  He illustrated this 
point by singling out the practice of transferring risks associated with hazardous industrial waste 
away from developed countries to the Third World.  He, however, pointed out that the global 
nature of the world environment put the whole world at risk because environmental harms have 
the capacity to spread worldwide indiscriminately.  Beck suggested the formation of the ‘World 
Risk Society’ as a global, transnational, interconnected and interdependent Cosmopolitan 
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Society as a global strategic collaborative network and mutually beneficial mechanism and 
discussion platform where representatives from both industrialised and developing countries 
could engage in discussions to avert a global ecological crisis.  According to Beck, this 
impending environmental disaster was characterised by five inter-linked processes including 
underemployment, gender revolution, individualisation, globalization and global ‘risks' such as 
ecological crises and the crash of the global markets (Beck, 1992 [1986], 3).  He proposed a 
reorganisation of power and authority as a means of addressing and mitigating risk in the World 
Risk Society'.  He also advocated the expansion of the scope for debates on ‘risks' beyond the 
field of natural sciences to include social scientist as well.  Wildavsky reacted to Beck’s views 
with optimism pointing out positive contributions that science and technology had made to 
humanity.  Evidence presented to back this claim included economic growth, technological 
advances spurred on by economic growth, dramatic improvements in health, increases in 
longevity and a decrease in sickness" (Wildavsky, 1991). 
 
Giddens (1991) shared Beck’s view that the world had entered a new phase of ‘late’ or ‘high 
modernity’ in which risk was a central scenario.  Giddens saw modernity as a risk culture in 
which the concept of risk is fundamental to the way lay actors and specialists organise the social 
world.  Like Beck, Giddens argued on the role of the media in increasing people’s awareness of 
risks.  He explained that an understanding of the pivotal role of risk could illuminate the 
following core elements of modernity: its apocalyptic nature through which it introduces new 
risks that previous generations had not faced; globalised impact of local events; the paradox of 
a reduction in life-threatening events erstwhile, high consequence risks resulting from 
globalization.  Giddens explained that in a shift in how risk scenarios were viewed has occurred 
in late modernity.  Whereby, instead of contemporary life being determined by the past, the 
future was predicted in risk scenarios.  This perception that risk is a part of normal life influences 
the choices people make at present, and this, in turn, influences how people make life's choices.  
In viewing and accepting risks as an integral feature of late modernity and choose possible future 
actions by anticipating outcomes (Giddens, 1991, 108).  
 
Having discussed the evolution of risk, the different epistemological positions and the main 
approaches to understanding risk, the discussion will now focus on risk perception which is the 
approach adopted in this study.  Risk perception has been regarded in multiple ways by 
sociologists, psychologists and anthropologists. The following section describes some of the 
approaches to risk perception applicable this current study. 
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3.5      Risk Perception 
 
The focus of this research is Risk Perception.  How people understand risk and the responses 
to hazards that they encounter is informed by socially and culturally structured conceptions and 
evaluations about the world, of what the world looks like and what (in their view) it should, or 
should not be (Boholm, 1998, 135). Risk Perception denotes an individual's response(s) to the 
uncertainty of the impact of an activity and an anticipation of negative consequences (Eiser, 
2004, 32). In seeking to establish what people mean when they say that a situation is risky 
consideration was given of how people think about and respond to perceived hazards in their 
environment. The process through which an individual  decides that a situation is ‘risky’ showed 
that individuals assess the information that they perceive from prevailing circumstances using 
their five senses, before concluding whether there was a chance that an action(s) or decision(s) 
could result in adverse consequences (Slovik, 1987, 281). 
  
Further studies have shown that in this sensory perception, there was a tendency of people 
arriving at conclusions that overestimated the number of deaths from infrequent causes/fatal 
events such as tornadoes, aeroplane crashes, and infectious disease epidemics, and 
underestimate the deaths from frequent and unspectacular causes such as cancer and diabetes 
(The Royal Society, 1992, 99). Additional studies focusing on the psychological aspects of risk 
perception indicated that fatalities from dramatic types of activities accompanied by vivid 
images often judged probable or more frequent because they are encoded in the memory and 
are easily recalled (Johnson and Tversky, 1983, 7).   
 
Earlier gender-focused cross-national comparative risk perception studies involving both male 
and female subjects in Japan, America, Bulgaria and Romania, indicated that there were 
differences in sensitivity to environmental and technology-related risks between men and 
women (Sjöberg et al. 1996; Kleinhesselink and Rosa, 1994) This view suggested that women 
tended to express higher concern over risks from technology and threats to the environment; 
this was attributed to women’s  physical vulnerability child-bearing and child-raising 
responsibilities that make women more concerned about health and safety and a relatively- more 
sensitive disposition to hazards in general than men. Flynn et al. (1994) refuted this view and 
substantiated their response with findings from a gender and ethnicity-focused risk perception 
study, in which she established that both gender and ethnicity as factors for consideration for 
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their potential to influence one’s regard for environmental risks to one’s health (Flynn, et al, 
1994). However, gender differential in risk perception remained a contentious issue. Flynn also 
noted that socio-cultural characteristics influenced how individuals of different genders 
perceived of risk.  Her study also singled out better education, higher income, holding more 
politically conservative views, having a greater trust in government, authority and industry as 
specific factors that reduced the level of apprehension towards risks.  
 
Additional enquiries on risk perception from non-psychological perspectives have generated 
multiple perspectives on risk and various proactive approaches to risk assessment. As a result, 
both qualitative and quantitative inter-disciplinary approaches towards the scrutiny of risk had 
emerged seeking to unravel the factors underlying risk perception in different contexts. This 
proliferation of cross-disciplinary risk initiatives has given rise to the emergence of specialist 
risk disciplines that cross-pollinate by drawing from multiple disciplines and different bodies of 
knowledge. Notable examples of this new impetus are evident in the field of public health, 
engineering, toxicology, biostatistics, actuarial science and the social sciences, among others.  
These efforts continue to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of risk.  The 
evolving multi-disciplinary trend towards the conceptualisation risk was reflected the following 
observation by Pidgeon (1992), who notes that: 
 
 “The field of risk perception research today involves a far more diverse group 
of research specialities together with theoretical and empirical foundations, 
not all of which take the individual as a basic unit of analysis" (The Royal 
Society Study Group, 1992, 98).  
 
 While appreciating this healthy and multi-disciplinary discourse on risk, in my current study 
has focused on ‘risks’ within the general maritime geographical environment, and occupational 
risk-perception within the work environment context of seafarers.  In developing the risk 
thematic lens for my research, my perspective was informed by a critical appraisal of the claims, 
context, methodology and evidence provided by a selection of pioneering works that theorise 
the concept of risk and ‘occupational risk perception' in different settings.  These include: 
Cultural Theory of Risk pioneered by Mary Douglas; Occupational Risk Perception developed 
by Rayner in expounding on Douglas’ initial thoughts; the concept of ‘Subjective Immunity’ 
elaborated on by The Royal Society Study Group (1992); the Social Amplification of Risk ideas 
developed by Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones; and two Seafarer ‘risk perception’ studies carried 
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out by Bailey et.  al. (2006; 2007).  The decision to focus on these studies was motivated by two 
main reasons. Firstly, because of the ideas propounded in these studies on risk, the dynamics of 
occupational risk culture, the variations in occupational risk behaviour, and its implications for 
a socially bonded professional group were relevant to the epistemological, ontological and 
sociological context of my study. Secondly, although these studies made claims and provided 
evidence obtained through rigorous research methodology, the context in which the studies were 
conducted, and the methods used differ from mine. While Douglas, Rayner, Risk Society and 
SIRC studies were conducted in the 20th century, in western (European and North American) 
geographical regions, and, largely on land-based populations, (apart from the SIRC studies), my 
study was carried out in the 21st century on a multi-national professional group, working in a 
mobile maritime work environment. Based on these different research contexts, a thematic 
proposition developed for this study borrowed from their initial ideas that were then applied in 
a different historical, geographical and methodological context.  
 
3.6 Cultural Theory of Risk  
 
The Cultural Theory of Risk provided a framework for analysing how groups in society 
interpret danger, and the process through which they subsequently either build trust or mistrust 
in the social institutions created to regulate risk.  This theory stated that how risk was viewed 
and the level of concern about its potential effects, could influence in three ways: (1) Risk-
mitigating precautions taken in anticipation of the event (2) Steps taken in the event of the 
occurrence happening, and (3) Potential impact of its perceived consequences on the individual 
or group of people.  Mary Douglas developed the Cultural Theory of Risk in the 1960s by 
focusing on the notions of ‘group' and ‘grid' as the cornerstones for the theory through an 
anthropological perspective. Whereas the ‘group' referred to the degree to which an individual 
is integrated into a bonded group, and group affiliation is maintained through adherence to its 
regulations, the ‘grid’ indicated the degree to which the whole group demanded adherence to a 
set of rules of conduct to signal loyalty. Douglas maintained that societal organisations could 
maintain “high grid” cultural way of life, characterised by demanding and durable forms of 
stratification in roles and authority and “low grid” ordering. Thus, whereas the group regulates 
its members’ roles through imposing of rules and regulations, individuals accept varying 
amounts of control exerted by the group. This was reflected in the individuals negotiating for 
their roles within the group. Douglas explained that competing structures of social organisation, 
cultural ways of life and affiliated outlooks could be characterized within and across all 
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societies at all times, through roles defined along a collectively controlled “group” and socially 
stratified “grid” (Douglas, 1970).   
 
Douglas conceptualised cultural risk theory as British colonial rule ended, and social 
anthropologists attempted to prove that the colonised people were intelligent (Douglas, n.d). A 
literature search seeking to obtain evidence of an empirical undertaking by Douglas that could 
have informed her observations that gave birth to the Cultural Theory of Risk bore no fruit.  
Therefore, this study concluded that Cultural Theory of Risk was primarily a conceptual piece 
of innovative work by Douglas. She concretised her initial ideas developed in response to her 
observations of the emerging enclave culture that limited external social interactions and 
influences beyond the boundaries of the group, but left individual freedoms within the group 
unregulated.  While recognising the pivotal role of Douglas' pioneering work on the generating 
a novel idea in the twentieth-century theory of cultural risk, this study acknowledges the 
contribution of Douglas' theory to other fields.  For instance, other theorists have already 
adopted the basic ‘group' and ‘grid' components of the Cultural Theory of Risk of risk, to 
matters related to risk perception in other disciplines.  These include the fields of political 
science, public policy (Thompson, et. al. 1999), public management (Swedlow, 2002), 
organizational studies, law (Kahan et al, 2006), and sustainability (Thompson, 2011). However, 
this theory was yet to be applied to the context of the twenty-first century in general, and 
specifically, to investigating the socio-cultural realities of a modern stratified seafarer sample.  
 
3.7       The Royal Society Study Group on Risk and ‘Subjective Immunity'  
   
The construction of the conceptual framework for this study, was partly informed by a critically 
assessment of the claims, evidence, context and methods used in a 1992 report published about 
risk perception, by The Royal Society Study Group, hereafter referred to as ‘The Royal 
Society’. The report discussed reasons underlying the variations in risk perception by people 
drawn from a range of occupations and different geographic regions.  Since risk is a socially 
constructed phenomenon, people perceive of risks differently, and subsequently, responses to 
hazards may vary, depending on a number of factors. These may include a combination of 
emotion, how well (or not) one comprehends their situation/circumstances, how much 
discretion one is allowed in negotiating the risks that one is exposed to, how much information 
one has about the potential effects of exposure to the risk(s) in question, and previous 
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experiences (The Royal Society, 1992). Additionally, what is regarded as a ‘high-risk' by one 
person or group, may be considered of a relatively-lower risk by another person or group of 
people. The latter may opt either to adopt risk-avoidance or risk-taking.  While comparing 
human perceptions to risk with that of non-humans to elaborate on her initial ideas on the notion 
of ‘Subjective Immunity', Douglas (1985) observed that people may downplay the risk of bad 
outcomes from very familiar activities, and therefore, may underestimate the risks that they are 
supposed to keep under control.   
 The Royal Society (1992) further developed Douglas’ notion of ‘Subjective Immunity’ to 
explain the inherent variations in risk perception among groups of people, across different 
geographical regions. While acknowledging that risks are conditional and are implied by the 
context to which they pertain, The Royal Society also stated that occupational hazards are 
perceived of in various ways depending on the specific workplace circumstances. Furthermore, 
each profession has inherent risks that are specific to the working conditions and activities 
entailed by employees’ engagement in work activities. The report claims that the perception of 
occupational risk among different professional groups also differs across different industries, 
geographic regions, countries, professions and industries.  
 The report further shows that due to variations in risk perception among individuals, within 
groups, across occupations, and across geographic regions, the views held by employees about 
the dangers that they face in their workplace, could be regarded as being subjective 
observations. This is because, each person’s age, nationality, cultural background and work 
experience influence the lens through which their opinions are formed. In addition, the social 
environment, values, and attitudes, all provide a social milieu in which the one’s worldview is 
socially constructed. Therefore, the variation in occupational risk perception both at the 
individual and group level could be because of several factors at play.  This, in turn, raises the 
issue about the criteria applied to gauge what is ‘risky' or not and the level of ‘riskiness'. 
The possibility that different yardsticks were used to assess levels of risk both among 
individuals from the same occupation, and across professional groups makes it difficult to 
ascertain whether the same criteria were being applied as the basis for risk estimation, even 
within the same occupational sub-groups (The Royal Society Study Group, 1992, 77).  For 
instance, concerning the factors by which the riskiness of an activity is assessed in sporting 
activities, medical procedures and modes of transport, the report states that the yardstick may 
be the athlete's age, employment history and profession, respectively.   
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The Royal Society report, therefore, suggested, that some measures for harmonising the 
‘heterogeneity of risk' in different types of activities could be used as criteria for assessing 
reasonable claims about specific occupational risks. While stating that the risk of death from 
medical procedures varies according to conventional procedures, the report clarifies that such 
estimates should be analysed over a period, by different patient groups and by groups of 
different sizes, for an objective assessment of the risk in medical procedures to be observed. 
The report also found that although motorcyclists faced a risk that was more than ten times 
higher than that faced by car drivers, “motorcyclists behave in ways that project more relaxed 
definitions of what is safe and what is unsafe” (The Royal Society, 1992, 77). 
In examining the claims made by The Royal Society, this study looked for the evidence to back 
the claims, the context of the study, and how these could combine to influence their conclusions 
about the challenges in ascertaining the basis for variations in risk perception within groups, 
across occupations and across geographic regions. Although the study provides a 
comprehensive coverage of risk assessment and perception informed by individuals from 
different disciplines, the evidence base for this study is unclear. The report was not implicit 
about the basis for the contributors' views; whether their view about risk perception documented 
in the report was based on a professional opinion or previous empirical research or from desk-
based literature searches, or a combination of any of these sources of information. The lack of 
clarity on the evidence base for the report's claims illuminates a gap in the information provided 
by the method of inquiry employed in the report. Lack of information about the methodology 
could have a direct bearing on the data collection and analysis method used to arrive at the 
stated conclusions. Therefore, it was not possible to verify the claims made in this report.   
3.8 The Seafaring Work Environment 
 
Ships are a mobile-built environment that constitutes a workplace for the crew designed to 
enhance their efficiency as functional spaces for the storage of the commodities being 
transported, as living quarters and recreation areas for the crew, and as workspaces where 
seafarers carry out their respective duties on the ship.  Empirical studies have identified the 
design of the ship as a major factor that can greatly affect the quality of the working life of the 
crew in a number of ways.  The ship layout had the capacity to influence the amount and quality 
of sleep, the space available for recreation and the level of noise that the crew were exposed to, 
while on duty as well as off-duty (Ellis, et al, 2012, 9).   
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In general, seafarers are exposed to a number of work-related risks that have potentially harmful 
physical and psychological effects. This section describes the challenges inherent within the 
work environment in which the seafarer professional group earn a living. This is the backdrop 
against which my interviewees’ views about their occupation that will be analysed in 
subsequent chapters. The mobile seafarer workplace has a number of man-made risk factors as 
well as those attributed to nature. These factors are explained in order to inform the reader about 
the spectrum of seafarer occupational risks, and to illustrate how the increase in incidents of 
maritime piracy in East Africa between 2000 and 2010 adds to an already-long list of potentially 
harmful factors in the seafarers’ work environment.  
As mentioned in the literature review, the OHS of the ship’s crew has been a neglected area 
(Bailey and Walters, 2013).  While working on board ships is risky and highly-demanding 
(Sampson 2013), in the absence of the appropriate safeguards to mitigate these dangers, these 
issues further precipitate the vulnerability of crew to a number of potentially harmful 
circumstances in their mobile workspace.  Some noteworthy occupational hazards that create 
risk factors to which seafarers are exposed include inadequate provision of occupational health 
and safety measures (Sadler, 1983) and the psycho-socio ripple effects in the seafarer’s private 
life, arising from working in an offshore mobile workplace, separated from their socio-cultural 
support systems, and disconnected from family relationships (Couper, 1999; Osnin, et al., 
2004).  Dangers arising from natural calamities include storms, hurricanes and resultant 
shipwrecks, technical problems and accidents (Listewnik, et al., 2007, Loginovsky, 2002; 
Lloyds, 2008).  
Additional common seafarer workplace hazards include negligent employers (Whittaker, 1996, 
3), crew abandonment overseas (Rankin, 1996, 1), and sub-standard working conditions (Parlak 
and Engin, 2003) and the resultant industrial accidents, including injuries on board (Couper, 
1996, 35). This study noted that a number of other common predicaments facing seafarers and 
that could be linked to poor OHS regimes had been identified.  Seafarer occupational risks 
already identified by other studies  include the following: fatigue (Folkard & Lombardi, 2005; 
Folkard, Lombardi & Tucker, 2005; Gatfield, et al, 2005; Majid, 2008; Smith et al, 2002; 2003; 
2006; 2007), diseases contracted ashore and/or transmitted on board (Kowalski, 1991; Saarni, 
2002; Santos, 2009; Scerbaviciene & Pilipavicius, 1999; Schlaich et al, 2009; Shoda et al, 
2001), pirate attacks, mechanical failures (Cheek, 1986; Chapman, 1992), prolonged separation 
from family members (Foster & Cacioppe 1986; Tang 2007a; 2007b; 2009),  psychological 
hazards (Leka, 2004), work-related stress (Leszczyńska, et al., 2008), and drug abuse (SPL, 
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2008), and casualties (Barnett, 2005; Shapovalov, 1991) that often result in fatalities (Larsson, 
et al. 1992).  
In addition to these challenges, Belcher et al. (2003) reported that women seafarers have to 
make additional adjustments to fit into a male-dominated seafarer working environment 
(Kitada, 2009), a challenge that has been attributed to the generally gender-skewed seafarer 
occupational profile (Shiptalk, 2008). While a convergence of multiple conditions on individual 
seafarers is common, these have been found to affect their workplace productivity (Folkard & 
Tucker 2003; Lamvik, 2001) occasionally making them accident–prone in the workplace 
(Loginovsky, 2002; Shapovalov, 1992; Salyga, J. & R. Malakauskiene, 2007).  
While conducting this study, the criminalisation of seafarers began to surface yet another issue 
of growing concern to the seafarers themselves, as well as for human rights organisations (Puri, 
n.d.; Seafarers Rights International, 2011).  Workplace conditions, forces of nature, piracy and 
the criminalisation of seafarers combine together to impinge on the rights of seafarers to be safe 
in a diverse and global workspace.  For instance, when seafarers are prosecuted abroad for 
offences such as marine pollution in lieu of absent owner/operators, the crew remain a 
vulnerable group in need of legal support and protection when dealing with public authorities 
in seeking ways of improving their working conditions (Kirby, 2011), as well as when the 
occasion arises that they participate in criminal justice proceedings either as a victim or as a 
witness.  
In addition, seafarers could be regarded as an isolated workforce. In this respect, Lane and 
Smith (2011) provide some empirical evidence from the study of merchant mariners and 
fishermen in which they referred “ships as jails”. Their study confirmed that the following 
structural changes and work conditions were contributing factors towards creating a challenging 
mobile maritime work environment, which included the: 
“Ship design, short port-turnaround time, decreased ship manning levels, 
shift patterns, poor health and safety conditions and the nature of work on 
ships culminate in increasing fatigue among seafarers” (Lane and Smith, 
2011).  
 
In this study attempted to provide an understanding of the social interactions and work life on 
ships as adjustments seafarers make to adapt to their work environment.  The crew are 
susceptible to multiple risk factors including two types of isolation - geographical and social. 
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Seafarers spend much of their contractual period offshore due to the nature of their work, remain 
geospatially, and physically far-removed from land-based activities and social interactions for 
extended periods.  They also experience emotional detachment while on board; for due to 
unstructured leave periods, seafarers are often unable to form lasting social bonds and long-
term friendships with colleagues (Chapman, 1992). The bonds formed while on a voyage may 
well remain limited to on-board acquaintances" (Thomas, 2003). 
Further studies have identified an association between these negative work environmental 
factors and symptoms of fatigue and perceptions of risk to personal safety, by deck and engineer 
officers working on ferries, offshore support, supply or standby vessels, as well as tankers 
(Smith et al., 2006). These aspects of the seafarer work environment could have an impact on 
how the crew view their occupational risks. In this section, the seafaring risks inherent in the 
maritime work environment have been described in detail, to portray the variety of inherent 
dangers that characterise the realities of the seafaring work environment from which the sample 
was drawn.  
This discussion dwells on the potential influence on seafarers’ safety outlook, of the ship as a 
continuous work and living space occupied by the crew for much of their contractual period.  
Being confined to such a limited space for a long time at a go, could conjure fear in any normal 
person due to the availability of multiple hazards, and the combined effect of their convergence 
on the lives of seafarers. This overview of the seafarer workspace was also intended to provide 
a glimpse into the reality of the ship as a workspace, where seafarers interact with the same 
group of individuals who provide a limited social circle for prolonged periods while at sea until 
crew changes are affected. The physical and social isolation of seafarers, their restricted 
movement to the perimeter of the ship and the behavioural adaptations that crew make as career 
adjustments have been discussed here, as some of the characteristics of a hazardous mobile 
work environment. 
 
3.9 Brief Overview of Structural Changes in the Global Shipping Industry   
 
The few decades preceding this study, the shipping industry underwent major structural, 
organisational, labour market and regulatory “upheavals” (Alderton et al, 2004), including the 
growth of Flags of Convenience (FOC), casualization of labour, outsourcing of crew through 
crewing agencies, and the multi-national composition of crew, sourced mainly from Asia and 
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the Far East. Ships fly the flag of the country in which they are registered.  FOC is a business 
law practice in the shipping industry that allows the registration of a merchant ship in a different 
country from that of the ship-owner.  Some ship owners opted to register their vessels in 
countries that had less-stringent crewing and safety requirements, and as a result, they imposed 
fewer financial and administrative burdens on the ship-owner, than those imposed by other ship 
owners.   
Seafarers working as contract migrant labourers (Chan, 2006) within a globalised political 
economy (Gilpin, 2001) are vulnerable to the practice of FOC, due to the inadequate 
enforcement of occupational health and safety regulations (Walters and Bailey, 2013). Some 
authors have regarded the FOC development as a ‘social-mediation’ for ship owners to commit 
‘organisational/corporate crimes’ by abetting the provision of sub-standard working conditions 
that enhance risk of harm at the workplace (Hills, 1987). Furthermore, while seafaring as a 
profession by its very nature possesses inherent occupational hazards the FOC lack the moral 
will to abide by health and safety regulations. Laxity in the enforcement of workplace health 
and safety regulations could lead to work-related fatalities and/or injuries (Tombs and Whyte, 
2008).  
At the time this study was conducted, the responsibility for the enforcement of seafarers’ health 
and safety on board ships was shifting from Flag State Control to Port State Control (PSC) 
authorities. Port State Control Officers(PCSOs) are responsible for inspecting foreign ships that 
dock in their ports, to ensure compliance with the requirements of international conventions, 
such as International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974  (SOLAS), International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships  (MARPOL), International Convention 
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW), and the 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC.2006) . In a study to assess the effectiveness of health 
and safety governance in a global industry, Bloor et al. (2006) established that there were 
inconsistencies in the PSC Inspection practices. They also found that there were differences in 
the level of meticulousness with which PSCOs conducted inspections impacted on the level of 
compliance with seafarers’ health, welfare and labour standards globally (Bloor et al., 2006). 
In this study, it was observed that PCSOs in some countries did not conduct thorough 
inspections, while others were relatively-more diligent in identifying deficiencies in the safety 
equipment on board ships. Thus, the inconsistencies in the thoroughness with which PSC 
inspections are conducted varied from one country to another, as well as from one port to 
another. This study highlighted how the variations in the “regulatory character” pose a 
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challenge to the application of health and safety standards by international governing 
organisations.   
In drawing attention to the impact on seafarers’ rights and Occupational Health and Safety 
(OHS) and labour relations, critics, including the International Transport Workers' Federation, 
have been critical of the laxity in Port State Control, accusing it of creating an enabling 
environment for the reduction in ship operation costs through the payment of low wages, and 
enforcing long working hours in unsafe working conditions (Working, 1999; ITF, 2010; MTD, 
2010). However, it is worth noting that some FOC provide good legal oversight. However, the 
practice of registering ships under FOC has been abused by ship owners to maximise their 
economic benefit and to circumvent internationally-stipulated occupational health and safety 
regulations (International Commission on Shipping, 2000, 15), which in effect can result in sub-
standard working conditions that compromise the wellbeing of crew working on their ships, 
while remaining legally anonymous protected by the flag state’s civil ensign (De Kleer, 2007, 
37; ICFTU et al., 2002, 7; Bernaert, 2006, 104; Hamzah, 2004, 4).  
While cognizant of the inherent weaknesses of FOC in meeting their international obligations 
to prioritising the protection of seafarers’ welfare in the wake of the maritime piracy crisis, 
various stakeholders continue to mobilise support and resources towards enhancing maritime 
security worldwide. It is inappropriate that ship owners in FOC, as business entities would put 
seafarers at risk by not having in place adequate facilities and services to reduce risks to their 
health and safety (Tombs & Whyte, 2007). Informed decision-making to enhance the protection 
of seafarers’ welfare worldwide in their perilous and borderless mobile workplace requires the 
accurate and timely articulation of seafarers’ views, together with those of the unions and 
employers. In view of the apparently elusive evidence on maritime piracy from seafarers on its 
impact on their welfare, the recent establishment of the Seafarers’ Rights International provides 
an appropriate research and analysis mechanism for collecting information on seafarers’ legal 
concerns and the subsequent formulation of strategies to help seafarers prepare for, and 
overcome, the effects of maritime piracy, among other occupational health and safety issues 
that have the potential to affect their welfare and that of their families (ITF, 2010b). In view of 
the danger posed by the upsurge in piracy in East Africa and the potential of harm to seafarers, 
suggestions have been made for ‘danger pay’ for sailors working in Somali waters (Linnington, 
2005). It is therefore important to consider some perceptions of risk.  
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3.10 Seafarer Occupational Risk Perception 
 
In order to link the discussion on occupational risk perception with the social context of the 
study, the findings from a sample of empirical studies on risk were critically-examined.  The 
studies included those conducted by researchers based at the Seafarers International Research 
Centre (SIRC) hereafter referred to as SIRC ‘risk studies’, as well as more recent studies on 
seafarer risk perception related seafarer behaviour and health. These empirical studies were 
found to be of relevance to this study in as far as they documented key findings that explained 
variations in seafarer risk perception at different times and in different settings. These studies 
established that there were variations in how seafarers perceived of the hazards in their mobile 
work environment, and this was reflected in the choices that they make.  
 
The nature of seafaring work invariably entails long periods of separation from their families.  
An empirical study to gauge the HIV risk perception and its influence on the sexual behaviour 
of 197 seafarers working on nine ships and twenty-six land-based office employees of an Italian 
shipping company, found that a high number of seafarers exposed themselves to risky sexual 
behaviour even though they knew that such behaviour pre-disposed them to HIV infection and 
despite their awareness of the risk of HIV transmission (Grappasonni, et al. 2011, 131).  
 
A different study on risk perception and safety among Norwegian offshore personnel who had 
already experienced an accident, a correlation was observed between the experience of danger 
and the involvement in accidents and near misses. The study showed that seafarers, who felt 
least safe, also experienced the highest level of job-stress (Bye and Lamvik, 2007, 1756).  This 
study suggested that both accidents and risk perception might be internally independent effect 
variables.  This relationship explained was being due to both accident and risk perception, and 
to being an effect of organizational, social, and physical factors such as for example job stress 
and workload.  Due to the significant correlation between risk perception and risk behaviour, 
the author asserted that: “when people feel 
 at risk are at risk”.  The study concluded that the measure of subjective risk perception in an 
organization was, in fact, a good measure of the formal estimated level of safety as well. 
 
A more recent quantitative study by Oltedal and Wadsworth (2010) examined whether risk 
perception was an indicator of shipboard safety. Data were derived from a survey carried out in 
2006, where 1262 questionnaires were collected from 76 vessels. Explorative factor analyses 
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were used to extract factors of safety culture and an Analysis of variance was used to assess the 
associations between the safety cultural factors and demographic and organizational variables. 
Finally, linear regression analysis was carried out to assess the association between risk 
perception and safety culture, controlling for the influence of demographic and organizational 
variables such as age, department, vessel type and nature of work. The study identified safety-
oriented shipboard management style, performance of proactive working practices, teamwork 
and good reporting practices as major factors that contribute to a better perception of shipboard 
safety. Whereas, a high demand for efficiency contributed to a more negative perception of the 
safety level. The study recommended a further examination of characteristics and influences on 
teamwork on perception of safety, to provide a better understanding of risk perception and 
safety at sea.  
 
Another study in First in the series of SIRC Occupational Risk Perception studies (‘risk 
studies’) comprised of a two-part report published by Bailey et al. in 2006 and 2007 to document 
the findings of an empirical study conducted in the year 2006. The study set out to investigate 
the perception of the risk of two categories of threats within the maritime work environment, 
namely, ship casualty and personal injury.  These two studies were selected from a 
consideration of three key factors: First, the rigour with which the studies were conducted.  
Second, how transparently the researchers’ claims were supported by evidence. Thirdly, the 
similarity between the target group in both studies and the maritime context of these two studies 
and this current study.  Both these studies were quantitative in nature and investigated the views 
of a sample of 2,372 seafarers and ship managers hailing from 50 countries. The 2006 study 
presented the findings of the risk of ship casualty. It set out to determine whether seafarers’ 
perception of risk is in any way influenced by their rank, work department, experience in the 
industry, experience in the company, type of ship on which they had most recently been 
employed and their nationality. The study was based on a questionnaire survey. The 
questionnaires contained closed questions, and the responses were quantified and analysed 
using SPSS. From the study, three main claims were made that are relevant to the study: (1) the 
majority of seafarers and managers regarded the likelihood of a ship-level accident occurring 
in their company as low.  (2) A significant minority saw the likely occurrence of such an 
incident as medium or high. (3) Certain ships were regarded as susceptible to readily 
identifiable risks, for instance, collision. Table 4 below summarises the factors identified as 
possible influences on the perception of the likely occurrence of specific hazards: 
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Incident type Factors 
Fire Nationality, most recent ship type worked on 
Explosion Nationality, rank 
Collision with another ship Nationality, most recent ship type worked on 
Sinking Nationality, rank and most recent ship type worked 
on 
Grounding Nationality, rank 
Contact with a fixed structure Nationality, rank and most recent ship type worked 
on 
Table 4: Factors influencing perceptions of the likely occurrence of each incident   type 
Source: Bailey et al. (2006, 41)  
 
The study on which the 2007 report was based was carried out to find out the opinions of those 
who work on board ships about risk and safety. Data was collected using a questionnaire. The 
responses gathered concerned the views of those working on ships, about the risk of personal 
injury when carrying out specific tasks and how risky it was at certain moments and within 
particular contexts. In this study, the researchers wanted to ascertain whether there were any 
similarities or differences in the perceptions of the danger posed by injury, from a culturally 
diverse research sample of 2,372 seafarers from 50 countries. The diverse outlooks generated 
were in turn assessed to establish whether the variability was associated with rank, department, 
nationality, experience or age. This study provided the following three main research 
observations of relevance to this study.  Firstly, that there were some significant differences in 
the perception of the risk of personal injury, with regard to the levels of risk associated with 
different work activities, at different times of the day and involving a range of factors including 
experiences in the last ship type worked on.  Secondly, that seafarers’ views about the possibility 
of injury while working at their own company, varied by nationality and rank.  Thirdly, the 
variation in occupational risk perception could have a significant impact on behaviour (Bailey 
et al., 2007, 14). 
 
The study identified nationality, rank, department, age and type of ship, as the principal factors 
that influenced risk perception among the seafarers interviewed, with nationality being the one 
most significant factor in relation to the perception of the risk of injury at different times and in 
different contexts.  The findings of this study were corroborated in later study (Bailey, 2009, 
20).  The latter study also identified the work department as a factor of influence.  The variation 
observed in the respondents’ views about the risks associated with different work activities, 
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showed a link between the respondents’ nationalities, and the hazards that they were most 
worried about.  This level of concern is reflected in the assigning of a higher rank to certain 
factors by respondents with similar nationalities on ships with both multi-national and single-
nationality crew composition (Sampson, et al. 2007).  For instance, the respondents from India 
appeared to rank higher than other nationalities, working under the influence of alcohol or drugs 
while carrying our mooring operations and tasks are undertaken over-side. Chinese respondents 
rated the risk of injury highest, while respondents from the Philippines rated it their least 
concern (Bailey et al., 2007, 9).  Respondents from The Netherlands, Philippines and China, 
ranked working in a hot environment as the one factor with the greatest potential to cause of 
injury, while respondents from the United Kingdom and India regarded slips, trips and falls as 
the most likely potential cause of injury.   
 
The last ship type worked on was also found to influence the trend observed in the respondents’ 
views about the level of risk posed by specific hazards. For instance, the seafarers who had 
recent experiences on dry cargo vessels associated moving vehicles with a higher risk than other 
vessels. Similarly, those who had recent experience of bulk carriers were more likely to regard 
rough weather, mechanical breakdown, piracy and moving vehicles as risk-prone. While those 
who had recently worked on tankers were more likely to view mooring operations as being 
more-risky than others (Bailey et al, 2007, 66). Regarding the association between the 
respondents’ position within the on-board hierarchy, the department in which they worked and 
their ranking of different risk factors, the study found that senior officers identified rough 
weather, as posing the highest risk, while junior officers, deck department staff and engineers, 
regarded mooring operations as the one risk about which they were most concerned.  Ratings, 
on the other hand, were of the opinion that times of mechanical breakdown posed the greatest 
threat to their safety.   
 
The study was unable to explain the association between age and low-risk perception in both 
younger seafarers as well as the more senior respondents. Instead, this SIRC study contemplated 
the possibility that the relatively low concern by the younger respondents could be attributed to 
their relatively-less training and exposure to seafaring risks than their senior colleagues. The 
researchers further speculated that perhaps the relatively longer work experience and exposure 
to a wider array of seafaring risks over time could have resulted in their familiarity with their 
work environment hazards and a blurring of their risk perception. The study suggested that the 
variation in occupational risk perception could have a significant impact on behaviour (Bailey 
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et al., 2007, 14).  It also acknowledged the complexity of explaining variations in seafarer risk 
perception and recommended it as a topic warranting further examination. This SIRC study 
provided useful ideas relevant to the current research. 
 
Further SIRC ’risk studies’ conducted to explain the variations in seafarer risk perception 
further, identified an array of factors stemming from seafarer employment policies and 
conditions and on board relationships. Studies carried out by Bhattacharya (2007; 2009), and 
that undertaken by Sampson and Wu (2007), established the existence of links between 
seafarers’ risk perception and the precarious nature of seafarers’ jobs.  This association was 
attributed to two reasons: (1) Seafarers’ fear of losing their jobs due to their vulnerable position 
in a labour market that offered them only temporary and short-term employment contracts, and 
(2) Gloomy local labour market conditions in their home countries.  Although the employees 
had a low trust in the work environment, they focus was on retaining their jobs. On board 
seafarer social relationships including the leadership style, the occasionally-intimidating and 
distinctly hierarchical superior-subordinate relationship between crew members on was also 
identified as a matter of concern that affected both communication among seafarers, as well as 
how they regarded the ‘riskiness’ of their job (Sampson & Wu, 2007, 148; Bhattacharya, 2007, 
172). Employer policies and practices were considered important influence on seafarer 
perception of risk in the absence of organisational support.  
A comparison of the risk perception levels across the maritime industry indicated that 
differences in seafarer views about the ‘riskiness’ of the seafarer work environment varied from 
one individual to another, and also between different groups of seafarers.  In this regard, a 
quantitative SIRC ‘risk study’ conducted by Bailey (2007), observed that there was a significant 
difference in the seafarer risk perception between three groups of people working in the 
maritime industry - ship managers, ships officers and ratings.  Bailey used available ship-level 
incident data for the 2000 to 2005 period from seven different maritime administrations in an 
attempt to validate the reliability of seafarers’ risk perceptions.  A comparison of the risk 
perception levels of seafarers across the maritime industry, to actual incident data, showed that 
more seafarers and managers did not perceive it likely that someone in their company would 
experience a ship-level event.  
An analysis of the managers' perceived likelihood of an on board incident, coincided with actual 
incident data.  The study concluded that the perceived likelihood of a ship-level event was 
influenced by the level of awareness about incident data, the sense of control and fear of 
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consequences of events, the organizational setting and social values emanating from the cultural 
background and nationality of the sample of ship managers and shipboard staff included in this 
study sample.  This study further suggested that the differences in perception of risk between 
the managers and shipboard staff, resulted from a greater awareness of actual incident statistics 
by managers and that this information provided them with a global perspective on the risk levels 
of the company fleet.  These key findings are of relevance to this research. 
A closer look at the evidence base for the conclusions arrived at in the SIRC 'risk studies', found 
the findings to be credible because salient indicators of the maritime industry sub-culture were 
used to interrogate the quantitative data collected.  The earlier study regarded the respondents’ 
outlook on a range of issues related to the maritime industry as significant.  This was significant 
to this study as the research target group worked in a global industry that continued to 
experience a convergence of major structural changes.  These upheavals could potentially affect 
the views of the respondents in this current study.  Aspects directly relevant to the current study 
include the attitudes of managerial staff towards safety, information and communication about 
their workplace risks, equipment maintenance, training, International Safety Management rules 
and the psycho-socio support systems established by the management in the maritime industry. 
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CHAPTER FOUR    
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter outlined the process followed to generate the four thematic propositions 
used in this study.  The formulation of each of the four propositions was influenced by ideas 
gleaned from some earlier researches that attempted to explain variations in occupational risk 
perception in other social contexts and professions, including within the maritime industry.  
These studies were picked for they clearly highlighted the existence of specific links between 
occupational risk perception and key employee characteristics. These included age, nationality, 
position in the workplace hierarchy, the length of work experience and the occupational 
subculture.  In the course of the discussion of test results, the rationale for the tests carried out 
and the grouping of the interviewees' ranks within the seafaring on-board work environment is 
explained in detail. This briefly illuminated specific aspects of relevance to this study that might 
not be obvious to readers from outside of the shipping industry.  Such details are only included 
where a wider audience of the facts considered them necessary for enhancing the consumption 
established in the data analysis Chapter (5). 
This current chapter outlines the various data collection stages and provides the rationale behind 
the decisions made before, during and after the data collection and preliminary data analysis 
processes.  These different procedures combined to inform the choice of a fieldwork site, the 
research sample, the preparation of the data collection instrument and the interview process as 
well. Each data collection stage discussed in detail provided the reader with a flavour of the 
research setting and communication process that yielded the data discussed in subsequent 
chapters.  This chapter sets out the key research aims and objectives of the study and provides 
a discussion and justification of the research design that was developed to address them.  In 
particular, it discusses issues of research design, the particular research methods used within 
this, the approach to sampling, data analysis, and also the ethical challenges raised by the 
research. 
 
4.2 The Research: Goal, Objectives and Research Questions 
This study sought to analyse the trend of maritime piracy off the coast of East African between 
2000 and 2010, and its impact on the welfare of seafarers.  The project was undertaken with a 
view to making an original empirical and conceptual contribution to understanding the 
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variations in occupational risk perception among a sample of seafarers.  With that goal in mind, 
this study set out to harness the views of the crew working on ships in the international fleet 
about seafarer risk perception.  The study was conducted towards the following Research 
Objectives: 
1. To identify, describe and analyse the variations   levels of occupational risk perception   
among a diverse sample of forty-four seafarers; 
2. To explain the factors that influence variations in the levels of seafarer risk perception  
3. To examine issues within the seafarer work experience underpinning variations in the 
interviewees’ concern about the risk of pirate attack; 
4. To explore the suitability of vignettes as a research tool in a phenomenological research 
on ship crew, as a hard-to-reach target group in their mobile workspace. 
These research questions arose from issues that emerged in the literature review and that were 
designed to make the research experience interesting, relevant, feasible, ethical, concise and 
answerable, as recommended by Green (2000).  While contemplating the scope of the research 
questions, it was decided to let the questions guide the formulation of research methods, by 
focusing attention on the specific research concerns raised in the literature review (De Vos & 
van Zyl, 1998, 267; Nghonyama, 2005, 17). These included the fear of maritime piracy and the 
perception of piracy as a seafarer occupational risk. In addition, the methods chosen were to 
facilitate a collection of responses that would attempt to answer the research questions, 
including expanding the research focus if the need arose during the study. This study sought to 
find out what the seafarers thought about maritime piracy, their levels of experience with piracy 
and how they rate piracy relative to other occupational risks. 
 4.3 Research Design 
The literature review highlighted a gap in academic literature on seafarers' perceptions of the 
threat of pirate attack as an occupational hazard.  By adopting a phenomenological research 
approach, this study based the understanding of variations in seafarer risk perception on the 
interviewees' subjective perceptions derived from their lived experiences in a maritime work 
environment.  The central focus of this study was the detailed responses that I gathered from 
interviewing forty-four seafarers to try to answer the following research questions: - 
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(a) What are the variations in levels of seafarer occupational risk perception within the 
sample?   
(b) What are the issues that influence variations in the levels of seafarer risk perception? 
(c) How can the dynamics of the seafarer work experience explain variations in concern 
about the risk of pirate attack?  
(d) To what extent are vignettes a suitable empirical research instrument in a 
phenomenological research on seafarers as a hard-to-reach target group in their mobile 
workspace? 
The data were analysed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. This study presented 
an attempt to explain the variations in seafarer risk perception in general, and specifically, the 
risk of pirate attack.  In attempting to do so, the researcher hoped to gain more experience and 
confidence in building a multi-level and persuasive argument, while reflecting on the 
complexity of the mobile seafaring research setting (Devine & Heath, 2009). This study adopted 
a phenomenological research approach to unravel and explain seafarers' occupational risk 
perceptions from their own perspective without being blinkered by theory busy port any 
preconceptions.  
Based on the epistemological paradigm of personal knowledge and subjectivity, 
phenomenology focuses on studying the individual's experiences from their standpoint, and not 
through any theoretical lens or pre-conceived ideas (Lester, 1999, 1).  This study was prompted 
by the absence of seafarers' views in earlier studies. This study had sought to amplify the elusive 
seafarer ‘voices'.  Thus, the personal perspectives and interpretations of the interviewees were 
the central focus throughout this study.  The idea to adopt an emergent research design was 
borrowed from the work of Holstein and Gubrium (1995) from a Constructionist point of view, 
provided access to the diverse worldviews of a sample of seafarers about their occupational 
risks.  These subjective perceptions of ‘risk' were social - constructed within a maritime and 
mobile workspace reputed for its hazardous nature. 
Due to the constraints of time, financial resources and access, the data collection and methods 
of analysis were tailored to accommodate what was considered feasible. Therefore, in the 
research design, the study took the pragmatic approach advocated by Hoshmand (2003) and 
decided to use the semi-structured interview method for it gives a fuller picture of the maritime 
piracy impact phenomenon under study, which would be the case if closed questions were asked 
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(Bryman, 1998, 2004; Fielding and Schreier, 2001; Kelle, 2001; Mason, 2002a). As I had no 
prior seafaring experience, the inclusion of two vignettes within the semi-structured interview 
guide provided an opportunity for me to get a broad picture of the piracy-related challenges. 
The answers to the vignettes, therefore, represented each interviewee's story, depicting piracy-
related experiences of seafarers. 
4.4 Potential Research Fieldwork Sites 
During this empirical study, the primary data collection involved administering face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews with ship crewmembers at a  seafarer mission centre, located at a 
busy port in the United Kingdom Before the fieldwork site of choice was picked, a desk-based 
preliminary assessment was carried to consider alternative viable avenues for collecting views 
of seafarers. The research target group was seafarers in active service, i.e. as a professional 
group. Therefore, consideration of the fieldwork site's suitability was a key step in the research 
methodology planning, because seafarers spend most of their working lives at sea in a mobile 
workspace. A reliable site on land was needed to provide regular access to ship crew from a 
variety of cultural backgrounds, ranks, trades and who worked on a variety of ships.  
 
This study was carried out as part of an academic programme in which time limitation was 
another serious obstacle. Prior knowledge of the limited time available to carry out the whole 
research process, combined with information regarding the mobile seafarer work environment, 
determined a relatively accurate prediction of the availability of a large number of seafarers as 
interviewees during the six-month data collection phase. Possible avenues for recruiting 
potential interviewees were also considered. For instance, initially the possibility of using a 
newly established online seafarer social networking site was considered as one possible way of 
facilitating contact with off-duty seafarers while they were online either offshore and/or on 
board offshore accessing the Internet, or ashore while on leave, or off-duty ashore.  I then 
monitored traffic to this seafarer chat room for four weeks to assess its suitability as a research 
interview forum.  After the site was considered unsuitable for the study,  the possibility of 
collecting data through face-to-face interactions at the mission sites was regarded as a more 
feasible alternative. This would locate the interviews in a social space ashore where ship crew 
spend some off-duty time pursuing leisure activities, as their ships are loaded and unloaded.  
 
The decision to settle on the seafarer mission centres as the preferred fieldwork site for 
contacting seafarers, four inherent common values guiding both this study and the core business 
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of the fieldwork site: guarantee of the researcher’s safety seafarer welfare service targeted 
activities; an environment that was suitable for conducting interviews; the availability of many 
potential interviewees.  For over a century, a global network of seafarer mission stations has 
provided officially recognised recreational facilities for ship crews. These missions are 
managed collaboratively by a number of organisations whose core focus is to provide seafarer 
welfare services. Consideration of alternative fieldwork sites was guided by the goal of this 
research and the core business of the seafarer missions as serving our mutual interest. 
Seafarer mission centres are located in ports along official shipping routes and most shipping 
companies and port officials know the services that they provide. Therefore, when ships dock 
in ports, ship crew have the opportunity to briefly step out of their mobile workplace as they 
come ashore to access port-based facilities and other land-based services. In such locations 
conducting face-to-face interviews with seafarers was possible without the need to board ships, 
or having to request the permission of their employers. It was important that potential 
interviewees be given the freedom to express their views about maritime piracy freely   out of 
earshot of their employers and thus free of any perceived or potential intimidation from their 
employers.  
In the year preceding the data collection, I evaluated the potential risk to my safety at four 
potential fieldwork sites by means of a preliminary desk-based SWOT analysis. The result of 
the SWOT Analysis is displayed in Appendix 5.  The site selected was discussed with the 
research supervisors focusing on the suitability of each site for finding a number of potential 
seafarers, while considering any potential risks to researcher safety at each site both in the short 
and long-term, was an important factor in informing the fieldwork site selection. Finally, a 
seafarer mission centre was selected as the most suitable fieldwork site.  It was located at a busy 
port in the United Kingdom as a suitable fieldwork site and data collection access was 
subsequently authorised.  
  4.5 Research Target Group 
The research interviewees were seafarers, who, at the time of this study, were working on ships 
in the international shipping fleet, and who spent a significant proportion of their contractual 
period offshore. Therefore, meeting them ashore for a face-to-face research interview would be 
potentially problematical. Typically, the professional activities of the crew are conducted on 
board ships (Gilpin, 2001). Most seafarers in this context are contracted migrant labourers 
(Chan, 2006) whose tenure of service may begin and end anywhere in the world. By regarding 
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the seafarers as the primary source of information, the research was undertaken from a 
professional seafarer occupational context within a globalised maritime industry undergoing 
major structural, organisational, labour market and regulatory developments (Alderton et al, 
2004). 
In focusing on ship crew, I viewed piracy as one of a number of occupational hazards with the 
potential to affect the welfare of seafarers. Piracy could pose a significant threat to their safety, 
specifically in relation to being harmed and/or being taken hostage in the event of a pirate attack 
(Burnett, 2002). By focusing research data collection on eliciting from individual seafarers their 
perspectives of the impact of piracy, and fear thereof, this research intends to provide a sample 
of ship crew with an opportunity to share their direct perceptions on piracy as a potential 
occupational hazard (Olsson, 2007). Through the dissemination of the final thesis, I hope that 
seafarers would be able to contribute their views towards improvements in occupational health 
and safety policies so that piracy could be included in the list of possible modern-day seafarer 
occupational hazards (Walters et al., 2002). 
 
4.6 Data Collection   
4.6.1 Sampling Technique 
A heterogeneous sample of seafarers was used in this study to ensure that the range of sample 
characteristics was broadly generalizable. The sample contained interviewees representing 
different cadres, ranks, and cultural backgrounds all with varying durations of work experience 
on a variety of ships in the international fleet. The decision to use a culturally and professionally 
balanced sample was made to ensure that the data collected during the interviews reflected a 
wide range of seafarers’ perspectives on their perceptions of maritime piracy in East Africa. 
Using a cold-contacting method, I met potential interviewees at the fieldwork site. The sample 
comprised of one female and forty-three male seafarers. A   disaggregation of the sample 
characteristics is presented later in this chapter as a preliminary account to be followed by a 
more detailed data analysis in next chapter.   
Since no up-to-date global seafarer labour force database was available at the time this study 
was undertaken, and because the shipping industry was undergoing a number of major structural 
changes described in the previous chapter, no sampling frame was available that could be used 
as a reference point in ensuring the representativeness of the sample selected. Instead, the 
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sample was constituted on a quota basis using the SIRC 2008 Global Labour Market for 
Seafarers (GLMS) study and the 2010 BIMCO/ISF Manpower Update, as reference points 
(Ellis & Sampson, 2008; ITF, 2010).  
The seafarer workforce profile generated by both these earlier studies provided a 
comprehensive description of the characteristics of the global seafarer workforce. This included 
the ranks, ship types, ages and nationalities of seafarers working on the global cargo fleet in 
2008. The ranks included Officers and Ratings, working in four departments on 3969 ships 
consisting of tankers and dry cargo ships in the international fleet. The four departments were 
Deck, Engine, Catering and Combined Deck and Engine. The study further established that 
70% of the seafarers were nationals of ten countries, namely the Philippines, Russia, India, 
Ukraine, China, Turkey, Indonesia, Poland, Greece and Myanmar. Other nationalities 
represented in the workforce included those from Germany, South Korea, Romania, Taiwan, 
Norway, Denmark, Latvia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia (Ellis & Sampson, 2003; 
Winchester et al. 2006). Since both BIMCO and SIRC have a reputation for rigorous research 
pertaining to the welfare of seafarers, and with relevance to the shipping industry, the databases 
were regarded as being a reliable reference in aligning the sample to the then known 
characteristics of the global seafarer workforce.   
Using data from the SIRC study, a sample was sought that would consist of seafarers with 
diverse ranks and nationalities, similar to the general seafarer population. The ranks within the 
sample encompassed ‘Officers' and ‘Ratings' working in the international shipping fleet but 
excluded crew working in national fleets, so as to maintain uniformity in the global spatial 
seafaring working environment of the whole sample. To ensure the cultural diversity of the 
sample and ease of sample selection, seafarer nationalities were grouped together into the 
following three geographical regions: 
a) South East Asian: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, etc.   
b) Europe & Others: Africa, Arabia, Caribbean, Greece, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and Western 
Europe  
c) Far East: The Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Taiwan, South Korea,  etc. 
The sampling parameters that were observed in this study made it possible to contact a sample 
of seafarers that closely resembled the estimated global seafarer work force, who worked on an 
estimated 53,000 ships at the time this study was undertaken.  
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4.6.2 The Fieldwork Process 
After obtaining access to the fieldwork site at a seafarer mission centre in the United Kingdom, 
I embarked on data collection. On a typical fieldwork day, I would approach potential seafarer 
interviewees at the mission centre during their leisure time, while they were ashore during 
stopover periods. Changes in the shipping industry in recent decades have included the 
mechanisation of port operations, shorter port turn-around times and intensification of labour. 
Thus, the crew have shorter rest periods while in port, when their ships are being loaded and/or 
off-loaded. Therefore, the location of the mission within the ports provided an invaluable 
service to seafarers. Crewmembers visit the mission centres while off-duty, in order to buy 
presents, change money, send money to their families, check email, Skype and/or visit nearby 
urban centres to socialise for a few hours. This temporary social interaction ashore enables the 
crew to widen their social circle briefly, by mingling with a variety of people, thus breaking the 
monotony of their limited on-board circle comprising fellow crewmembers. 
Before the commencement of the practical field visits to interview seafarers, the ship movement 
schedule posted on the port website was examined to facilitate an understanding of the ship 
arrival and departure schedules ahead of time. This step made it possible to estimate the number 
of potential interviewees who might be available on a given day, based upon the ships' size, 
cargo and duration in port calculated on the basis of the arrival time, and whether cargo would 
be loaded and/or offloaded in port, the type of cargo, the weather forecast, and the time when a 
pilot had been booked to guide the ship out of port on departure.  
Typically, cargo handling is carried out in dry weather conditions, in order to preserve the 
quality of produce. The latter three factors had to into account given the unpredictability of 
ships' departure schedules, as wet weather could slow down the offloading of agricultural 
produce, which could lead to an increase in the duration of the stopover. Since there are no crew 
changes at this port, these factors proved to be an important indicator of how long the ship 
would remain in port and of the availability of potential research interviewees among those who 
would visit the Seafarer Mission during their leisure time. 
During the data collection exercise, it was observed that a considerable proportion of the ships 
that called at the port were car-carriers.  Thus mid-way into the fieldwork period, when the 
number and frequency of ships decrease for a few weeks, I considered the possibility that the 
port may have been experiencing a delayed ripple-effect of the Japanese Tsunami that had 
occurred a few months earlier and which could have explained a reduction in the export of cars 
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made in Japan. This reduction in ship numbers to the port, in turn, slowed down the data 
collection process significantly for about a month, as there were fewer potential interviewees. 
Nonetheless, on average, I had two to three successful data collection days in any given week. 
On any given day between five and ten potential seafarers would visit the mission centre for 
varying lengths of time, while I was on hand to contact them. Activities included shopping, 
exchanging foreign currency, using Internet facilities, and playing pool or musical instruments. 
Thus, the mission provided a highly conducive atmosphere for conducting interviews.  
Sampling and the recruitment of interviewees is an essential part of the empirical research 
process as was the responsibility of identifying suitable interviewees in the seafarer mission 
research setting. Adopting a pragmatic sample recruitment procedure included initiating 
conversations with all eligible and potential interviewees, whom I was meeting for the first 
time. While prioritising the seafarers' rights to recreation space within the centre, I sought clues 
to assess each seafarer's suitability as a potential interviewee. Personal demeanour, such as 
idleness after completion of financial transactions at the centre and/or having a relatively 
relaxed appearance after using the Internet facilities, were found to be positive indicators of the 
likelihood of the seafarer's willingness to participate in the study.  
Although the majority of crew who were approached agreed to be interviewed, a small minority 
of potential interviewees made very brief stops at the mission, leaving little opportunity for me 
to approach them to request an interview. In addition, three out of the 50 seafarers approached 
for an interview request politely declined to cite either an urgency to return to their ship to 
relieve colleagues at the end of work shifts or a lack of confidence in their level of English. 
Their reasons for declining interviews were understandable and did not reflect a lack of interest 
in the study. Furthermore, the 6% refusal rate was considered very satisfactory for a cold-
contacted sample (Thomas, Bloor & Frankland, 2007). 
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4.6.3 Data Collection Instrument 
For this study, semi-structured interviews were used. These included two vignettes, as the 
preferred data collection tool. An interview guide was developed in close consultation with my 
PhD supervisors with the intention that the interview would take the form of a mixture of open-
ended questions and vignettes and administered in a conversation-like manner, in order to 
provide the interviewees with the flexibility to answer the questions in as much detail as they 
considered appropriate.  
The interview guide was designed to include the following three sections corresponding to three 
categories of information of direct relevance to the research questions:  
Section 1: Personal and Professional Information  
Section 2: Perceptions of piracy, occupational risks, fears and anxieties 
Section 3: Projected responses to threats/risks of piracy attacks 
A copy of the interview guide used as the data collection instrument in this study is the attached 
as Appendix 6. 
(a) Semi-Structured Interviews 
For this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 44 seafarers. The interview 
guide included two vignettes. The researcher decided to use semi-structured interviews for their 
inherent practical advantages as an instrument for data collection, one of which is that the semi-
structured form of questions provided the flexibility to include open-ended questions that 
allowed interviewees to elaborate on their responses. This was important in order to provide the 
interviewees with the opportunity to respond in the English language at a level with which they 
were comfortable. This freedom of language expression was crucial in my dialogue with most 
of the participants, for whom English was not their first language. Therefore, the words were 
adjusted to suit the interviewees' level of understanding. In addition, semi-structured interviews 
had the potential to glean responses with high levels of validity, as the interviewees were able 
to provide detailed responses from which the researcher as a keen interviewer, was picked up 
underlying/hidden meanings behind the interviewees' words.  
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews created room for further probing into the interviewees' 
answers. This fact was particularly important when the responses contained surprising 
information in painting a clearer picture of the seafarers' experiences with maritime piracy. As 
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such the semi-structured interview technique, including two vignettes, enabled me to explore 
issues such as the seafarers’ ‘lived reality’ of insecurity, perceived sources of insecurity and the 
ways in which these issues play themselves out in the lives of seafarers.  
While administering semi-structured interviews it was possible to develop positive rapport with 
the interviewees and obtain data on aspects such as feelings and emotions that were not easily 
observable from written responses and structured interviews. Unlike telephone interviews, 
semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to pick up non-verbal cues from the 
interviewee to complement verbal communication (Sampson, 2003). Being in the physical 
presence of the interviewee, administering semi-structured interviews enabled me to first set 
the interviewee at ease, before commencing the interview. The relaxed atmosphere created an 
environment made it possible to interject comments during the session in order to clarify unclear 
points. Thus entering into a dialogue with the interviewee enhanced the possibility of obtaining 
a clearer understanding of the interviewee’s point of view on the issues discussed (May 2001, 
p.123).  Semi-structured interviews also allow for a certain level of standardisation of the 
themes/topics covered and the comparison of different interview cases. For the research where 
time was limited, semi-structured interview guides offered the practical advantage of ensuring 
that all the core themes were covered during each interview during the time available.  
On the other hand, semi-structured interviews are not flawless data collection tools and have 
attracted criticism accordingly. Firstly, conducting an in-depth analysis of interviewee 
responses may be difficult if the responses are not carefully steered to remain focused on the 
research questions. The semi-structured and open-ended nature of the questions could also 
make the interviews more time consuming, which required me to be time-conscious. There is 
also an ever-present tendency towards generating subjective responses that, if unchecked, 
would result in probing questions, in a semi-structured interview, that could lead the 
interviewee into providing the responses I expected, thereby increasing the subjectivity of the 
research output. Like all data collection instruments, for semi-structured interviews, the 
relevance of responses depends largely on the interviewer's skilfulness in guiding the 
‘conversation' and the interviewee's articulation of the relevant facts throughout the duration of 
the interview. Therefore, I harnessed the potential of the semi-structured interview as the study's 
data collection instrument of choice, with a balanced view of both its inherent strengths and 
weaknesses. 
(b) Employing Vignettes in Qualitative Interviews 
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A vignette is a brief description of a hypothetical situation relevant to the interviewee’s 
experience that is narrated to them in order to capture their interest sufficiently enough to make 
them identify with the protagonist of the plot. The story describes a practical situation requiring 
a response from the main character. The aim of the inclusion of a vignette in the interview is to 
enable the interviewee to empathise with the central character of the vignette and provide a 
detailed explanation when asked to describe what they would do if they found themselves in a 
similar situation to that described in the story.  When included in semi-structured interviews, 
the use of vignettes found to be very helpful in encouraging interviewees to speak at greater 
length. Such elaborative responses provided plenty of data.  
 
When meeting the seafarers for the first time, the vignettes offered the interviewees an 
additional opportunity to provide detailed explanations when responding to questions by a 
stranger on a sensitive topic. The vignettes were crafted in such a way that the interviewee could 
relate to the piracy-related situations described. In addition, a Likert-scale type of variation in 
responses was anticipated (King, 2004, 194).  Vignettes were included for to provide further 
opportunities for the interviewees to talk about maritime piracy in their own words. Vignettes 
thus enhanced the data collection process by preventing monotony, encouraging the interviewee 
to talk at greater length, while eliciting seamless probing through the description of a 
hypothetical situation with which the interviewees could relate. As the seafarer puts himself in 
the position of the vignette subject, an empathetic response was drawn out as if they were the 
subject of the vignette (Simons, 2014). 
Vignettes are also useful in establishing rapport, especially when meeting prospective 
interviewees for the first time. In this regard, vignettes were hailed by Alexander and Baker 
(1978) as a powerful data collection tool for their potential “to produce more valid and more 
reliable measures of respondent opinions than the “simpler” abstract questions more typical of 
opinion surveys’” (Alexander and Baker, 1978, 1). They harnessed the robustness of vignettes 
in a study on police and nurse reactions to crime victims. The use of vignettes has also been 
hailed for its potential as a qualitative research tool, with the ability to tease-out responses to 
sensitive issues from a culturally heterogeneous sample (Barter & Renold, 1999; Harvard 2012, 
1).  
Therefore, in seeking out a sample that was representative of the typically multinational ship 
crew for whom English may not be their first language, I included the vignettes in anticipation 
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of the possibility that questions could be understood differently by some of the seafarer 
interviewees, with their perceptions coloured by their linguistic backgrounds and English 
language comprehension (King, et al, 2004; Seguin & Ambrosio, 2002). Thus, when asking a 
question during an interview, I may have meant one thing, while the interviewees may have 
interpreted it to mean something different altogether. The vignettes used in this study were 
carefully crafted scenarios in which depicted normal seafarer work environments where piracy 
attacks are a possibility. The idea was to enable the interviewee to empathise with the subject 
of the vignette sufficiently to verbalise what a typical response would be if they were in the 
workplace situation depicted (Liebermann, 2). As a result, the vignettes made it possible to 
probe further and overcome linguistic barriers.  
 
4.6.4 Research Access and Ethical Dilemmas  
 
During this study, the administration at Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) was 
helpful in liaising with the seafarers’ mission to facilitate approval of access to the fieldwork 
site for the sole purpose of interviewing seafarers during the centre’s opening hours. An 
application for permission to embark on data collection was submitted to Cardiff University 
School of Social Sciences Ethics Committee to ensure that due consideration had been given to 
data protection and to safeguard the identity and rights of the respondents while making 
informed decisions about my safety. The application included a full project proposal, 
Participant Information Form and Consent Form. Considerations of applications by the 
Committee are conditional upon presentation of these forms duly completed by the researcher. 
A copy of the completed Ethical Approval Form is hereby attached in Appendix 7. The 
application was considered and approved by the Ethics Committee. I thus embarked on 
fieldwork supported by Cardiff University and governed by the university ethical guidelines. 
In relation to the interviewees, I neither viewed them as a ‘subject' nor as a ‘repository of 
information' to be gleaned by me as the researcher in order to meet the objectives of the study 
and answer the research questions. Elsewhere, where researchers have adopted such a research 
approach, the fieldwork experience can be regarded impersonally and thus ‘parachute’ in and 
out of the data collection environment without due regard for the respondent as a human being 
(Coffey, 1999). As I embarked on this research with no prior seafaring experience, I decided to 
approach the research field experience with no preconceived ideas about seafarers. Instead, I 
visited the site, initially accompanied by my main supervisors, then subsequently on my own. 
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I went with an open mind, hoping to learn from the interviewees about views on the hazards 
that they face in the workplace, including maritime piracy. In using semi-structured questions, 
I wished to empower my interviewees to provide information that would highlight their better-
informed personal stories detailing their experiences with piracy.  
In order to protect the identity of the interviewees, each was given a pseudonym so that their 
responses could not be traced. I also informed each interviewee that their responses during the 
interview would be handled confidentially; no one else would read their written responses or 
listen to the audio recording of the interviews. In addition, I assured them that Cardiff 
University Data Management guidelines would govern the research information management 
encompassing the responses captured during semi-structured interviews that would be stored 
as academic research data and would not be used for any other purpose.  
 
To initiate contact with the seafarer missions, access request letters were sent to the mission 
stations, requesting their assistance to recruit research participants and to interview respondents 
on their premises. This was done with ample time for discussion prior to the data collection 
commencement, to accord the missions’ respect to exercise their discretion in permitting the 
publication of the research on their website and conducting the interviews on their premises.  
 
4.7 Overview of Data Collection and Data Analysis  
The research data was collected through face-to-face interviews of forty-four interviewees who 
included one female and forty-three male seafarers.  The interviews were held over a six-month 
period in the year 2011 at a busy port in the United Kingdom.  The interviews that lasted 
between forty-five and fifty minutes each were conducted during in a recreation area during the 
crew's leisure time. An interview guide containing semi-structured questions and two vignettes 
were employed as an aide-de-memoir to facilitate a focused discourse. A digital recorder was 
used to capture the interview verbatim was done using. 
The research data analysis was carried out in three individual stages. These included a 
preliminary data analysis documented in Section 4.8 of this chapter, a quantitative data analysis 
reported in Section A of Chapter Five and a qualitative data analysis that has been documented 
in Section B of Chapter 5.  The preliminary data analysis comprised of sorting out of the 
interview verbatim and into meaningful categories based on recurring responses, and of the 
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sample’s bio-data. This process helped in generating sample descriptive characteristics and of 
themes that guided the more detailed thematic qualitative data analysis in Chapter Five. The 
quantitative data analysis entailed the use of Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square statistical tests to 
explore possible associations between the interviewees’ bio-data and the three seafaring risk 
factors that they were most concerned about. The qualitative data analysis, on the other hand, 
used a phenomenological qualitative analytical approach to obtain more information from the 
interviewees’ responses that could help to explain the variations in piracy risk perception within 
my research sample. This approach was useful in helping for a further examination of the 
research data in order to get a fuller explanation of the variations in risk perception by my 
interviewees.  
 
4.7.1  The Data Collection Process 
The flexible research design approach adopted in this study aimed at projecting an 
acknowledgement of the seafarers' autonomy in their workspaces.  Practically, this was 
projected in the respect shown towards the interviewees' rights to ‘own' their views on maritime 
piracy. Thus, during the researcher's interactions with the interviewees, their time and views 
were respected for each interviewee was regarded as an active participant and stakeholder in 
the research process. This approach was reflected throughout the data collection process, 
beginning with meeting the seafarers at the fieldwork site to ensure that as many seafarers as 
possible coming into the centre had the opportunity to be contacted to participate in this study.   
A random convenience sample was interviewed during the data collection process. Once I 
identified a potential interviewee, I politely requested a few minutes to introduce the study to 
them individually. Once this courtesy was accorded, I introduced myself, the purpose of the 
research and the voluntary nature of the respondents’ participation. I then requested a few 
minutes of their time to ask a few questions. Once this approval was given verbally, the seafarer 
was requested to indicate their verbal consent by completing and signing a pre-prepared consent 
form before the interview commenced. The form included a clause that indicated clearly to the 
respondents, the option for them to withdraw from the research at any time during the research 
should they wish to do so.  
The respondents were informed that their responses would be anonymised and that they would 
be assigned them pseudonyms during the interview in order to protect their identity. This would 
ensure that their real names would be omitted from the data files, and the responses could not 
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be traceable to any individual interviewee. This would be achieved practically by assigning a 
number to each interviewee, thus preventing the responses from being traced back to individual 
seafarers. In this way, their responses would be treated confidentially. English remained as the 
international language of the sea and all seafarers are expected to have some degree of English 
language proficiency. As each respondent spoke English comfortably, the interviews were 
conducted in English and the consent forms and questionnaires were all written and 
administered in the English language.  
 
4.7.2 The Pilot Study  
Once I had prepared a sample interview guide, I proceeded to conduct a three-week pilot study 
at the seafarer mission already identified. The intention of piloting the interview guide was to 
try out the questions on a small sample of interviewees, with a view to refining it as a data 
collection instrument prior to administering it to a larger sample. Feedback elicited during the 
piloting experience enabled me to improve on some key areas, including establishing a suitable 
sequence of questions and determining a realistic interview duration. On average, I found that 
I spent about an hour talking to each interviewee. The first ten to fifteen minutes of this was 
devoted to introducing myself, explaining the purpose of the study, allowing the interviewee to 
ask any question about his/her participation in interview, and generally just establishing a 
rapport with the interviewee to enable the individual to be at ease before they signed the 
research participant consent form indicating their willingness to be interviewed for my study of 
their own volition.   
During the pilot stage, it was decided to scale down the number of vignettes from three to two, 
in order to avoid rushing the interviewees and to allow more time to elaborate on answers. 
Piloting the interview guide also enabled me to identify some additional seafaring risks that I 
had excluded in the initial version of the interview guide. A more comprehensive list of 
seafarers' occupational risks was another useful outcome obtained from my preliminary 
assessment of the interview transcripts at the piloting stage. One other addition to the data 
collection instrument was the inclusion of an open-ended question after the vignettes whose 
aim was to provide an additional opportunity for interviewees to voice any other concerns that 
may affect their welfare with regards to piracy, but which were omitted from the interview 
guide. This later addition could be regarded as a seafarer's ‘wish-list', that enriched the feedback 
received from interviewees at the pilot stage. Thus, the process of amending the interview guide 
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was a positive one for me as a researcher, for it increasingly refined my data collection 
instrument, making it fitter for purpose. 
The short piloting experience was very helpful in practical terms as well. In addition to the 
improvements it helped make to the interview guide, the pilot provided me with initial 
interactions with seafarers that served to enhance my confidence in approaching ship crew of 
different nationalities. Furthermore, the piloting experience enabled me to make realistic plans 
with regard to fieldwork logistics as the researcher became more familiar with port access 
protocol. During the research pilot phase, some potential challenges were identified that 
presented bottlenecks or unavoidable circumstances, which by their very nature would be 
inevitable during the fieldwork period; but which nonetheless, when combined, could prolong 
the main data collection period by reducing the availability of potential interviewees. While I 
became aware that these were issues over which the researcher had no control over, being aware 
of them before embarking on the main fieldwork mission illuminated previously grey areas in 
the research field. Knowing them ahead of time provided me with invaluable information that 
helped me to develop a realistic work-plan for the main fieldwork phase of the research process.  
The anticipated challenges included the shipping schedule and turn-around-time as obtained 
from the port website ‘In Dock Schedule’ from where I observed that some ships arrived late at 
night or early in the morning to offload only, and left after only a few hours. This category of 
ships arrived when the mission centre was closed and departed by the time the mission opened. 
Research access was permitted on condition that I contacted the seafarers in the centre during 
working hours. Thus, the crew of such ships arriving outside of the mission's working hours 
would be inaccessible to me. On a number of occasions, a group of seafarers would arrive as I 
was preparing to return home and thus it would be regarded as being too late to conduct an 
interview. A further challenge presented itself when some crewmembers chose to remain on 
board and not visit the seafarer's centre, or hurriedly visited to get transport into downtown 
without coming into the centre because they had brief off-duty periods and/or had to return to 
attend to other pressing duties on board.   
 
4.7.3 The Main Fieldwork  
 
(a) Data Collection  
After refining the interview guide, the main fieldwork phase commenced.  Forty-four seafarers 
were interviewed over a five-month period in 2011, at a seafarers' mission centre located in a 
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busy port in the United Kingdom. Forty-four interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted 
between forty-five and fifty minutes. The total interview time was between 1,980 and 2,200 
minutes. Although the interview questions and vignettes were prepared beforehand, in the 
course of each interview, there was room to adjust the language spontaneously to the level of 
each interviewee, or to repeat questions to allow me to understand a respondent's point of view 
clarify meanings to respondents and avoid generalisations about the matter under discussion. 
Semi-structured interviews provided me with an opportunity to ask probing questions when the 
need arose, to steer the respondent's focus on to the specific issue   for further interrogation. 
Furthermore, the interview sequence was guided using the refined interview guide to ensure 
that the key issues of interest to me were covered in all of the interviews, while allowing enough 
flexibility for interviewees to develop their own answers. A copy of the interview guide has 
been attached as Appendix 6.  
 
(b) Data Recording Process and Challenges 
 
During the interview sessions, all interviewees were asked the same questions in the same order 
as detailed in the interview guide, and the interviews were digitally recorded verbatim with the 
permission of the interviewees. Occasionally these recordings were supplemented with hand-
written notes taken in shorthand in blank interview guides, to capture all the details when, for 
instance, background noise was thought to influence the quality of the recording. In addition to 
the audio recording of interviews, after each interview was concluded and the interviewee had 
departed, I replayed each interview and filled out printed copies of the interview guide, which 
are available to the interviewee online on Cardiff University Portal in line with the university’s 
policy governing research data protection. This provided a safe data storage facility to ensure 
that both the audio recordings and transcripts were not lost and the identity of the interviewees 
was  protected throughout this study.  
 
(c) Benefits of Audio Recording Interviews 
The data generated were therefore available in both written and digital form. Being able to 
record the interviews both in digital and written form provided me with the flexibility to adjust 
the recording method according to the interview situation as it evolved. While appreciating this 
approach, Coffey and Atkinson (1996) add that there are different variations to qualitative data. 
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In planning the fieldwork, normal challenges associated with audio recording the interviews in 
a social setting due to the nature of the interview setting in the seafarer missions. This is a 
recreation space for off-duty ship crew, where they engaged in leisure activities, purchased 
toiletries and souvenirs while they were off-duty ashore, as their ships were loaded and 
offloaded. In this informal interview setting, background noise and poor sound quality 
presented inevitable challenges expected when audio recording interviews. The interview 
recordings captured some aspects of the atmosphere in the interview setting. These included 
the faint sound of the television in the background, the low tones of off-duty crew engaged in 
shopping transactions at the café cashier, or while seafarers sat by chatting while selecting 
articles, skype callers, indoor games, the shuffling footsteps of shoppers in the other part of the 
leisure centre and the occasional upbeat café/restaurant conversations and motorised traffic. 
These blended to provide a warm background buzz in the social area adjacent to the relatively 
quieter corner where the interviews were conducted. Thus, the background noise adequately 
captured the atmosphere in the interview setting, as a realistic reflection of seafarers’ social life 
ashore.  Despite these inevitable research-setting peculiarities, the audio recording of the 
interviews was still carried out, respecting the seafarers’ social space and with the recognition 
that the researcher was an outsider and thus could not have full control of the surrounding 
research setting in the seafarer mission centre.   
During the interviews, the details provided in the responses were influenced by the amount of 
time each interviewee could spare for the interview, as well as the interviewees' level of English 
language fluency. The time factor in turn largely depended on the interviewee's availability. 
When embarking on every interview with an open mind, realising the possibility that the 
interview might be interrupted. In view, if this unpredictability, audio recordings of the 
interviews offered the option of temporarily halting the recording case of an interruption, and 
later replaying the recording to enable the interviewee to pick up the discussion from where it 
had stopped. Audio recording enabled me to produce a digital recording of the interviews that 
could be stored electronically and backed up as a precaution against data loss. The audio tape 
is also a faster way of recording interview responses, as it frees the interviewer from having to 
write down the answers to the interview questions. Instead, I was able to concentrate on actively 
listening to the interviewee, while guiding the discussion to elicit the information required. 
 
4.8 Preliminary Data Analysis 
4.8.1 Transcription, Data Sorting and Indexing 
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Lapadat and Lindsay (1999) encourage the use of audio transcription of the question-answer 
audio recording into text documents, as it provides invaluable reference material. Poland (1995) 
also recommends research audio transcripts to serve as quick reference material. After 
completion of the data, the 44 audio recordings were transcribed and crosschecking for accuracy 
with notes written in the interview guides where available. While acknowledging the variety of 
data analysis strategies adopted by researchers (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994), first the large 
amounts of qualitative, data obtained were organised into meaningful categories based on the 
similarity of responses. This data management strategy enabled me to make sense of the 
qualitative data generated from the rich harvest of diverse perspectives obtained from the 
sample of seafarers interviewed. Organising the data facilitated the development of ideas for 
thematic analysis, prior to embarking on a more in-depth data analysis. This section outlines 
the initial preliminary analysis undertaken after completion of the fieldwork phase and 
transcription of the interview recordings. The systematic thematic analysis is the subject of the 
next two chapters. 
 
The preliminary data analysis was carried out using a stepwise approach, involving three simple 
but time-consuming steps, including sorting-out, categorisation, and indexing the data so as to 
identify any patterns or associated ideas and/or completely different themes emerging from the 
data. To begin with, I used a printed blank interview guide to number all of the questions for 
ease of reference. While refering to the field notes used in developing the interview guide, the 
questions were marked and linked with the aim of achieving the following two main objectives: 
(a) to identify key issues related to the research questions, (b) to corroborate concerns on issues 
raised, and reiterate opinions on issues already identified within the seafarers' work 
environment that the interviewees had discussed in relation to their regard for maritime piracy. 
The procedure for identifying associations within the data involved assembling all the 
transcripts in order of their assigned serial number, ranging from interviewee number one (#1) 
to interviewee number forty-four (#44).  Followed by a perusal of each transcript to pick out 
recurring words among the different responses. This preliminary data analysis exercise 
generated the Coding Schematic Index contained in Appendix   Preliminary Data Analysis  
The coding of my data included the following categories of information obtained from the 
interview transcripts: -  
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a) Category 1: interviewees' bio data, including their seafaring work experience; 
b) Category 2: their knowledge of and experiences with maritime piracy;  
c) Category 3: the range of seafarer occupational hazards or risks. Each category contained a 
number of questions from different sections in the interview guide.  
 
From this initial categorisation of the data, it was established that the responses generated 
sufficient detail and diverse responses for a thematic analysis on three key issues: (a) seafarers' 
fear of maritime piracy experiences; (b) variations in seafarers’ concern about the risk posed by 
maritime piracy to their welfare and their self-perception as victims of piracy; and (c) their 
reactions to this fear of, and the risk posed by, piracy at an individual level, as members of a 
seafaring professional group and being potential victims targeted by pirates for kidnap-for-
ransom piracy in East Africa, and to their families as tertiary/indirect victims of piracy. A closer 
look at the variations in interviewees’ responses to the questions posed, showed some patterns, 
links and associated meanings regarding their occupational risks, fearful situations, how they 
rated piracy in relation to other occupational risks and how they would respond to an imminent 
pirate attack.  The patterns were then categorised according to similarities and dissimilarities in 
responses. These patterns, similarities and dissimilarities formed the basis for data analysis in 
the next two chapters 
 
4.8.2 Sample Descriptive Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics have been found to be helpful in addressing specific sampling questions 
(Pallant, 2007), while depicting the range of sample characteristics, and highlighting the diverse 
individualities and unique worldviews that each interviewee beings to the sample and study.  
As indicated in the literature review chapter, prior to the commencement of this study in 2009, 
the available piracy incident data in the public domain and studies on seafarer occupational risk 
perception were mainly quantitative.  The piracy data comprised mainly of numbers of ships 
attacked, then the number of seafarers held hostage or those still missing, the hostage duration 
and ransom figures paid out to pirates to secure the freedom of the crew. No qualitative studies 
seeking out seafarers' views on their occupational risk perception were available.  This study, 
the sample characteristics show the bio-data of those interviewed. Each one of the forty-four 
interviewees represent and the individual who brings to this study their ‘story', being a unique 
perspective of seafarer occupational risks. This uniqueness of this socially constructed view is 
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a crucial component in lending ‘a human face’ to the variation in research data on seafarer 
occupational risk perception.  
The interview data provided a glimpse into the diverse characteristics of my sample. This  
included: their ages (groups), nationalities (by region of the world interviewees hailed from), 
ranks or positions that each individual held on the ship that they were working on at the time of 
the interview, the duration of their work experience, the researchers that they had worked on 
previously, as well as the ship that they were working on at the time of the interview. 
 
(a) Age Distribution  
Of the 44 interviewees, 17 (39%) were under the age of 30 years, 14 (32%) were between 31 
and 40 years of age, 11 (25%) were aged between 41 and 50 years, while only two (4%) were 
over 50 years of age. The youngest respondent was 25 years old, while the eldest seafarer 
interviewed was 55-years-old. Figure 5 below illustrates the distribution of interviewees by 
age. 
 
 
Figure 5: Sample Distribution by Age 
 
(b) Nationality  
At the time this study was conducted, most ships in the international fleet had a multi-national 
crew working on board. However, for the purpose of this study, each individual seafarer 
interviewed, presented an important personal and professional experience perspective, which 
was considered key in enhancing the objectivity and rich diversity of the data.  Of the 44 
seafarers interviewed, 24 interviewees (55%) were from the Philippines, while 8 (18%) were 
Eastern Europeans, 6 (14%) were from South East Asia, 5 (11%) were from Western Europe, 
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and only 1 (2%) interviewee was from North America. Figure 6 below illustrates the 
distribution of nationalities within the research sample.    
 
 
Figure 6: Sample Distribution by Nationality (Geographical Region) 
 
Table 1 below summarises a comparison of the interviewee sample proportions with those 
established in SIRC’s 2008 study entitled, The Global Labour Market for Seafarers Working 
on board Merchant Cargo Ships (GLMS).   
 
 Interviewees by Geographic Regional and Percentages 
 
 
 
Current 
Research 
Sample 
 
Far East Asia 
 
South Asia 
 
Eastern 
Europe 
North 
America 
Western 
Europe 
 
The 
Philippines 
India  
Sri Lanka 
Indonesia 
Myanmar 
 
Ukraine 
Croatia 
 
The USA 
 
Italy 
24 (55%) 6 (14%) 8 
 (18% ) 
1  
(2%) 
5 (11%) 
6 (13%) 
GLMS (28%) (48%) (6.4%) (30%) 
  
Table 1: Interviewees by Geographical Region & Percentages 
 Source: The Global Labour Market for Seafarers Working Aboard Merchant Cargo Ships 
(GLMS) 2008 
A disaggregation of the research sample by geographical region of origin showed that 87% of 
the interviewees were from six countries across the Far East, South Asia and Eastern Europe, 
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while the remaining 13% came from North America and Western Europe. The 2003 SIRC 
Global Seafarer Labour Market Survey (GLMS) indicated that 70% of seafarers were drawn 
from ten countries in South Asia and Eastern Europe, while 30% were from elsewhere. 
Although the proportions in both studies are not exactly the same, the sample proportions 
resonated with the GLMS to the extent that both studies highlighted the multi-national nature 
of the global seafarer labour force. The two studies also established that a significant proportion 
of seafarers currently working in the international fleet hail from only a few countries, mainly 
in the Far East, South Asia and Eastern Europe.  Sustainability of maritime transport hinges on 
the quality of the work force supply.  Therefore, regular updates on the human resource trends 
in the industry are closely monitored and forecasts published. The current study reiterated the 
findings of a major global seafarer work force update by BIMCO and ISF 2013 that identified 
the following trends in labour supply in the shipping industry. 
  This observation corroborates findings published in, indicating the following two 
observations that were found to be true for this study as well.  
a) Firstly, that the Philippines and India are major seafarer supply countries, with many 
seafarers from these countries working on foreign flagships. The BIMCO study established 
that 29.5% of seafarers worldwide were from the Far East, while 12.8% were from the Indian 
subcontinent. On the other hand, 55% of the sample in this study is from the Philippines. 
This indicates that the Philippines were slightly over-represented in the sample, compared 
to the reality in the global workforce.  
b) Secondly, the BIMCO study established that 20.8% of the global seafarer's supply was 
nationals of Eastern European countries. On the other hand, 8% of the interviewees in this 
sample were from Eastern Europe.  This proportion of seafarers drawn from a single Eastern 
European country resonates with findings reported in the BIMCO/ISF publication, which 
pointed to an increase in the number of Eastern European seafarers in the international fleet, and 
particularly from Ukraine, Latvia and Croatia (BIMCO/ISF, 2010). Table 2 below summarises the 
findings of the BIMCO/ISF report that was based on data obtained by a global seafarer labor 
survey, having been carried out through questionnaires sent to governments, shipping 
companies, crewing experts and maritime administrators. 
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Table 2: BIMCO/ISF 2010 Seafarer Manpower Update 
Source: BIMCO/ISF estimates 
 
Based on a comparison of the distribution of geographical regions represented in the sample, 
and the findings of other studies on global seafarer nationality distribution characteristics led to 
the conclusion that the sample from the current study compared favourably with the nationality 
characteristics of the global seafarer workforce. This observation enhanced to some extent the 
possibility of relating the findings of the current research to the views of other seafarers about 
maritime piracy. For instance, although Filipinos were over-represented in this study's sample, 
the proportion of Filipinos and Indians when combined (69%) was similar to that in the GLMS. 
In addition, the sample in this study includes a wide range of different nationalities, including 
seafarers from Italy, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Myanmar, India, the Philippines, Croatia, the 
USA and the Netherlands. Thus, although this is not a quantitative study where more attention 
is paid to representativeness than to validity, this study is broadly similar in quota terms to what 
we know of the composition of crews in the international fleet. 
 
(c) Marital Status 
Concerning the marital status of the sample, 26 (59%) of the interviewees were married, 16 
(36%) were single, while the remaining two (5%) were separated from their partners at the time 
of the interview. Figure 7 below depicts the distribution of the marital status of the individuals 
covered in this study. 
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Figure 7: Sample Distribution by Marital Status 
 
 
(d) Work Experience vs ships worked on 
From the sample of 44 seafarers, 14 had worked as seafarers for between 0 and are years, 12 
had worked as seafarers for between 6 and workforce years, 10 had worked as seafarers between 
11 and 20 years, while the remaining four had each worked as seafarers for over 20 years. The 
distribution of seafarer work experience is illustrated in Figure 8 below.  
 
 
Figure 8: Sample Distribution by Seafarer Work Experience 
 
(e) Current Position/Rank on Ship 
Out of the sample of 44 seafarers, 14 (32%) were Senior Officers, 13 (29%) were Junior 
Officers, while 17 (39%) were Ratings as illustrated in Figure 9 below. A further disaggregation 
of Senior Officers, flagships in Figure 10, established that 43% of the Senior Officers were 
Chief Engineers, 36% of the Senior Officers were Chief Mates/Officers, and 14% worked in 
security-related roles, while 7% were Navigation Officers. This latter  
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Figure 10: Seafarer Ranks within Sample      Figure 9:  Senior & Junior Officers in sample 
 
Of the Junior Officers in the sample, 15% of them were Third Officers, Cadets (20%), 8.1% 
were Second Officers, 8.1% were 4th Engineers and 8% were Communication Officers. This 
disaggregation of the sample who was Junior Officers has illustrated in Figure 10 above.   
 
The proportion of Ratings in the sample included Able Bodied Seamen (20%), Engine Oilers 
(10%) Chief Cooks (15%), Ordinary Seamen (15%), Wipers (15%), Sailors (10%) and 
Motormen (5%). This disaggregation of Ratings in the sample is illustrated in Figure 11 below.  
 
 
Figure 1: Disaggregation of Ratings in the Sample 
 
Table 4 below provides a summary of the Seafarer Rank distribution in my study compared to 
two other international studies on the seafarer labour force. The studies are listed in 
chronological order, to reflect the trend in the seafarer workforce in the period preceding my 
study. The two other studies include: (a) the SIRC 2008 Global Labour Market for Seafarers 
(GLMS) study; (b) the 2010 BIMCO/ISF Manpower Update that reported that the 2010 global 
36%
43%
14%
7%
Chief
Mate/Officer
Chief Engineer
Security &
Security
Supervisor
Navigation
Officer
Ratings (17)
20%
20%
15%5%
15%
15%
10%
Able Bodied
Seaman (AB)
Cadet (training)
Chief Cook
Motorman
Ordinary
Seaman
Wiper
Sailor
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seafarer workforce supply comprised 1,371,000 seafarers, including 624,000 officers and 
747,000 Ratings; and (c) my fieldwork, conducted in 2011.  
 
 Senior 
Officers 
Junior 
Officers 
 
Ratings 
 
Total 
GLMS Study 2008 21.5% 22.1% 56.4%  
100% BIMCO/ISF 2010 45.51% 54.49% 
Current research 
fieldwork (2011) 
32% 30% 38% 
 
Table 4:  A comparison of Global Seafarer Rank Distribution in three studies 
The above comparison in the seafarer rank distribution highlights that although my sample 
embraces a range of ranks including Chief Engineers, Cadets and Ordinary/Able-bodied (AB) 
Seamen; there was an over-representation of Officers.  
 
(f) Type of ships worked on   
At the time this study was undertaken, the interviewees had worked on a variety of ships. Of 
the 44 interviewees in the sample, slightly over 50% (21) had worked on a ship as it passed the 
East African coast. Notably, one interviewee had transited East Africa six times as a seafarer. 
One other interviewee said his ship had passed the East African coast countless times and 
undertook such voyages at least twice a year. Figure 12 below illustrates the variety of ships 
that the interviewees worked on at the time this study was undertaken. These vessels included 
Roll-On-Roll-Off (Ro-Ro), bulk carriers, car carriers, chemical/gas carriers, container carriers, 
passenger and cruise ships, and general cargo ships. In the ten years preceding this study, the 
interviewees had also worked on a wide range of ships in the international fleet.   
 
 
Figure 12: Distribution of sample by current type of ship 
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The range of ships that my sample had worked on in the last ten years is shown in Figure 13 
below. These included bulk carriers, car carriers, chemical/gas carriers, container carriers, 
Passenger and Cargo/Ro-Ro, multi-purpose heavy-lifts, tugboats, repair ships, fish trawlers, 
navy auxiliary ships, refrigerated ships and general cargo carriers. 
 
 
Figure 13: Distribution of sample by ships previously worked on 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
This study was undertaken as an empirical inquiry, to establish the views of a sample of 
seafarers about maritime piracy, their levels of experience with piracy and how they rated piracy 
as compared to the other risks that they faced at work. The research included face-to-face 
interviews of forty-four interviewees during a six-month period. Each interviewee was 
considered as having the potential to incorporate some unique cultural and seafaring work 
experience that informed the lens through their views on their occupational risks was 
constructed. Therefore, the responses could provide the (so far) elusive ‘voice’ of seafarers in 
the worldwide anti-piracy narrative. The diverse qualities of my research sample include their 
ages, nationalities, length of work experience, their ranks, the ships that they had worked on, 
their seafaring occupational risk(s) and the interviewees' ranking of maritime piracy relative to 
the other situations in their maritime work environment, which in their opinion, pose a threat 
of harm to them.  In this chapter, the robustness of quantitative data analysis was harnessed in 
order to condense detailed information on the descriptive characteristics of the sample, while 
also attempting to organise the data into meaningful categories. This enabled a display of the 
diverse sample characteristics in a simplified and summarised form accessible to a wider 
audience (Bryman, 2008).  
By targeting a diverse group of ship crewmembers, this study sought to bring a new dimension 
to the understanding of risk perception in general, and seafarer occupational risk in particular. 
The newness envisioned, was in the involvement of seafarers as the primary research target 
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group of a qualitative study on seafarer risk perception.  Each interview was recorded, 
transcribed and coded in preparation for data analysis. This chapter provided a quantitative 
description of the disaggregated sample data, by focusing on the personal and professional 
characteristics and views of the sample.  In so doing, this chapter served as a precursor to the 
more detailed quantitative and quantitative data analyses undertaken, details of which are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The discussion in the previous chapter focused on the data collection process. It laid out the 
research goal, objectives, research questions, sampling procedures, the data collection process 
and a description of the research sample.  The current chapter comprises of two sections, Section 
A and Section B. The former section reports on the Quantitative Data Analysis while the latter 
section documents the key themes that emerged from the Qualitative Data Analysis. Together, 
these two sections set out the findings from the empirical data analysis in such a way as to 
address the four research questions set out in Chapter One.  
The quantitative data analysis explored links between the interviewees’ interviewees’ ages, 
nationalities, ranks and the length of interviewees’ work experience, against the three seafarer 
risk factors that they were most concerned about. This statistical analysis established the four 
facts: that, there were conflicting views about piracy among the interviewees with less than five 
years’ seafaring experience, among those aged below 30 years and among two sections of 
Officers; that the risk of piracy was a major concern among the interviewees of all ages, across 
all ranks, and also among interviewees with different seafaring careers. The latter finding 
presented a dilemma, because none of the interviewees had a personal hostage experience, 
except for a few of them who had direct experienced failed pirate attacks, and/or personally 
witnessed armed robbery with violence against their colleagues in West African ports.  
Therefore, the concern about piracy required more explanation. This elaboration was sought 
through a qualitative data analysis that probed the interview data further to find facts that could 
help in explaining the paradox identified by the quantitative analysis.  The qualitative data 
analysis examined the narrative parts of the interview data in order to provide a further 
explanation about the variations in the interviewees’ risk perception.  The three findings that 
emerged from the qualitative analysis highlighted the role of maritime piracy narratives and 
images, geographic settings and family concerns, in influencing seafarers’ piracy risk 
perception.  Each of these findings is discussed in detail in Section 5.14 of this chapter, and 
Section 6.2 in Chapter Six.  The data analyses found that risk perception was indeed a complex 
phenomenon that would be best analysed using multiple methodologies to help identify aspects 
that could not be explained adequately through statistical tests (Slovic, 2002). A summary of 
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these research findings is provided in Section 5.14 of this chapter. These research outcomes are 
also discussed in relation to the research questions in Section 6.2 of the next chapter. 
 
Section A: Quantitative Data Analysis 
 Bivariate Analysis of Seafarer Occupational Risk Perception   
5.2 Data Preparation 
During the fieldwork phase of this study, an interview guide containing semi-structured 
questions was used to collected interviewee responses. The data collected comprised of a small 
amount of quantitative data and a relatively larger amount of qualitative information. This 
section reports on the quantitative data analysis that was carried out in order to establish whether 
there were any links between my interviewees’ views on risk perception and their ages, 
nationalities, ranks and work experience. The quantitative data analysis process included an 
initial preparation of data into a form suitable for quantitative tests, followed by Cross-
tabulation and Chi-Square statistical tests using SPSS. The results of both tests were interpreted 
to come up with research findings.  
The interviews provided information on the interviewees’ demographic profile, their 
professional background and their views about the risks that they face at work, and their 
projected risk behaviour when faced with an imminent pirate attack. Data collected during the 
interviewees described the personal characteristics of the sample. These included their names, 
ages, marital status, nationality, their rank and the position on the ship they were working on at 
the time of the interview, the duration of their seafaring work experience, the ship types that 
they worked on at the time of the interview, and their ranking of different seafaring occupational 
risks, and their experiences with and views about the threat posed by maritime piracy. In the 
previous chapter, it had been pointed out that SIRC ‘risk studies’ claimed that there was a link 
between the views of seafarers about occupational risk, and their age, nationality, rank, and 
work experience. The analysis in this chapter focused on interrogating only the specific data 
that was considered relevant in exploring this theoretical position.  That data included 
interviewees’ ages, nationalities, ranks, work experience and their views about the different 
seafarer occupational risks perception. The risk perception of how they ranked different 
occupational risks. The task of this chapter, therefore, is to try to establish whether any 
meaningful association(s) could be identified between the age, nationality, work experience and 
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seafaring risk perception as denoted by the interviewees’ ranking of each risk during the 
interviews.  
Three groups of (scalable) risk levels were created through a data re-coding process.  To achieve 
this, the ‘Top 3’ seafaring occupational risk factors of relatively greater concern to the research 
interviewees were ranked.  The process of identifying the occupational risk factors that were of 
concern to the interviewees was carried out in stages, beginning with each interviewee giving 
their input to generate a list of risk factors during the interview stage. Each individual was given 
a list of seafaring risks gleaned from a review of the literature on maritime health and safety 
(reported in Chapter 2), and refined during the fieldwork piloting stage. Interviewees were 
allowed to add to the list any factors in their workplace, which were omitted, and yet, in their 
opinion, posed a danger to them at work. A list of 23 risk factors emerged from this risk-
identification process. These included: being hijacked/attacked by pirates, explosion, falling 
overboard and into the dock, fatigue, feeling homesick, fire, injury, on board isolation from 
colleagues, serious illness, ship collision/foundering/grounding, abandoned abroad, accidents, 
bad/stormy weather, death, discrimination, capsizing, big waves, machinery malfunction, 
Officers attitude, stowaways, stealing goods (especially in Asia and Africa), bombing and 
terrorism.  
 
The second stage of the risk-ranking strategy during the interviews involved asking each 
interviewee to assign to each risk-factor a number ranging from ‘1’ and ‘6’, whereby ‘6’ 
denoted the threat that they were ‘most worried’ about, while ‘1’ the risk that they were least 
concerned about. A closer look at the responses revealed that a few individuals mentioned 
almost all the interviewees, 14 risks; while some hazards were only identified by a single 
interviewee identified six specific risk factors.  The six hazards that garnered the most attention 
among my interviewees, included ship collision/foundering/grounding, fire, injury, falling 
overboard and into the dock, hijacked/attacked by pirates and explosion.  The factors that were 
only mentioned by one or two interviewees, included: being abandoned abroad, accidents, 
bad/stormy weather, death, discrimination, capsizing, big waves, machinery malfunction, 
Officer's attitude, stowaways, stealing goods (especially in Asia and Africa), bombing and 
terrorism. 
In order to conduct a meaningful quantitative analysis of the sample’s risk ranking and their 
personal characteristics, the three factors that each interviewee ranked as their ‘‘Top 3’ concerns 
were focused on.  This risk-prioritization was inferred from the number that each individual 
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assigned to the six risk factors identified by the majority of the interviewees.  This interpretation 
was based on three assumptions: Firstly, that each interviewee had some information about each 
risk that they ticked and ranked; secondly, that this information could be based on their 
seafaring and other lived experiences; and thirdly, that their risk ranking was an informed 
decision.  Therefore ‘6’ was the risk they were ‘most worried’ about, while ‘5’ was the factor 
they were ‘a little worried’ about, and ‘4’ was the hazard the interviewees were ‘least worried’ 
about. In order to carry forward the testing of my interviewee's seafarer occupational risk views 
to the next stage, ‘Top 3' risks assigned the numbers ‘1', ‘2' and ‘3'. In this way, the risk-ranking 
and risk-prioritization processes culminated in the compilation of a list of the three main 
seafaring risk factors of relatively greater concern to each of my interviewees.  
These risks and the particular levels of concern/worry expressed by each interviewee is  
summarized in Table 5.2 below:  
 A: Ship collision/foundering/grounding                B: Fire                         C: Injury 
D: Falling overboard and into the dock                 E: Attacked by pirates     F:  Explosion 
 
 
Interviewees 
(44) 
Interviewees’ ‘Top 3’ risks/concerns/worries 
‘1 
‘most worried’  
about 
‘2’ 
‘a little worried’   
about 
‘3’ 
‘least worried’  
about 
#1 F C E 
#2 F D E 
#3 E D F 
#4 E A A 
#5 C A E 
#6 E C A 
#7 C A D 
#8 E A B 
#9 E A B 
#10 E B A 
#11 F E B 
#12 E B A 
#13 E B A 
#14 E B A 
#15 A B E 
#16 A E D 
#17 E C E 
#18 F B E 
#19 E B F 
#20 E A B 
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#21 E A B 
#22 F A E 
#23 E A D 
#24 D B E 
#25 A E B 
#26 C A E 
#27 E C B 
#28 A only - - 
#29 A E F 
#30 E A B 
#31 D E B 
#32 C B E 
#33 E C - 
#34 E F B 
#35 B C -   
#36 A C E 
#37 A B E 
#38 C B A 
#39 E A C 
#40 E C - 
#41 A C E 
#42 A B E 
#43 A E B 
#44 A E A 
 
Table 4:  Interviewees’ ‘Top 3’ Seafaring Occupational Risks 
Note:  Some interviewees mentioned only one or two risk factors 
 
Through the data re-coding process described above, a scalable ‘risk’ ranking dummy variable 
was created.  This was used to assess the three risk-levels levels (groups) of perceived 
occupational risk. The three levels that I created are on a scale 1 - 2 units apart i.e. the number 
‘1' (three) denoted the risk factor that the interviewee is ‘most worried' about, while the number 
‘2' (two) represented the factor that interviewees are ‘a little worried' about, and the number ‘3' 
(one) symbolised the hazard that my sample was ‘least worried' about.  The variables created 
were used to populate the sample database on SPSS with the ‘Top 3’ risks factors stated by each 
interviewee.   
Based on the thematic proposition stated above in Section 5.1, the tests that I carried out on the 
ages, ranks and work experience, against the three risk-levels ‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3’, were guided by 
the following assumptions: 
The null hypotheses, which stated that,  
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The risk factor(s) ‘most worried’ about, ‘a little worried’ about, or ‘least worried’ about by the 
individuals in the sample, is independent of their ages, ranks and work experience. 
The hypothesis, which stated that, 
The risk factor(s) ‘most worried’ about, ‘a little worried’ about, or ‘least worried’ about by the 
individuals in the sample, is dependent on their ages, ranks and work experience. 
 5.4 Analysis: Age, Nationality, Rank, Work Experience vs ‘Top 3’ risks  
In order to examine the relationships within my data that might not be readily apparent from 
the descriptive characteristics provided at the end of the previous chapter, I used the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 23 to carry out Cross-tabulation and Pearson 
Chi-Square tests on the ‘Top 3’ risks factors indicated by each of my interviewees.  Three risk 
levels used for these tests included responses about the risk that each interviewee indicated as 
the factor(s) that they were either ‘most worried’ about, ‘a little worried’ about, and the ‘least 
worried’ about.    Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square tests were administered to ascertain the 
probability that the two variables were related.  For the purpose of this study, the first set of 
variables used included age, nationality, work experience, rank and position on the ship, and 
my second variable, against which each of the first set was tested, was the ‘Top 3’ risks.  
Therefore, in each case, a Null hypothesis was tested to ascertain whether the two variables 
were independent of each other. 
The tests carried out depending on the type of data to be tested. For instance, whereas both 
Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square tests were carried out on categorical data that depicted the 
interviewees’ ages, ranks and work experience, because these interviewee aspects could be 
counted and assigned into categories. However, the data on nationality was not suitable for Chi-
Square testing because although the interviewees of a particular nationality could be counted to 
ascertain the total number of citizens who hailed from a particular country, the nationalities 
could not be arranged into meaningful categories appropriate for Chi-Square testing. Therefore, 
only Cross-tabulation tests were possible with the data on nationalities. After a consideration 
of the type of data available, suitable statistical tests were carried out to ascertain whether there 
was any association(s) between the age, nationality, work experience, rank and positions that 
my sample held on the type of ship which they were working on when I interviewed them, and 
the values assigned to the occupational risk factors selected by each one.   
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5.4.1 Interviewees’ Age vs ‘Top 3’ risk factors 
In this section, I have discussed the relationship that I identified between the ages of my sample 
and the risks that they regarded as their ‘Top 3’ worries.  For ease of data manipulation, I 
categorized the interviewees’ ages into the following age groups: Under 30 years, 31 to 40 
years, 41 to 50 years and 51 to 60 years.  The age groups were Cross-tabulated against the risk 
that each age group was ‘most worried’ about, ‘a little worried’ about, and ‘least worried’ about.  
See Appendix 5.3.2 for detailed Cross-tabulation test results for age versus each risk perception 
level.  
(a) Age vs risk ‘most worried’ about 
This section describes the relationship between the different age groups represented in the 
sample and the risk that they were ‘most worried' about.  From the results displayed in Figure 
14 below, it was established that the interviewees, in the under 30 years of age group, were 
most concerned about ship collision, while those in the 31 to 40  and 41 to 50 years’ age groups 
were ‘most worried’ about being attacked by pirates.  However, the sample members in the 
highest age bracket 41 to 50 years indicated that they were most concerned about both injury 
and attack by pirates.  Based on this observation, it was concluded that fear of being attacked 
by pirates was a consistent concern among all the age groups in the sample. 
 
Figure  14:  Cross-tabulation  results of interviewee ages vs risk ‘most worried’  about 
The Chi-Square test results of the age against the risk that the interviewees were ‘most worried’ 
about, providing a p-value of 0.132 which is greater than the 0.05 significant value. This 
confirms that the null hypothesis is accepted.  I, therefore, concluded that there was no sufficient 
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evidence from the data of the influence of age on the risk ‘most worried' about.   See Appendix 
5.3.1 for the detailed Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square test results.   
 (b) Age vs risk ‘a little worried’ about 
 
Figure 15:  Cross-tabulation  results of interviewee ages vs risk ‘a little worried’  about 
From the results displayed in Figure 15 above, I established that the interviewees under 40 
years of age were both ‘a little worried' about the risk of collision/foundering/ grounding, being 
attacked by pirates and fire.  The rest of the sample who were above 41 years old, were little 
afraid of both fire and injury.  Those under 30 years of age had ranked fire as the second factor 
of which they were a little afraid.  Based on these observations, the study concluded that the 
interviewees from all the three age groups were a little afraid of fire. 
Chi-Square test results of the age against the risk that the interviewees were ‘a little worried’ 
about provided a p-value of 0.540 which is greater than the 0.05 significant value. This confirms 
that the Null hypothesis is accepted. Based on this observation, I concluded that the risk that 
my interviewees were ‘a little worried' about is not associated with the interviewees' age. See 
Appendix 5.3.1 for details of the Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square test results. 
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  (c) Age vs risk ‘least worried’ about 
 
Figure 16: Cross-tabulation  results of interviewee ages vs risk ‘least worried’ about 
The results of the Cross-tabulation test provided the following indications: That, interviewees 
under 30 years of age were ‘least worried’ about being attacked by pirates; That, those aged 
between 31 and 40 years of age identified the risk of fire, while  interviewees in the 41 to 50-
year age-category indicated ship-collision; while those in the 51 to 60 age bracket stated that 
they were ‘least worried’ about the risks of both fire and pirate attacks.  Figure 16 above, 
illustrates these test results.  
The Chi-Square test results of the interviewees’ age against the risk that the interviewees were 
‘least worried' about, providing a p-value of 0.682 which is greater than the 0.05 significant 
value.  This confirms that the Null hypothesis was accepted.  See Appendix 5.3.1 for details of 
the Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square test results.  
Based upon the test results for the age against the ‘Top 3’ risks, I established that there was no 
difference between the age groups in the perception of the risks that they were ‘most worried' 
about, ‘a little worried about' and ‘least worried' about. Since the results are based on a sample 
size of 44 seafarers, there is not sufficient evidence from the data of the influence of age on the 
‘Top 3' risks. 
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5.4.2 Nationality vs ‘Top 3’ risks 
(a) Nationality vs risks ‘most worried’ about 
In this section, a description is provided of the results of the Cross-tabulation tests carried out 
on the relationship between the nationality of the seafarers and the risks that they are ‘most 
worried’ about.  The test results produced three main patterns. The results, illustrated in Figure 
17 below, showed that the interviewees who hailed from South Asia, Western Europe and 
Eastern Europe were ‘most worried’ about ship collision/foundering/grounding, while those 
who were Philippines nationals rated pirate attack as the risk they were most concerned about. 
North Americans in my sample were ‘most worried' about the risk of injury, while South Asian 
nationals were ‘most worried' of a ship collision. See Appendix 5.3.1 for the detailed results.   
 
Figure 17:  Cross-tabulation results: Nationality vs risks ‘most worried’ about 
 (b)  Nationality vs risks ‘a little worried’ about 
A Cross-tabulation  test to explore the relationship between the nationality of the seafarers and 
the risk the interviewees were only ‘a little worried’ about established that the Eastern European 
nationals were a little concerned about injury, the Western Europeans, the North Americans, 
and South Asian nationals were ‘a little worried’ about the risk of a fire incident on the ship, 
while those from the Philippines stated that they were ‘a little worried’ about ship 
collision/foundering/grounding. These results are illustrated in Figure 18 below. See Appendix 
5.3.2 for detailed test results. 
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Figure 18: Cross-tabulation results: Nationality vs risks ‘a little worried’ about 
 (c) Nationality vs risks ‘least worried’ about 
The tests on the relationship between the nationality of the seafarers and the risk they were 
‘least worried’ about found that Philippines nationals are ‘least worried’ about pirate attacks, 
while the American, Western European, South Asian and Western European nationals in my 
sample were ‘least worried’ about pirate attacks.  These results are illustrated in Figure 19 
below. See Appendix 5.3.2 for detailed test results of the Cross-tabulation analysis.  
 
Figure 19: Cross-tabulation results: Nationality vs risks ‘least worried’ about 
Based on the test results conducted to find out if there were any associations between the 
nationalities of my interviewees, and the risks that they were ‘most worried’ about, ‘a little 
worried’ about and ‘least worried’ about gave rise to two conclusions. Firstly, that there was no 
discernible pattern between the nationalities and risk levels stated by the interviewees.  
Secondly, that, because this finding was based on a sample of 22 seafarers only, there was 
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insufficient evidence from the data, of the influence of nationality on occupational risk 
perception.  
 
5.4.3 Seafarer Work Experience vs ‘Top 3’ risks 
This section documents the results of the Cross-tabulation test carried out to explore possible 
relationship(s) between the interviewees ‘work experience and the occupational risk that 
worried them most.  For ease of data manipulation, the duration of the interviewees’ work 
experience was categorized into the following four 10-year periods: 0 to 10 years, 11 to 20 
years, 21 to 30 years and 31 to 40 years.  
(a) Seafarer Work Experience vs risks ‘most worried’ about 
A Cross-tabulation test to ascertain whether any link existed between the sample’s seafarer 
work experience and the risks that they were ‘most worried’  about established that the 
interviewees of all four work-experience categories indicated that pirate attack was the 
occupational risk that they were ‘most worried’ about. This result is illustrated in Figure 20 
below. See Appendix 5.3.3 for the test details. 
, 
Figure 20: Cross-tabulation results: Seafaring work experience  
      vs risk ‘most worried’ about 
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(b) Seafarer Work Experience vs risk ‘a little worried’ about 
Tests to ascertain whether any link existed between the sample seafarers’ work experience and 
the risk that they were ‘a little worried’ about, established that the interviewees with less than 
ten years’ seafaring experience were ‘a little worried’ about fire, while those with 11-20 years 
at sea were ‘a little worried’ about collision/foundering/grounding, and those with over 20 
years’ work experience were ‘a little worried’ about injury. This result is illustrated in Figure 
21 below. See Appendix 5.3.3 for the full test output. 
 
Figure 21: Cross-tabulation results: Seafaring work experience vs risks ‘a little worried’ about 
(c) Seafarers’ Work Experience vs Risks ‘least worried’ about 
The relationship between the interviewees’ work experience and the risk that they were ‘least 
worried’ about is displayed in Figure 5.3.3 (b) below. From the results, I identified the pirate 
attack as the risk of the least concern to my interviewees with seafaring experience of fewer 
than five years, and over 10 years. Those with between 11 and 20 years’ experience also 
indicated fire as being of the least concern to them. The section of interviewees with between 
6 and 10 years’ work experience identified fire as the concern that they were ‘least worried’ 
about.  These results are illustrated in Figure 22 below. The relatively-low regard for pirate 
attacks shown by those in my sample with less than five years' work experience contradicts my 
earlier observation in Section 5.3.3 (a) that identified the pirate attack as the one risk which 
interviewees with varying lengths of seafaring experiences were ‘most worried' about. I will 
address this contradiction in the concluding section of this chapter. Based on the observations 
that I have mentioned in this sub-section, about the possible influence of my interviewees' work 
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experience on their views about their occupational risks, and due to the fact that the results were 
obtained from a research sample of forty-four interviewees, I concluded that there was no 
sufficient evidence from the data, of the influence of work experience on risk perception. See 
Appendix 5.3.3 for detailed test results.  
 
Figure 22: Cross-tabulation results: Seafaring work experience vs risks ‘least worried’ about 
 
5.5 Current Position Ship vs ‘Top 3’  
The positions held by my research comprised of fourteen designations spread among forty-four 
individuals. These seafaring positions included Chief Mate/Chief Officer, Chief Engineer, 
Security Officer, Navigation Officer, 2nd Officer, 4th Engineer, 3rd Engineer, Engine Oiler, 
Able-bodied Seaman, Cadet (trainee), Chief Cook, Ordinary Seaman, Wiper and Sailor.  A 
Cross-tabulation across the entire sample’s current positions to find out the risks that my sample 
was ‘most worried’ about, ‘a little worried’ about and ‘least worried’ about provided the 
following observations:  firstly, that pirate attack was the occupational risk factor that twenty 
interviewees were ‘most worried’ about. This concern was expressed by interviewees in a 
number of roles, except for those who held positions of Security, Navigation, Chief Cook, 
Motorman and Sailor. Secondly, fire and ship collision/foundering/grounding were the 
workplace hazards that were only ‘a little worried’ about. Thirdly, some interviewees stated 
that they were ‘least worried’ about pirate attack.  An analysis of the current position against 
the ‘Top 3’ risk factors produced mixed results, in which pirate attack was indicated both as the 
occupational risk factor that all interviewees across all fourteen positions were ‘most worried’ 
about, and also the one that they were ‘least worried’ about. The respondents for both sets of 
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responses held different positions on the ships they worked on. Therefore, in order to make it 
easier to carry out tests that could help to identify any pattern(s) between the positions held and 
their stated level of risk perception, it was decided to re-code the data in order to group the 
current positions of the research sample into three meaningful categories. These groups were, 
in turn, collapsed to form grouped ranks. The collapsing of the ranks into three meaningful 
groups helped to appropriately categorise the interviewees’ positions into formal and broader 
seafaring ranks and was more suitable for the statistical analysis task. 
5.6 Collapsed/Grouped Ranks vs ‘Top 3’ Seafaring Risk Factors 
(a) Contextualising the Rank Collapsing/ Grouping 
The process of grouping the interviewees’ current positions into scalable ranks for this study 
took into account the on-board hierarchical structure, which in turn delineates the broad 
categories into which crew positions are divided in the maritime industry.  At the helm of the 
structure is the Captain (Chief Mate) who heads the Senior Officer category as the on-board 
think-tank with the overall responsibility for the whole ship. This ship managerial role including 
the whole ship's safety is also the on-board ‘risk communication' focal point between the on-
board personnel, and external actors off the ship, i.e. the shipping company, and maritime safety 
agencies, etc.  Thus, the Captain would normally have a relatively greater awareness about the 
imminent threats to the ship and is responsible for making decisions on risk communication and 
coordination of the activities geared towards the ship's safety while at the same time managing 
the routine normal day-to-day activities.  
Therefore the Captain and Senior Officers could be privy to more detailed information on 
security threats to the company than the rest of the crew. This could give them both ‘the big 
picture' (at a macro level) of piracy trends worldwide, as well as at the ‘macro' level related to 
the activities on the ship and in the areas voyage route(s). Junior Officers and Ratings, on the 
other hand, are often considered to be the ‘hands' on-board the ship, a role that made their 
concerns more task-oriented, and more about their personal safety. The analysis of ranks versus 
risks was extrapolated with this background in mind. The grouping of the interviewees by their 
current positions entailed dividing the fourteen positions into the following two meaningful 
categories.  The first included a combination of Senior Officers and Junior Officers and the 
second comprised of Junior Officers and Ratings.  The decision to divide the interviewees into 
these two groups was informed by the empirical findings found in Bailey (2009) that identified 
an association between the variations in risk perception among the different groups of workers 
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in the maritime industry.  In this study, Bailey linked the dissimilar views to the diverse levels 
of awareness about ship incident statistics (Bailey, 2009). Ship managers’ views about threat 
levels were found to coincide with actual incident statistics, unlike their peers of lower cadres. 
In assuming that the interviewees had some level of awareness about the seafaring work 
environment, in grouping the interviewees’ positions into ranks, a Rational Actor Paradigm was 
adopted.  Thus, it was assumed that the interviewees' views about risk perception differed 
according to their ranks and that different cadres of seafarers had different levels of awareness 
about the prevalent risk level on their ship and in different regions (The Royal Society, 1992). 
 
(b) Category 1: Senior Officers, Grouped (Junior Officers - Ratings) vs ‘Top 3’ risks  
In this section, the sample’s ranks have been examined against the risks that they identified as 
being of concern to them.  While the concerns have been assessed at the three risk-levels, the 
ranks have been categorized into the following three groups for a comparative analysis of the 
results: (a) Senior Officers only (b) Junior Officers and Ratings (c) Senior and Junior Officers. 
The results of a Cross-tabulation test of the Senior Officers and the combined group of Junior 
Officers and Ratings against the risks that both groups were ‘most worried’ about identified the 
threat of a pirate attack as their top concern.  The Chi-Square tests provided a probability value 
(p-value) of 0.296, which is greater than the significant value (0.05). Therefore, the null 
hypothesis (H0) is accepted. This has led to the conclusion that there was no difference between 
the rank and the risk that the interviewees were ‘most worried’ about, i.e. pirate attack.  These 
results are illustrated in Figure 23 below and detailed test results are available in Appendix 
5.3.5.   
 
Figure 23: Cross-tabulation results: Senior Officers (Junior Officers-Ratings) vs risks ‘most  
 
 
106 
 
       worried’ about. 
  
(b) Senior Officers, (Junior Officers - Ratings) vs risks ‘most worried’ about 
A Cross-tabulation test of the Senior Officers and the combined group of Junior Officers and 
Ratings, against the risks that they stated as the occupational hazard that they were ‘a little 
worried’ about found that, the risk factor the Senior Officers were ‘a little worried’ about was 
being attacked by pirates, while for the Junior Officers and Ratings, it was the possibility of a 
fire incident. These results are illustrated in Figure 24 below. A Chi-Square test of data on 
Senior Officers and the combined group of Junior Officers and Ratings data yielded a 
probability value (p-value) of 0.451. This value is greater than the significant value (0.05). 
Therefore, the null hypothesis (H0) is accepted. This has led to the conclusion that the risk that 
the Officers are ‘a little worried’ about is independent of the rank of the interviewee. Detailed 
test results are available in Appendix 5.3.5. 
.  
Figure 24: Cross-tabulation results: Senior Officers, Junior Officers-Ratings vs risks 
               ‘a little worried’ about 
 
c) Senior Officers, (Junior Officers - Ratings) vs risks ‘least worried’ about 
Results of a Cross-tabulation test of the Senior Officers and the combined group of Junior 
Officers and Ratings, against the risk factor that they were ‘least worried' about, showed that 
while Senior Officers were ‘least worried' about pirate attacks, the risk of fire was identified by 
most of the Junior Officers and Ratings. 
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Figure 25:  Cross-tabulation results: Senior Officers, Junior Officers-Ratings vs risks  
       ‘a little worried’ about 
A Chi-Square test provided a probability value (p-value) of 0.042, which is less than the 
significant value (0.05). Therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis (H0) that rank is not related to 
the ‘least feared risk', From these two observations about the relationship between rank and the 
risks that Senior Officers and   the Junior Office-Ratings grouped rank was ‘least worried about', 
I made the following two inferences: Firstly, that, based on a research sample size of 44 
individuals, there was no sufficient evidence from the data of the influence of rank on my 
interviewees' occupational risk perception. Secondly, that, based on the Chi-Square results 
obtained, the Senior Officers rank was related to the pirate attack, while the risk of fire was 
related to the Junior Officer and Rating group. These results are illustrated in Figure 25 above. 
See Appendix 5.3.5 for detailed test results. 
 
Category 2: (Senior & Junior Officers), Ratings vs ‘Top 3’ 
 
In this section, the combined/grouped rank that included both Junior and Senior Officers has 
been referred to as ‘All Officers’. 
 
(a) All Officers, Ratings Vs risks ‘most worried’ about 
Cross-tabulation test of All Officers and Ratings against the risk factor that they were ‘least 
worried’ about found that pirate attack was the risk that both rank categories were most worried 
about. Ratings had also indicated that they were most worried about ship collision, foundering 
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and grounding as well. These results are illustrated in Figure 26 below. Chi-Square test results 
provided a probability value (p-value) of 0.064, which is less than the significant value (0.05). 
Therefore, I accepted the hypothesis that the fear of pirate attack is dependent on rank. See 
Appendix 5.3.5 for detailed test results. 
 
Figure 26: All Officers, Ratings vs risks ‘most worried’ about 
 
(b) All Officers, Ratings vs risks ‘most worried’ about  
The test results from a Cross-tabulation of All Officers and Ratings against the risk factor that 
they were ‘a little worried' about showed that while those falling within the Officers rank were 
a little worried about the risk of ship collision/foundering/grounding, the ratings indicated fire 
as their first choice. These results are illustrated in Figure 27 below. The Chi-Square test results 
provided a probability value (p-value) of 0.651, which is greater than the significant value 
(0.05). Therefore, I accepted the null hypothesis that the fear of ship 
collision/foundering/grounding and fire are not dependent on my interviewees’ ranks. See 
Appendix 5.3.5 for detailed test results. 
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Figure 27: All Officers, Ratings vs risks ‘a little worried’ about 
 
(c) All Officers, Ratings vs risks ‘least worried’ about  
The results from a Cross-tabulation of All Officers and Ratings against the occupational hazard 
that they were ‘least worried’ about showed that while Officers were ‘least worried’ about the 
risk of pirate attack, Ratings were least worried about fire. These results are illustrated in 
Figure 27 below.  
 
Figure 27: All Officers, Ratings vs risks ‘least worried’ about 
This low regard for pirate attack by a section of the Officers contradicts the earlier result in 
Section 2(a) above, the risk of pirate attack was found to be the one factor that interviewees 
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from both the ‘All Officers' and the Rating rank categories were most worried about. I have 
discussed this contradiction in the concluding section of this chapter.  Chi-Square test results 
provided a probability value (p-value) of 0.660, which is greater than the significant value 
(0.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis that the relatively low regard for pirate attack by the 
Officers’ group, and of fire by Ratings, is independent of rank was accepted.  See Appendix 
5.3.5 for the test results. 
In view of the intensification of labour in the shipping industry in the decades preceding this 
study (Bloor, 2011), ships, I considered the possibility that perhaps the different worry-levels 
about piracy could have emerged from the Officers’ reflection their personal experiences or 
scenarios narrated to them by colleagues of  characteristic of voyages through ‘high-risk’ 
shipping lanes like the coast of East Africa. In such instances, when a pirate attack is assumed 
to be imminent, the Captain or his designee Officer would be concerned about ensuring that 
additional security-enhancing best management practice measures, including crew drills, and 
putting additional staff ‘on watch', these could add to an already-heavy officer's workload. This 
in itself, could cause some Officers to worry more than others.  I argue here that this difference 
in views about the risk of pirate attacks by seafarers from the same (senior) rank, could signify 
a convergence point between concerns about new and unprecedented risks (the unknown),  and 
ripple- effects of the structural changes in labour in the shipping industry. Perhaps piracy was 
indeed as a proxy for these other ‘fears' (Giddens) that seafarers had at the time this study was 
carried out. 
A closer look at the individual responses of the Senior and Junior Officers and in my sample 
provided additional information on the reasons that could help explain the different views held 
by individuals belonging to the same seafarer rank. The reasons that my interviewees provided 
for regarding pirate attacks as more worrisome, included piracy narratives in the media and by 
close associates, previous personal encounters with pirates/sea robbers, additional role-specific 
ship security responsibilities, and being privy to company risk-assessment information on the 
prevailing security threats to the company. The other section of Officers who regarded pirate 
attacks as less worrisome, attributed their views to their security training, their core business 
and primary role as security personnel, crew teamwork experience in thwarting pirate attacks, 
having armed guards on board, the ability to prioritise contracts with companies whose voyages 
are limited to safe (less risky) regions. 
 
 
 
111 
 
5.7 Variations in  Safety Ashore vs Offshore  
This study also evaluated whether the notion of ‘risk as image perception’ suggested by 
Jackson (2006), could be applied to the sample in order to explore further the variations in 
their views about occupational risk.  The data was assessed to ascertain whether the research 
sample's views of relative safety on land and at sea could provide any additional meanings 
to the images that they had constructed about their ‘likelihood of victimisation’.  To evaluate 
this facet of their risk perception, the interviewees were asked how safe they felt while 
working at-sea and ashore. Figure 28 below illustrates the variations in my interviewees’ 
responses. 
 
Figure 28: Variations in responses on feeling safe while ashore 
 
Of the forty-four seafarers in my sample, 75% of them felt very safe when going about their 
daily life ashore stating there were fewer risks compared to the dangers associated with the 
maritime environment.  In expounding on the offshore hazards, the absence of which made 
them feel safer ashore, Interviewee 12 listed the absence ashore of bad weather, big waves 
and pirates. Several other interviewees expressed similar sentiments. Others attributed their 
feeling of being more safe ashore, to the additional leisure time they have while in port, when 
they do not have to think about work, and when they are more relaxed and in the presence 
of more people, unlike while at sea (Interviewee 9) Two other interviewees expressed the 
same views. Interviewee # 6 gave a more specific reply stating that how safe he felt ashore 
depending on the country where they were docked. He felt very safe ashore in Europe and 
America. 
 
Another five interviewees stated that they felt only ‘a little safe’ ashore. One of them further 
explained that this low level of safety ashore largely depended on the port, the country as 
well as the shore where they were landing (Interviewee #19).  Some interviewees indicated 
75%
11%4%
How safe do you feel 
going about your daily life 
when on shore? 
Very Safe
A little safe
A little unsafe
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that feelings of safety while ashore varied from country to country. They perceived 
themselves as ‘being at risk' in certain countries, in certain ports, and of some coastal areas. 
How they viewed their level of risk, in turn, influenced, how safe or unsafe they felt. 
Different factors influenced their different and constantly changing levels of perceived of 
risk ashore in different countries. For instance, Interviewee #8 said that he felt ‘very safe’ 
while in ashore in port and in shopping malls in South Africa due to the presence of port 
security and guards respectively. However, he felt ‘a little unsafe’ while walking the streets 
because of a personal mugging experience. Therefore, personal experiences of victimization 
on land had a similar effect on seafarer risk perception, as did the personal encounters with 
pirates at sea. In both instances, the perception of risk was influenced by personal experience. 
 
On the other hand, about a fifth of the interviewees reported that they felt ‘very safe’ while 
at sea. They attributed this to know that they had modernised their vessel to make it more 
efficient and reduce accidents due to human error, due to safety measures on board, due to 
their personality and training, awareness of safety guidelines and the assurance of God's 
protection of them and the vessel (Interviewee #13). A few others in the sample also reported 
their reliance on divine protection. Out of the sample, twelve interviewees said that they felt 
a little safe while at sea mainly due to the unpredictable weather in the high seas (Interviewee 
#39). Five other interviewees expressed the same feeling.   About half of the interviewees 
felt neither safe nor unsafe while at sea due to the vulnerability of the ship to forces of nature 
while at sea. The comments by Interviewee #3 summarized the general position of this 
section of interviewees stating that: “the ship is floating on the sea, anything can happen”. 
One interviewee felt a little unsafe while at sea, stating that he felt a little safe only when he 
knew that his ship was going towards Somalia. This variation in my interviewees’ responses 
about their relative feelings of safety at sea is illustrated in Figure 29 below. 
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Figure 29: Responses to feeling Safe while at sea   
 
Based on the observations on the variations in the respondents' relative feelings of safety at sea 
and ashore, this study found that interviewees' perception of risk at ashore was influenced by 
personal experienced criminal victimisation, as well as the absence of natural hazards 
characteristic of the maritime environment. 
 
From the quantitative analysis presented in this section, it was established that the risk of piracy 
featured as a major concern among interviewees of all ages, across all ranks, and also among 
interviewees with different lengths of seafaring careers. The study also observed that there were 
differences in the levels of concern about piracy, by two sections of interviewees with the same 
length of seafaring experience, and also among those who belonged to the same age bracket. 
Acknowledging that SIRC ‘risk studies’ provided very helpful ideas that informed the 
development of my thematic propositions, with regards to how age, rank, nationality and work 
experience influence variations in risk perception by seafarers, however, my study found that a 
quantitative study alone was inadequate in explaining the different views among my sample.  
For while the evidence-informed findings of those earlier studies suggested that the age and 
work experience of seafarers were influenced the variations in seafarer risk perception, 
however, these reports stopped short of explaining the variations in views about the same risk 
of pirate attack, by crew members with the same length of work experience and age-groups.  
22%
27%44%
2%
0%
5%
How safe do you feel in general 
when you are at sea? 
Very safe
A little safe
Neither safe nor unsafe
A little unsafe
Very unsafe
Other
 
 
114 
 
From the observations in this section about the risk perception variations among the 
interviewees with less than six years' work experience, this study argues that the views about 
the occupational hazards by my interviewees who had between 0 and 5 years' work experience 
and also that of the individuals within the under 30-year age bracket, could have been influenced 
by other aspects of their work experience, that was beyond the scope of numbers. Based on the 
observations the initial thematic position was adapted to reflect these findings and concluded 
that Seafarer risk perception was a complex world-view constructed from the convergence of 
multiple factors emanating from the work experience. Therefore, age, nationality, rank and the 
length of the seafarer career alone did not influence the variations in seafarer occupational 
risk perception. The qualitative analysis endeavoured to further interrogate the interview data 
so as to find additional information within the seafarer work environment, that could identify 
additional seafarer work experience-related information that could better-explain the influence 
of age, nationality, rank and work experience on seafarer risk perception.  This is the task of 
the qualitative data analysis, which is the subject of the section that follows. 
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Section B: Qualitative Data Analysis 
 Factors Influencing Variations in Seafarer Risk Perception  
5.7 Introduction: Qualitative Data Analysis Overview 
The previous section reported on the results of the statistical tests carried out to investigate 
whether there were any associations between the risk factors that the interviewees identified as 
being in their ‘Top 3’ concerns, and their age, nationality, rank/position on ships and the length 
of their work experience. The results established that a number of the interviewees had reported 
piracy in their ‘Top 3’ concerns (with a substantial proportion putting it as their number one 
concern). This finding presented a dilemma for the following three reasons: None of the 
respondents had been taken hostage by pirates; Just a handful of the respondents had been on 
ships that had experienced failed attempts by pirates; only a minority among the interviewees 
had personally witnessed armed robbery with violence against their colleagues while docked in 
West African ports.  This was the core paradox that this section set out to explain.  The study 
found that the suggestion by Slovic (2002) that risk perception is a complex phenomenon, 
requiring multiple (expert and non-expert) perspectives to help identify aspects that may not be 
revealed through statistical tests, was true for this study of a sample of seafarers.   
Although SIRC studies had suggested that variations in seafarers’ risk perception were 
influenced by age and work experience, they did not explain the differences in views about the 
same risk by crewmembers with the same length of work experience and by individuals of the 
same age.  This section elaborates and explores issues raised in the quantitative data analysis 
by further examining the qualitative data for additional information that could help to explain 
these conflicting views about the risk of pirate attack.  In order to discuss seafarer occupational 
risk in more concrete terms, this study has used the hazardous phenomenon of maritime piracy 
to illustrate how seafarer risk perception plays out in the lives of ship’s crew.  This choice was 
informed by the research observations in the previous chapter, which identified pirate attack as 
a consistent concern among the research interviewees.  
This section reports on the qualitative analysis of interview data that explored salient elements 
of seafarers’ lived experience that could be relevant in shaping perceptions about the risk of 
piracy. The qualitative data analysis in this chapter found that, when seafarers talk about their 
perception and concerns about piracy, they are referring to one or more of a number of distinct 
things (including the ABC Affect/emotion, Behavioural adaptions, and Cognitive assessments 
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of personal risk and/or the general problem of piracy).  Secondly, there are high levels of stated 
concern about piracy overall in the sample of seafarers, despite the fact that none had ever 
experienced piracy directly, according to the official definition.  When asked to rank particular 
occupational risks, the seafarers consistently ranked piracy higher than many other occupational 
hazards, even though the latter hazards were more statistically frequent.  Within the sample, 
there appeared to be some interesting variations in the levels of fear expressed between those 
seafarers of different age groups, by length of career, depending on the type of ship and routes 
followed.   
The discussion in this section revolves around the following themes- 
•  Piracy narratives and images facilitate both risk communication and amplification 
• Seafarers’ views about risk vary in different geographic settings, in different regions, both 
while at sea and ashore; 
• Seafarers’ family concerns influence the variation in their views about risk;  
       Each theoretical proposition is analysed under a separate section. 
 
 
5.8  Risk Communication and Amplification:  Role of Piracy Narratives and Images   
5.8.1  Piracy Risk Communication 
(a) Piracy Risk Information Sources   
 The analysis suggested that information about the threat posed by piracy originated from three 
main sources: through personal accounts by colleagues and close associates, from both solicited 
and unsolicited piracy incident reports and news in print and electronic form, and through pre-
departure briefings in their countries.  Each source of information has been discussed separately 
in order to identify it as an avenue through which seafarers receive risk information.  The first 
source of information on the risk of piracy mentioned by some of the interviewees was direct 
and indirect experiences of encounters with pirates.  Failed pirate attacks, experienced by the 
interviewees or successful ones narrated to them, or described in media narratives, portrayed 
pirate incidents to them as an unpleasant and violent experience.  They symbolised sources of 
first-hand and reliable information about the risk of harm posed by pirate attacks and hostage 
experiences. The experiences included their personal involvement in failed pirate attacks, and 
indirect experiences narrated to them by close associates.  
Although none of the 44 interviewees had been taken hostage by pirates, ten of them had worked 
on ships that had been attacked by pirates and sea robbers in different parts of the world.  The 
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failed pirate attacks had taken place along the coast of East Africa (Interviewees #7,8,13, 19, 
29, 32, 34), and while sailing along the Malacca Strait in South East Asia (Interviewee #6). 
Three attacks on crewmembers by sea robbers and the theft of items were reported by two 
interviewees to have occurred while their ships were docked in Conakry, Freetown and Lagos 
ports in West Africa. One interviewee who had been a repeat victim of attacks by sea robbers a 
few months prior to the interview, recalling the incident said that:    
“Some people boarded our ship looking for something to steal. They came like 
mice to steal mooring rope…they stole a watch, telephone and VHF radio and 
ran away…” (Interviewee #43) 
Interviewee #42 had a similar experience in Lagos. From this account, apparently the sea 
robbers were more interested in stealing valuables (material objects) from the ships that they 
boarded illegally. The stolen items included personal property belonging to crewmembers, as 
well as items for use in work-related tasks. From the responses of these individuals who had 
experiences with sea robbers in West Africa, it appeared that even though at the time the 
interviews were held, piracy in that area was mainly a low-level enterprise crime. However, as 
seafarers spend a long time separated from their families, when personal items were stolen, a 
link with their loved ones is broken. Therefore, when sea robbers ransacked his cabin stealing 
seemingly insignificant items that had sentimental value to the interviewees, then it is this value 
of the lost item that influenced the interviewees’ piracy risk perception. Both these interviewees 
reported that pirate attacks were the occupational threat about which they were ‘most worried’.  
Experiences narrated to the interviewees by their relatives and the interviewees indicated close 
associates as a source of information on the risk of pirate attack. These included fellow seafarers 
who were not known to them personally. A sample of the relatives who had narrated the ordeal 
of countering pirate attacks included members of the immediate and extended family, and other 
close associates. Here, three interviewees recalled that:  
“Last year in 2010 my big brother was working on a ship when they were chased by 
pirates……” (Interviewee #44)   
My uncle has been working on three different ships when they were attacked along the coast 
of Somalia” (Interviewee #24).  
“Last year my cousin was taken hostage by pirates…….” (Interviewee #27) 
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“The ship of someone I know was hijacked… (Interviewee #30). “We hear of many 
Ukrainians who have been on ships attacked by pirates…many of my friends have 
experienced a piracy attack” (Interviewee 41).  
I made two inferences form these account. Firstly, that due to the close (family or friend) 
relationship between the interviewees and the piracy victims made them regard the accounts 
as trustworthy. Secondly, that due to the reliable character of the risk information source, 
even the case of failed pirate attempts was interpreted to carry a threat of harm, and it was 
quite a significant event in the interviewee’s mind.   
 
Both direct and indirect experiences of failed and successful pirate attacks shaped my 
interviewees’ views about occupational risk.  Some interviewees, who had heard about the 
ordeals endured by ex-hostages, indicated some of the hostage experiences that influenced 
how they viewed the risk of pirate attack including the uncertainty about hostage period 
duration, physical discomfort, and the possibility of a fatal outcome.  In this regard, four 
interviewees stated that:   
 
“…  My cousin was held by pirates for 8 months …the first week was the worst.  he said that 
it was a very bad experience… ” (Interviewee #27)  
 
“The ship of someone I know was hijacked and held for months” (Interviewee #37) 
“The crew were contained in a small space with little water and food ….” (Interviewee #30) 
“I heard from others that their ship was attacked by pirates.  Also some Filipinos were killed 
by pirates last year…”  (Interviewee #38)  
 
Whereas a section of the interviewees had heard from a single person who had personally 
had a direct encounter with pirates, others learnt of piracy from multiple workmates, from 
fellow citizens, and from seafarers of different nationalities who had been victims of piracy 
(Interviewee #38), or who knew of someone who had survived an ordeal at the hands of 
pirates.   
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     A second major channel through which all interviewees had received piracy risk 
information was through print and electronic media.  This opinion was captured by the 
response by one interviewee who stated that: 
 
  “I have had no personal experience with piracy but have heard about it from TV, News, 
*** magazine that pirates board ships and ask for ransom” (Interviewee #10).  
A number of other interviewees expressed similar views. 
 
An evaluation of the interviewee responses disaggregated the main media modes of piracy 
risk information dissemination: Daily news on TV, emailed news and through printed copies 
of newspapers distributed on board at ports of call (Interviewee #13); Weekly International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) reports (Interviewee #17), and shipping industry-specific print 
and electronic news, solicited and unsolicited newsletters freely distributed to seafarers 
through port-based seafarer leisure centres, maritime training institutes and on ships as well 
(Interviewee #16). Other interviewees also mentioned having received information on the 
high risk posed by pirate attacks in East Africa, and additional information on Counter-
Piracy Best Management Practice, during pre-departure briefings, at seminars to disseminate 
information to all serving seafarers and other interactive forums where the interviewees met 
with colleagues at the maritime training institutions.  Other new piracy information sources 
that emerged during this study, included the early warning/alerts issued to ships by NATO 
and EU NAVFOR allied naval forces along the coast of East Africa when suspicious 
watercraft were spotted, and also through informal discussions with armed guards and crew 
of other ships while travelling in convoy.  
 
In addition, companies received reports on piracy threat levels and statistics, and email updates 
on hostage negotiations and releases. The interviewee responses indicated that they received 
piracy risk information through a number of sources.  Some of the information was solicited, 
while most was unsolicited and freely available.  The general view across the whole sample 
pointed to the print and electronic media as being a regular source of both solicited and 
unsolicited piracy information.  Most of the interviewees appeared to have had access to more 
than one source of print and electronic piracy news and other information. The variety of media 
sources also included freely available seafarer newsletters and magazines, which were available 
on board ships in various languages and at seafarer missions.  During the research period, piracy 
was a topical issue of concern to all stakeholders in the shipping industry. In addition, Very 
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High Frequency (VHF) radio exchange among ships provided real-time information to ship 
Captains while offshore, and especially while passing through high-risk and/or busy shipping 
lanes.  
 
(b) Content of Piracy Risk Information  
The previous sub-section, enumerates the interviewees’ sources of piracy risk information. 
These included some personal experiences of failed attacks, witnessing robbery with violence 
against their colleagues on board, stories from colleagues and close associates, and piracy risk 
information received through print and electronic media.  Interviewee #27 articulated the impact 
on seafarers of the cumulative effect of piracy over time; whereby it created an awareness of 
the high risk to crew associated with pirate attacks and the ripple effects of increased crew 
alertness to their risk of becoming victims of piracy crime. The relationship between media 
piracy reports of crime and increased fear of piracy, can be explained when the potential of 
different sources of criminal incidents is considered in the social amplification of piracy risk. 
The interviewees’ concern about the risk of piracy can be explained in light of the cumulative 
effect of regular piracy updates and other forms of news that they received on a regular basis.  
Such information on piracy has the potential to keep seafarers preoccupied with the dangers 
that maritime piracy poses to them, and to make them regard pirate attacks against them as 
highly probable 
 
This section sets out to examine the means through which the research sample received 
information about the risk posed by maritime piracy. The responses of the interviewees   
describing the content of piracy information received are used to illustrate how the amount, 
frequency and source of information affected their piracy risk perception. Specific aspects of 
the content of messages portray pirate attacks as threatening, and therefore passing on such 
messages has the potential to influence the interviewees’ perception of piracy as an occupational 
risk factor.  From information received through the print and electronic media, the interviewees 
constructed mental images about ‘the riskiness’ of pirate attacks from piracy statistics that 
captured the frequency of successful pirate attacks, the large number of seafarers held hostage 
at any one time and their nationalities, the increasingly long hostage periods and the huge 
ransom amounts being paid out to pirates to free hostages. Crime statistics have the potential to 
steadily increase the fear of seafarers falling victim to crime. The statistics that quantified 
certain harmful results of pirate attacks were the main pointers of a degenerating piracy 
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situation. Over a period, as crew receive similar negative news of pirate attacks and related 
deaths, this could paint a gloomy picture on the maritime piracy trend in East Africa.  From the 
responses, it appears that information filtering through the electronic media to seafarers 
communicated increased levels of risk to the interviewees, with regular announcements 
containing more bad news about piracy.  
For instance, the following responses captures the role of pirate attack incident statistics in 
fuelling fear, building mental images of piracy as an increased threat to seafarers’ safety: 
“Statistics on piracy cause enough fear” (Interviewee #6). 
“We get weekly reports sent to seafarers by *** from which I learnt that pirates are stealing 
more ships, kidnapping many crew and asking for a lot of ransom money...”  (Interviewee 
#31)  
The link suggested by Jackson (2006) between the communications of piracy risk (statistical) 
information was explored to evaluate its influence on the construction of seafarers’ views on 
risk.  This study found that there was a link between the sources, content, amount of piracy 
risk information and piracy risk perception among the sample due to the dissemination of 
regular piracy risk information including statistics, which sustained a growing mental image 
of being ‘at risk’ of a pirate attack. The regular piracy reports appeared to reinforce this 
interviewee's views about the increased risk associated with pirate attacks. The influence of 
media reports in fuelling the interviewees’ risk perception can be better understood when 
analysed in light of the powerful influence of electronic media in the 21st century. Additional 
comments by the other interviewees focused on how their risk perception was influenced by 
risk information that pointed to the large number of seafarers held hostage at any one time. 
This painted in the   interviewees’ minds, an image of a worsening situation of the threat of 
piracy. Such that even the interviewees whose voyages did not include ‘high piracy risk 
areas’ (HRAs) were not immune to the impact of risk information in fuelling their increased 
awareness that crew were the targeted victims of pirate activities in East Africa. In this 
regard, two interviewees stated that,   
“…piracy is a threat to all seafarers and I could be a victim sometime (Interviewee #38) 
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“…. seafarers on all ships are part of the same professional group as me…. we are all 
victims of pirates…” (Interviewee #33)  
 
Information about the uncertainty surrounding ransom negotiations was also stated as a factor 
that influenced the views about the risky character of piracy. The interviewees reported that in 
some cases, the ransom negotiations took a long time, or that ship owners abandoned their 
employees who had been captured by pirates, claiming bankruptcy and thus an inability to pay 
the ransom premiums demanded by to pirates to free hostages. 
 “ ………. their ship was taken over by pirates, they were held hostage, the 
ransom was not going to be paid so some hostages escaped by jumping into the 
sea and were rescued by Navy on patrol. But, the ones who did not jump into 
the sea were shot by the pirates” (Interviewee #38) 
 
Some of my interviewee responses indicated that piracy risk information relayed by the media 
was the avenue through which they obtained detailed information on the harmful consequence 
faced by crew who experienced pirate attacks. From the interviewees’ responses, the fear of 
such repercussions influenced their perception of the risk of pirate attacks. Pirate risk 
information portrayed situations of jeopardy resulting from both failed pirate attacks, but 
especially from piracy hostage experiences. The following comments capture the view that 
hardships befell seafarers once they were in the hands of pirates. These included physical, 
psychological and mental distress for long periods, occasionally with fatal consequences. Each 
form of piracy information, whether electronic, print or verbal, had the ability to trigger a string 
of negative thoughts in the interviewees’ minds. These in turn could increase their awareness 
of, or attention to, the possible danger to their safety (Farrall, Gray and Jackson, 2008, 367). 
Thus through statistics, messages focusing on the negative consequences of pirate attacks 
helped fuel seafarers’ piracy risk perception. Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones (2002) analysed the 
cognitive process of the Social Amplification of Risk, to illustrate how mass media narratives 
and images can influence the development of anxiety about ‘risk’. They highlighted the role of 
the media in amplifying the risk associated with hazards that are of a low probability, but of 
high consequences, such as train crashes and terror attacks (Alaszewski and Horlick-Jones, 
2002, 16).  
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In order to assess whether these views held true in the maritime work environment, this study 
considered whether seafarers and the ships they worked on could be regarded as mobile piracy 
‘risk amplification centres’ that facilitate communication of maritime piracy risk. The 
interviewees’ accounts highlighted the influential role played by mass media in a globalised 
information age, as it both communicated and amplified the risk of pirate attacks in East Africa. 
After the initial piracy risk information had been received by the interviewees, further media 
reports, piracy incident statistical updates and ‘stories’ narrated by colleagues further reinforced 
the fact that seafarers were ‘at risk’ of pirate attacks. Therefore, regular and successive risk 
information facilitated a piracy risk perception ‘snowballing effect’. In this sense, ships 
functioned as mobile maritime piracy risk perception amplification centres.    
 
Even after the maritime safety statistics pointed to a general reduction in the threat of pirate 
attacks in East Africa, media reports still portrayed piracy as a high-risk factor in spite of it 
having assumed a relatively-low probability risk factor in the region. As the epicentre of pirate 
attacks shifted from the eastern to the western part of the African continent, piracy rhetoric in 
the media compared the emerging trend in the latter region, to the previous trend in the former 
region. Through this media delivery, piracy narratives communicated by the media facilitated 
the transference of risk perception from East Africa to West Africa. Since these two regions 
were within one land mass, such comparisons portray a geographic spread, and increase in size 
of the area where seafarers are under the threat of pirate attack. Therefore, the media facilitated 
an amplification of piracy risk perception and   acted as a conduit for linking high piracy risk 
areas within the seafarer work environment. This geographic link could have made the high 
piracy risk area appear to have expanded. Risk transference and linking of high risk areas 
around the same continent by the media, had the potential influence the seafarers’ views about 
piracy risk.  
 
Interviewee responses also pointed to a link between their views about the risk of pirate attack, 
by implying the possible ripple effects of the communicated threats to the emotional welfare of 
their families as well. Risk communication travelled beyond the boundaries of the seafaring 
work environment, and into seafarers’ private lives, and its effects were felt among the seafarers’ 
families and seafarer-sending communities located in areas far-removed from piracy high-risk 
areas. From the responses of the   interviewees, this study found that both the sources of piracy 
information and the content of information relayed had influenced the seafarers’ views about 
maritime piracy risk in different ways. While some interviewees received information about the 
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nature, extent and consequences of pirate attacks from print and electronic media and from tales 
by close associates, others stated that they had first-hand information about the threat of pirate 
attack from personal experiences.  
 
 
5.9 Geo-Spatial Variations in ‘Risk as Image Perspective’  
 
The quantitative analysis carried out in the previous chapter identified pirate attack as ranked 
among the ‘Top 3’ seafaring occupational hazards that all the interviewees with varying work 
experiences were concerned about. However, there were differences in the level of concern 
about the risk of pirate attack, among three groups of interviewees. Namely, the individuals in 
the under 30 years’ age bracket, among interviewees with   less than six years of seafaring 
experience, and among the Officers in the sample.  Further scrutiny of the ships that the Officers 
worked on at the time they were interviewed, showed that those who were ‘least worried’ about 
pirate attacks worked for shipping companies whose routes were mainly in the Baltic Sea, 
Mediterranean Sea and South America and did not include East Africa. Therefore, they worked 
on ships and routes where piracy was not a real reality in their geographical area of operation. 
On the other hand, the Officers who were ‘most worried’ about pirate attacks, included those 
who had worked on ships along the coast of East Africa.  A quantitative data analysis failed to 
adequately explain these three contrasting views.  This realization prompted me to seek 
additional information that could provide me with an expanded view of the detailed aspects of 
the work experience of the Officers, of the individuals in aged under 30 years, and of 
interviewees with less than six years of seafaring experience.   
 
It was already established that modern seafarers are migrant workers, whose careers are 
developed within an evolving global, mobile and maritime work environment that has been 
reputed to have a high mortality and mobility rate (Sampson, 2013). In this section, I examined 
the interviewee responses to explore whether the differences in seafarer risk perception were 
influenced by geography.  In this section, I gauged the interview responses to try and establish 
three facts: (a) Whether the differences in my respondents’ views about risk had a geospatial 
distribution, (b) if this geographic dispersal of risk perception was reflected in the views about 
their safety on land and at sea (c) to ascertain whether their views on the ‘riskiness’ or ‘non-
riskiness’ of the voyage routes that they had worked on during their seafaring career could help 
explain their different perception of risk levels. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter was 
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guided by the theoretical proposition that stated that ‘Seafarers’ views about risk vary in 
different geographic settings, in different regions, both while at sea and ashore’. 
 
(a) Variations in Perception of ‘Riskiness’ of some Routes and Ships 
 
Due to an increase of frequency in both successful and failed pirate attacks in East Africa 
has earned the region the labels of 'top piracy hotspot in the world' and 'high risk area' (HRA). 
Therefore, a number of the interviewees who were worried about a high risk of pirate attack 
situated the risk of pirate attacks mainly within two geo-specific graphical maritime 
environments, i.e. along the coasts of East and West Africa. In this section, based on the 
interviewees’ responses, I have discussed the association between the variations in the 
perception of the risk of pirate attacks within the sample in relation to three factors: the views 
about ‘riskiness’ verses ‘non-riskiness’ of some geographic areas denoted by shipping 
route(s), ashore and off-shore, and of certain types of ships.   
 
In light of the ‘piracy crises’ in East Africa during the research period, it was significant 40 out 
of the 44 interviewees reflected that they geographically associated a reduced threat of piracy 
with being far from the East African coast. In addition, some interviewees who often passed 
areas reported to have a higher number of pirate attacks regarded their likelihood of being 
attacked as also high (Interviewee #31). A few other interviewees expressed similar responses. 
Individuals in the sample with a higher level or concern about the risk of pirate attacks linked 
their increased level of risk safety to regularly passing along high risk areas in East Africa 
(Somalia, Gulf of Aden) and West Africa (Gulf of Guinea, Lagos, Freetown, Conakry). The 
following responses appeared to equate passing through these areas, with increased exposure 
to the risk of pirate attack: 
 
 “Attacks off the coast of Somalia, in Lagos, in Freetown…. piracy is mainly in East Africa… 
while Europe and America are safe” (Interviewee #16) 
 
“Piracy is a problem but only in Somalia” (Interviewee #36). 
 
In contrast, other interviewees equated voyages that excluded the East and West African 
shipping routes as being associated with a lower level of risk of pirate attack.  In addition, some 
of those who were less worried about the risk of pirate attack had not yet had any contract with 
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ships whose voyages passed along the high risk areas. This view is projected in the following 
responses of some interviewees who had indicated that they were not concerned about piracy.  
 
“I have never passed East Africa” (Interviewee #28) 
 
My ship is safe because it does not go to the piracy area…… we do not pass the Gulf of Aden… 
ships avoid such areas that pose security risks” (Interviewee #42) 
 
“I am mostly in North and South Europe and till now I have never heard of any piracy” 
(Interviewee #31) 
“My work in ten years covered mainly Europe, which was considered to be a low piracy risk 
area” (Interviewee #35).   
 
“My ship travels the Baltic, the Mediterranean, South America and Britain where there is no 
piracy” (Interviewee 32) 
 
“My contracts are mainly in Europe where there is no piracy” (Interviewee # 38) 
 
This latter category of interviewees was less worried about the risk of pirate attack because 
their ships mainly plied European waters where, in their opinion, they were far less likely 
to encounter pirates. They linked their increased level of safety and lack of concern about 
the risk of pirate attack, to the relatively low-likelihood of piracy victimisation.   
In theorising on the link between the fear of crime and how people regard the danger posed 
by criminal activities, Jackson (2006) suggested that ‘risk is an image perspective’ by 
showing how thoughts about crime are linked to the emotional responses triggered in 
anticipation of possible consequences of the imminent threat. He argues that the central issue 
is how the potential impact of the crime is portrayed in the media, i.e. the ‘image of risk of 
a particular victimization’, and not the statistical likelihood of falling victim to the crime. 
Jackson also traced how fear of crime originates and travels, by emphasizing the seamless 
progression of thoughts (‘worry’) about crime, into an emotional state of anxiety about 
crime. In my study, the chain reaction from receiving risk information to ‘worrying’ about 
piracy manifested itself indifferent forms. Some interviewees appeared to recognize their 
recurring emotional awareness of a fearful, nervous feeling, and recalled that this initial 
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reaction progressed to a sense of heightened anxiety every time they were informed that their 
ship would be passing along Eastern Africa. Two interviewees stated that:  
“When we pass East Africa I become nervous because this is a piracy area…” 
(Interviewee #14) 
“I become nervous and worried. When we get near East Africa, I prepare myself for 
anything to happen” (Interviewee #15). 
For other interviewees, the risk perception manifested itself both as physical, as well as an 
emotional response to piracy as a threatening mental and psychological stimulus. This was 
especially true of individuals who had both direct and indirect experiences of piracy and 
armed robbery. This intense mental preoccupation with piracy in some instances continued 
even when they were off-duty, and at times interfered with their sleep pattern, resulting in 
insomnia. One interviewee affected by an impending sense of risk of pirate attack stated that:  
“I can’t sleep because I expect a pirate attack on our ship” (Interviewee #9). 
 This apparent preoccupation with the risk of pirate attack was also inferred from the 
response of another interviewee that pointed to an influence beyond seafarers’ control:  
 “Yes I am concerned about piracy … you can’t help but to think about it” (Interviewee #23) 
For a section of the interviewees, mental and psychological manifestations of piracy risk 
perception seemed to endure even after they had left East Africa. This enduring mental and 
psychological state was attributed to passing along ‘high risk areas’ regularly. For instance, 
Interviewee #14 said that fearful thoughts of the potentially-harmful consequences of pirate 
attacks regularly revisited him because the ship he worked on transited along the East 
African coast a couple of times in a given year. He admitted to recognising a heightened 
sense of risk manifesting itself several times, as a feeling of nervousness, especially when 
another ship passed near his ship as it passed along the East African coast. From the 
responses of three interviewees, they appeared to be so pre-occupied with the fear of pirate 
attack, that they saw pirate attack as an imminent threat to every vessel passing along the 
high-risk areas anytime. This view was projected in the responses of the three interviewees 
who stated as follows:  
 
“Every ship passing East Africa is a pirate target...” (Interviewee #38) 
“There is always the possibility of the ship being attacked….” (Interviewee # 29) 
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“When a ship is passing the area you always need to look out for pirates (Interviewee #37). 
Jackson (2006) recommended an examination of whether emotion and cognition interact, or 
if they operate independently to form an individual’s appraisal of threat, and whether the 
vivid and resonant affectively tagged images of risk are fundamentally important. From the 
observations discussed in this section, it became apparent that the images of piracy were  
constructed by the individuals in my sample were important to them personally, and were 
also of significance to this study To the interviewees, the images held special significance 
as the basis of their concern about piracy as an occupational risk. The interviewees believed 
the piracy risk information that they received regularly, because these had been corroborated 
by piracy incident statistics and ‘stories’ from close associates whom they trusted. Based on 
the believability of the images, the perception of piracy risk was an informed one. As a 
researcher, these images were important in explaining the variations in risk perception 
among the sample, even though none of them had any personal experiences of the 
consequences of pirate attacks that they had enumerated.  This study found that emotion and 
cognition did not operate independently, but instead the there was an inter-play between the 
two domains influenced how the interviewees viewed their vulnerability to pirate attacks, 
and their likelihood of victimization.  
From the discussion in this section, it became clearer that the variation in seafarer risk 
perception was geo-specific in character.  This variation was influenced by an awareness of 
the general safety piracy threat level in a given area, and the views about the hazardous 
nature of a given route based on piracy risk information in general, and on the statistics 
contained in piracy incident reports.  Bailey (2007) established that differences in the 
perception of risk resulted from a greater awareness of actual incident statistics that provided 
a global perspective on risk levels. From the observations gathered in this section, I 
established that the observation by Bailey (2007) was valid for the research sample. The 
interviewees’ views about the risk of piracy in the ‘high risk areas’ in East and West Africa, 
and ashore and at sea, were influenced by actual statistics on pirate attacks. 
 
5.10 Influence of Risk Perception on Occupational Risk Behaviour  
As discussed in Chapter 3, occupational risk perception could influence risk behaviour 
(Rayner, 2006). The assumptions of Rayner’s study established that his respondents had 
exercised their discretion in making informed decisions to protect themselves from the 
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adverse effects of radiation hazards in their workplace (Rayner, 2006). Similarly, Douglas’s 
Rational Actor Paradigm approach portrayed individual’s decision-making as an informed 
decision to negotiate risks pertinent in their work environment.  Interviewees were asked 
what they would do if they knew that their ship was going to pass along the East African 
coast. The interviewees’ responses appeared to weigh their options in assessing the 
consequences of exposure to the risk of a pirate attack and the correspondingly high rewards 
of reducing their susceptibility by engaging in counter-piracy Best Management Practice 
mechanisms for which they had been trained. The majority of those whose voyages passed 
along ‘high risk areas’, and who perceived themselves as vulnerable to pirate attacks used 
the counter-piracy skills that they had been trained in to ward off pirates.  Such informed 
decisions on risk-behaviour included risk-avoidance by opting out of certain ships, or 
selecting among an array of optional courses of action provided by the shipping companies. 
Although piracy risk-mitigating mechanisms varied from ship to ship, from the responses of 
a number of interviewees I generated a list that included various measures including counter-
piracy drills on-board, carrying a number of trained security personnel (armed guards) on 
board, ‘target-hardening’ tactics to thwart attempts by pirates to board ships, ships travelling 
in convoys through high-risk areas.  
Seafarers alter their behaviour in response to concerns about piracy. My research sample 
adopted a Rational Actor Paradigm approach in making informed decisions that enabled 
them to ‘negotiate’ the risk of pirate attack. Participating in the counter-piracy activities built 
trust among seafarers and reduced their perception of the risk of pirate attack. For instance, 
risk avoidance was the piracy risk behaviour of choice for some Senior Engineers in the 
sample mentioned in that they would avoid certain types of ships that were passing particular 
routes. The ships singled out by seafarers in this regard include tramping ships (Interviewee 
#15), such as Roll-On-Roll off (RO RO) ships and also trading ships that frequently pass 
between Africa and Asia (Interviewee #29) or any passing along the coast of Somalia 
(Interviewee #9). Three other interviewees expressed the same view. Interviewee 33, on the 
other hand, was adamant that:  
“I would first ask the route the ship is taking. If Somalia, never. I would 
not do the assignment because I am not sure if my life would be safe. In 
case the ransom is too high, I am not sure if the owner will pay” 
(Interviewee #9). 
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Opting out of certain routes was not a course of action available to the majority of the seafarers 
interviewed; however Senior Engineers were in decline in the seafarer labour force at the time 
this study was carried out, and so they had more flexibility in negotiating the risk of piracy. In 
this regard, my study found that Douglas’s notion of ‘grid’ and ‘group’ could be applied to the 
sample to a limited extent, in explaining how the decline in Senior Engineers entering the global 
seafarer supply market provided seafarers in this specific position with more flexibility to 
negotiate their workplace risks, a decision that was influenced by their level of risk perception.   
On the other hand, three interviewees indicated that they would not avoid any ship passing East 
Africa because of additional security precautions available. In this regard, one of them stated 
that;  “We pass East Africa under convoy, helicopter surveillance and an armed convoy that 
escorts our ship, which makes me feel safe” (Interviewee #16). 
These observations raised the possibility that the piracy-avoidance behaviour of the 
interviewees may have been determined to a certain extent by their rank, as this in turn 
determines their negotiating power. In rationalising this specific power dynamic from a fear of 
crime perspective, I noticed that interviewees with relatively less experience, and of a lower 
seafaring rank, adopted a different stance than did the Senior Engineers. In this regard, 
Interviewee #43 said that: 
“As a Cadet, I have no choice and go wherever I am told to go. If I refuse, then it can have 
negative consequences to my training…”. (Interviewee #43) 
This interviewee had less flexible terms of employment and fewer options to respond to risk. 
Therefore, his perception of risk could be influenced by his powerlessness and concerns for his 
job security.  Earlier studies by Bhattracharya (2007 and 2009) and Sampson and Wu (2007), 
had identified links between seafarers’ risk perception, and the precarious nature of their jobs. 
Their fear of losing their jobs has been attributed to their vulnerable position in the seafarer job 
market that offered only temporary and short-term contracts under local market conditions in 
one’s country. This was a consequence of changes in labour conditions in the global shipping 
industry. As a result, although seafarers have a low level of trust in their work environment, 
their focus is on doing whatever is necessary to retain their jobs. From this observation, I 
established that the differences in risk behaviour were influenced by the individual’s rank and 
thus on the amount of power they can wield in negotiating their occupational risks. Seafarer 
risk perception is also affected by seafarer labour conditions, which vary by country. While 
seafarers rely on their employers to provide a safe working environment and adhere to 
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occupational health and safety regulations to minimize the potential impact of occupational 
hazards, as casual and mobile workers they remain vulnerable to ill treatment and exploitation. 
Young males minimize risk. Some of the interviewees in the sample who were under 30 
years of age stated that they were ‘least worried’ about piracy, also indicated that if they 
were informed by their captain that they were approaching the East African coast, they would 
rehearse precautionary pirate-repulsing measures that they had been trained to use to thwart 
pirate attempts to board their vessel (Interviewee #36). Other interviewees appeared to 
minimize the risk of piracy in East Africa because they had passed near the Somali coast a 
number of times without being attacked (Interviewee #22).  The age and male gender of this 
group of less-concerned interviewees can be explained by empirical findings that outline 
why young males may tend to minimize risks of crime, which in this case, is the risk posed 
by piracy. Young men are more likely to claim they are not fearful, when their beliefs about 
themselves influence their perception of the possible impact of becoming a victim of crime. 
The young male interviewees in my sample could have been avoiding fearful thoughts and 
any cues pointing to negative impacts of piracy, by neutralising the impacts of possible 
victimization, and by convincing themselves that the crime will not have any harmful effects 
on them.  
In a study conducted to scrutinize and differentiate how women and men perceive crime 
risks and fear, Smith and Torstensson (1977) found that men’s perception of risk and fear of 
crime victimization is affected by age, injury experiences, educational attainment, social 
class and economic status (Smith and Torstensson, 1977; 626). Smith and Torstensson’s 
(1977) study identified that empowerment through educational and occupational attainment 
and subscribing to values of physical prowess (machismo) among the lower class are two 
ways of explaining the lower level of perceived risks and fear among young men.  
 
When neutralization techniques are employed, they can enable one to justify the criminal act 
either by denying any responsibility for the act, or by denying that it can injure or has injured 
them, or by condemning the condemners, or by appealing to higher loyalties (Agnew, 1985). 
These earlier studies helped to explain how one section of the interviewees might have 
(unconsciously) employed neutralising techniques to expound on how they viewed piracy, 
while others’ responses did not portray any discernible techniques. Of those who used such 
techniques, some denied any responsibility by seafarers for being attacked by pirates. To this 
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effect, one seafarer stated that, seafarers were innocent victims of attacks on ships, and that the 
attacks were an offshore symptom of larger land-based problems in Somalia including youth 
unemployment, and the proliferation of arms produced and manufactured in rich countries 
(Interviewee #34). A second neutralising technique used by a number of the interviewees was 
to either directly and/or indirectly deny that pirates intended to injure seafarers. In this regard, 
Interviewee #43 was the only one whose responses reflected support or ‘Stockholm Syndrome-
like’ empathy with the pirates. He discounted the pirates’ intention to injure crew, stating that; 
“pirates do not want to kill you, just give them what they want and they will leave you alone” 
(Interviewee #43). I regarded his standpoint as being in line with the neutralising technique of 
‘condemning the condemners’.  
 
5.11 Influence of Family Concerns on Piracy Risk Perception 
In this section, I have assessed the extent to which any secondary effects resulting from   piracy 
risk communication including the interviewees’ concern about possible effects of pirate attacks 
on family members could influence their views about occupational risk.  Although seafarers 
‘sacrifice’ for their families, responses by a number of the   interviewees reflected their concerns 
about the possibility that there are potential negative ripple effects of piracy on their families. 
Worried about the possibility of crew members being hijacked by pirates was a mutual concern 
both for seafarers as direct (potential) victims, and by their families and dependents as indirect 
or tertiary victims of pirate attacks. This concern is reflected in the response of one seafarer 
who stated that: 
 “…My mother is very worried about me. When my ship goes to East Africa, 
I have to ring her at every port so she knows I am ok, or she will be worried” 
(Interviewee #8) 
Family members of active seafarers were bearing the psychological burden of pirate attacks. 
This influenced the interviewees’ perception of risk, which was already fearful for their 
safety. The perception of the risk of piracy was also linked to the financial repercussions that 
could result from a seafarer falling into the hands of pirates. Expressing this one of the 
interviewees stated that: 
 
Seafaring is a nice job and enables me to support my family. Piracy attacks 
worry my family ….” (Interviewee #24). 
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A number of interviewees stated a similar view. Those interviewees who stated that they 
were the sole breadwinners for their families echoed this view. Therefore, in addition to 
worries about possible negative emotional consequences to seafarer family members 
associated with piracy, the interviewees’ perception of the risk of pirate attack piracy was 
also due to the threat that it was perceived to pose to their livelihood. Concerns by family 
members for the safety of their loved ones who were working at sea compelled some family 
members to follow piracy updates posted on the internet and in the print and electronic 
media. Thus, families also accessed piracy risk information to keep up-to-date on the piracy 
crisis. Therefore, when an attack was reported, families would check the incident report(s) 
to establish the identity of the hostages, and to ascertain whether their loved one had been 
involved.  From the observation about the possible negative emotional and financial impact 
of piracy on families, the interviewees’ perception of risk of pirate attack was also influenced 
by their concern of the potential ripple effect on their families. 
 
5.12 Influences of Broader Work Experience Factors 
The quantitative data analysis in the previous chapter revealed variations in risk perception 
among seafarers with the same length of seafarer work experience   A closer look at the work 
experience of the 18 individuals who had ranked piracy as the risk that they were most 
worried about, indicated that 14 of them had worked as seafarers for less than ten years, 
while the remaining four had worked on ships for more than ten years. I also noted that out 
of the research sample of 44 interviewees, the 14 who had identified piracy as the risk factor 
that they were most concerned about had careers of less than ten years, while the other four 
with the same level of concern about piracy had more than ten years’ experience at sea. This 
variation in concern about piracy in my research sample comprising of seafarers in active 
service in the international fleet at the same period that piracy incidents in East Africa were 
on the rise, can be rationalised through a discussion on ‘Subjective Immunity’ proposed by 
The Royal Society in Risk (1992).  
 
The observation that the interviewees with relatively-longer seafaring work experience had 
the same fearful view of piracy as those with shorter work-experience is consistent with 
Mary Douglas’s (1985) observation that no matter how long humans are exposed to hazards, 
no level of familiarization with risk can adequately equip human beings to cope with 
everyday hazards (Douglas, 1985, 29). However, because of this similarity in concern about 
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piracy by both relatively inexperienced seafarers and experienced seafarers  it was difficult 
to ascertain whether the same criteria was being used by both sections of seafarers to estimate 
the risk posed by piracy. For it is possible for differences in criteria to exist within the same 
occupational (sub) groups (The Royal Society, 1992, 77). It is possible that those with shorter 
work experience will regard piracy with more concern than those with longer work 
experience, the latter of whom having been exposed to a wider variety of the perils of the 
seafaring work environment in their career. Secondly, I concluded that, those who had 
shorter work experiences and who were all under 40 years of age and of male gender, may 
have had little or no concern about piracy, as they may have unconsciously used neutralising 
devices to minimize the risk of piracy.  
 
5.12.1  Influence of Ship Design Vs Type of Risk    
In elaborating on seafarers’ fear of piracy as a major concern, the interviewees who indicated 
that they were afraid of going to piracy areas also said that they were unable to avoid passing 
along East Africa for they could not opt out of voyages through high risk areas from fear of 
losing their jobs and/or not getting further work (Interviewee #25), and that risk 
compensation allowance paid out to seafarers when they passed piracy hotspots is good 
additional income (Interviewee #40). Four others in the sample expressed similar views. The 
interviewees also mentioned specific ships that they thought pirates had taken a liking to, 
and therefore these ships were regarded by seafarers as being riskier. Given a choice, they 
said would avoid those vessels that were specially targeted by pirates. Some ships are 
targeted for their design, including oil tankers, bulk carriers and container ships as they are 
considered slow ships with low decks near the water line that can be easily captured by 
pirates, who hook ladders onto the ship easily because the deck is near the waterline 
(Interviewee #1). Several other interviewees shared the same opinion. Interviewee responses 
pointed to heavily loaded bulk carriers as being highly lucrative targets for pirates as they 
could reap multiple benefits from both human as well as non-human elements on board. In 
this regard, one interviewee stated that: 
“Pirates think that these ships are very good because they can take seafarers 
hostage and get ransom through delaying the ship from delivering its cargo” 
(Interviewee #13). 
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 Other interviewees stated that oil tankers were regarded as prime targets for pirates, because 
pirates could reap ransom from the capture of the crew and syphon the oil cargo for illegal 
re-sale. This was a significant observation, because of reports emerging as this study came 
to an end, which showed an increase in attacks on small tankers in Southeast Asia, by gangs 
interested in stealing the marine diesel and (gas/oil) cargo for re-sale. This ‘petro-piracy’ 
property crime was also reported to be a thriving in West Africa (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 
2016). In view of this emerging trend, interviewees’ perceptions of the risk of pirate attack 
on oil tankers and of these types of vessels as being ‘more-risky’ was a valid observation. 
Yet, another section of the interviewees identified passenger ships (cruise liners) as possible 
targets, due to the high number of potential human targets aboard. One interviewee 
elaborated on this view when he stated that: “Pirates equate big ships with big money” 
(Interviewee #20).  
 This latter section of the chapter had set out to explore three theoretical propositions: That, 
seafarers’ views about risk varied in different geographic settings, in different regions, both 
while at sea and ashore; That, maritime piracy narratives and images facilitated both risk 
communication and amplification; That, family concerns influenced seafarers’ views about the 
risk of maritime piracy. The facts established through the qualitative data analysis are 
summarised in the section 5.13 below.  
 
5.13 Chapter Summary 
 
The two data analysis processes reported in this chapter generated two-inter-related sets of 
research findings. Section A of this chapter set out to explore the thematic proposition that: age, 
nationality, rank and the length of work experience influence Variations in seafarer 
occupational risk perception. SPSS was used to carry out Cross-tabulation and/or Pearson’s 
Chi-Square tests in order to assess whether there were any identifiable pattern(s) between the 
interviewees’ responses projecting their level of concern about the ‘Top 3’ seafaring risks that 
they had identified.  The test results were interpreted based on the null hypothesis that; 
Variations in risk perception are not linked to age, rank, nationality and work experience. Five 
main findings reported in this section, emerged from this interpretation of the test results, and 
directly relate to each of these characteristics. Firstly, that although the risk of piracy was 
identified as the risk about which my interviewees of all age categories were either ‘a little 
worried about or ‘most worried’ about, the risk of piracy was independent of my sample’s age. 
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 Results from each age-group showed that, the individuals who were under 30 years of age, 
identified ship collision/foundering/grounding, while interviewees in the 31 to 40-year age 
bracket identified pirate attack as their major concern. The individuals aged between 41 and 50 
years stated that both injury and attack by pirates were their major concern. Based on this 
observation, I concluded that fear of being attacked by pirates, was a consistent major concern 
among all the age groups in my sample. The Chi-Square test results corroborated the acceptance 
of the Null Hypothesis.This finding contradicts with the observation in the SIRC ‘risk studies’ 
that linked the seafarer risk perception levels with their age.  Secondly, that there was no 
identifieable link between the nationalities of my interviewees and their occupational risk 
perception.  
The tests of the nationalities against the ‘Top 3’ risks, did not identify any generalisable pattern 
that could highlight any association between the two variables. Ship 
collision/foundering/grounding was indicated as the risk factor that South Asian, Western and 
Eastern European interviewees found most worrisome. Injury was the one risk that Eastern 
European and South Asian interviewees were ‘a little worried’ about. While pirate attackwas 
pin-pointed as the factor about which the South Asian, Western and Eastern Euroepean 
nationals in my sample were least worried about. Based upon the research observations, I 
concluded that there was no link between nationalities of my interviewees, and their ‘Top 3’ 
risk factors. Thirdly, regarding association between my interviewees’ ranks and their projected 
occupational risk perception, the study found that there were differences in the views held by 
two sections of Officers about risk that pirate attacks posed to seafarers. Based upon this result, 
it was established that the differences in piracy risk-perception among these individuals 
belonging to the same rank, could be regarded as subjective observations that were socially-
constructed within the context of a hazardous occupation (Bailey and Walters, 2013, 35). This 
conclusion arose from an assessment of the relationship between  my interviewees’ relatively-
senior position within the on-board hierarchy, against their risk perception levels.  
Whereas the analysis established that pirate attacks were the risk that all the interviewees of all 
ranks were ‘most worried’ about,  some of the interviewees in the combined Senior Officers 
and Junior Officers’ group  stated that they were ‘least worried’ about pirate attacks. In seeking 
to better understand this contradiction in how the Officers viewed the risk of pirate attack, this 
study considered the possibility that the impact of structural changes in general, and shrinking 
crew numbers in particular, on the way Officers may regard the risk of pirate attack, may have 
caused this seemingly contradictory view. For although Officers are positioned in the upper 
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rungs of the crew (Sampson, 2013, 77), the intensification of labour in the shipping industry in 
recent decades as a result of structura lchanges in the shipping industry (Bloor 2011), could 
have resulted in fewer crew members being available on-board, to carry out the recommended 
counter-piracy target-hardening activities on ships. Since Officers had responsibility for major 
functions on the ship, due to individual differences it is possible that thoughts about pirate 
attacks could worry some Officers more than others.   
The basis of their different risk levels notwithstanding, this variation in the perception of the 
same risk factor (pirate attack), by individuals within the same rank and profession, reiterates 
the suggestions made by The Royal Society (1992) report about the subjective nature of the 
views held by employees on workplace dangers.  Additionally, since the Officers in my sample 
hailed from different regins of the workd, the subjectiveness of their views about risk could be 
rooted in the milieu of their diverse cultural backgrounds wherein their general worldviews are 
constructed.  
This study concluded that the lens through which the Officers viewed the risk of piracy, was 
coloured by multiple  factors,  related to their on-board roles and responsibilities of Officers. 
These factors warranted a more detailed explanation to provide a more comprehensive 
discusion on the complexity of piracy risk perception within the same rank. This main thrust of 
Section B was to explain the influence of these additional factors underlying the different views 
about the risk of piracy by individuals of the same rank. Fourthly, from an evaluation of the 
length of the interviewees’ seafaring experience and their ‘Top 3’ risks, there was no statistical 
evidence that risk perceptions are related to the number of years that they had worked as 
seafarers i.e. the length of their work experience alone, and in isolation of other work 
experience-related factors. This observation was informed by two different statistical test results 
involving the length of the interviewees’ work experience against their ‘Top 3’ risks.  In one of 
the tests, pirate was attack identified as the one seafaring occupational hazard that all the 
respondents with varying work experiences were both ‘most worried’ and ‘least worried’ about.   
However, of the seventeen interviewees who comprised the group with 0 to 5 years’ work 
experience, nine interviewees identified pirate attack as the risk that they were ‘most worried’ 
about, while the remaining eight interviewees indicated that they were ‘least concerned’ about 
the risk of pirate attack. This contradiction prompted further scrutiny of interview responses 
that these seventeen individuals provided during the interviews. The information obtained 
provided an expanded view of the detailed aspects of their work experience, which helped to 
shed more light on the differences in the ranking of the same risk factor by this group all of 
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whom have the same length of seafaring career. Additional insight on this contradiction was 
illuminated by assessing the information that they had provided about the routes and geographic 
areas where all seventeen of them had worked in the ten-year period preceding this study. From 
this additional information, it became apparent that, the relatively-short seafaring experience of 
those with less regard for piracy had not included voyages along the shipping routes that were 
associated with a high incidence of pirate attacks. Consideration of the possibility that the 
difference in views about the risk posed by pirate activities could not be explained by the length 
of their work experience alone, and requires a more elaborate analysis.  
In Section B, a phenomenological qualitative analytical approach was adopted to obtain 
more information from the interviewees’ responses that could help to explain the variations 
in piracy risk perception within my research sample.  From the analysis in this section it 
became apparent that seafarer risk perception was a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon 
(Slovic, 2002).  This study attempted to explain the varying opinions about occupational risk 
in an evolving maritime work environment. The complexity of this task was compounded 
by the inter-play between different related factors within the social context in which 
seafarers’ views about risk are constructed.  
The qualitative data analysis process established six facts about the influences on piracy risk 
perception. Firstly, broadly speaking, these views were the product of a combination of four 
major inter-related factors including, but not limited to, the following: Firstly, that piracy 
risk information overload resulting from regularly received streams of piracy risk 
information. This volume of information from close associates, added to piracy narratives 
received regularly from print and electronic media to paint images in the minds of the   
interviewees of a growing piracy problem, and deteriorating situation of great concern to the 
shipping industry. Secondly, that ships function as piracy risk information amplification 
centres where risk information is received, processed and passed on by the crew, the media 
and shipping companies. Thirdly, that the nature of the seafarer occupational culture could 
be regarded as a significant influential-factor on how piracy risk information is received, 
believed and communicated within the global seafaring community. Fourthly, that an initial 
awareness about the inherent risk to seafarers of harm from pirate attacks has the potential 
to create and fuel risk perception.  
This ability was reflected in the detailed recollections that some interviewees provided about 
the influence of their pirate risk information sources on their views about an escalating level 
of piracy and its growing position as a seafarer occupational hazard. Fifthly, the way in 
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which seafarer labour is managed because of the structural changes within the shipping 
industry influences the power that individual seafarers are able to use to negotiate the risks 
that they face. This affects their perception of risks, and of risk behaviour options available 
to each rank. Sixthly, seafarers’ concerns about the possible financial and emotional ripple 
effects of pirate attacks on seafarers’ families influenced the views of the sample about the 
risk of pirate attacks. Although stated as six different factors, in reality, these factors actually 
combined to influence the sample’s views about piracy as an occupational risk factor and 
were socially constructed within their hazardous global maritime work environment. 
From the two analysis processes discussed in this chapter, this study obtained information 
that informed responses to the four research questions that this study sought to answer. These 
responses and the conclusions arrived at are discussed in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 6.1 Introduction: Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents research findings and conclusions that emerged from the data analysis 
presented in the previous chapter. The research outcomes are presented and related to each of 
the research objectives and questions.  Two sets of research findings and conclusions that are 
discussed in this chapter under two separate sections. Section A covers empirical findings and 
conclusions informed solely by data generated from the current primary research. Section B, on 
the other hand, presents research implications of relevance to his study but which were not 
supported by the data generated during this current study.  The chapter begins with a recap of 
the research objectives and research questions. This is followed by a summary of the research 
findings, conclusions, methodological reflections, policy reflections, research implications, and 
limitations of this research, suggestions for further research and a final note.  
The fieldwork stage of this study was carried out in 2011 when the incidence of maritime piracy 
along the coast of East Africa was relatively high compared to the research-reporting period 
(2017).  Therefore, although the dated nature and changes in the pattern of maritime piracy in 
East Africa have been acknowledged, nonetheless this study still represents a useful 
contribution given that when it was undertaken this was a new and under-researched field.  
  
6.2 Summary of Research Findings 
The overview of the research outcomes and conclusions presented in this section includes 
research outcomes with empirical, methodological and policy implications arising from both 
quantitative and qualitative analyses of the interview data.  Empirical findings that emerged 
from both quantitative and qualitative explorations of the data.  During the first data analysis 
phase, Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square tests of association proved useful as quantitative 
bivariate data analysis methods, in identifying links between the interviewees’ ages, 
nationalities, ranks/positions, (seafaring) work experience, and their ‘Top 3’ risks.  The test 
results helped to establish four main facts: Firstly, that the risk of pirate attack as the one 
seafaring occupational risk factor that all the interviewees were concerned.  Secondly, that there 
were contradicting views about the level of concern about pirate attacks by three sections of 
interviewees.  Namely, the interviewees with less than six years’ seafaring experience, among 
‘All Officers’ i.e. interviewees of the same rank, and among interviewees who were under 30 
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years of age i.e. individuals within the same age bracket.  Thirdly, that the quantitative analytical 
methodology was inadequate in explaining these three contradictions, based on either age, 
nationality, rank or work experience alone.  Thus, there was need for additional information to 
explain these variations.  Fourthly, that based on a sample size of forty-four interviewees, the 
data was not sufficient to make inferences about the general seafarer population. 
The interview data was subjected to a qualitative data analysis in an attempt to elaborate on the 
factors identified in the quantitative data analysis.  This second level of analysis was 
instrumental in identifying the following as factors pertinent to the seafarer work environment 
with the potential to influence seafarer risk perception. Firstly, the perception of the risk of 
pirate attacks as being geo-specific, with regional that depended on the threat level 
communicated through piracy risk information.  Secondly, the impact of piracy risk information   
overload received by seafarers both from solicited and unsolicited sources, and which portrayed 
piracy as a major threat that crew needed to contend with.  Thirdly, that ships could be regarded 
as piracy risk amplification centres where piracy risk information was received, processed, 
communicated and amplified within the seafarer community; Fourthly, that variations in 
perception of the risk of pirate attack was influenced by the knowledge of ships preferred by 
pirates for their financially-lucrative benefits to be reaped from both the cargo and crew; Fifthly, 
that the geographic distribution in the perception of piracy was a risk factor that depended on 
the perceived levels of piracy threat inferred by seafarers from information accrued from 
‘stories' narrated by close associates, piracy incident statistics, piracy trend analysis, Sixthly, 
that concerns about possible the  psychological and financial ripple effects of piracy on seafarers 
families and seafarer sending communities influences seafarers perception of piracy as an 
occupational hazard. Finally, that variation in perception of occupational risk is a complex 
matter influenced by the interplay of multiple factors converging upon seafarers who live and 
work in a hazardous work environment.  
Regarding the research methodology used, vignettes proved to be a very appropriate data 
collection tool when applied in a phenomenological research design context.  A user-friendly 
communication facilitator eased establishment of rapport with cold-contacted interviewees.  It 
also enabled respondents to interviewees to speak at length in expressing express their views 
about the risk of pirate attacks. These detailed accounts provided the seafarer perspectives that 
were crucial in attaining the aim of this research.  Thus capturing these views on seafarer risk 
perception was a treasured research outcome.   
 
 
142 
 
The phenomenological research approach best suited this study, for such an approach put the 
interviewees at the centre of the research focus so that they could air their views about their 
workplace risks based. These views were constructed within the seafarer lived experiences.  
Concerning employer policy and support, this study found that disembedding processes and 
precarious labour could have an influence on how the interviewees view the risk of pirate attack.  
This is because due to combined effect of the precarious nature of seafarers’ employment 
conditions, the hazardous nature of the maritime work environment and lack of organisational 
support.  These challenges put seafarers in a dilemma that could have been reinforced by a lack 
of viable mechanisms to channel their suggestions for risk-minimization and improvements to 
their occupational health and safety.  
 
6.3 Overview of Research Findings and Conclusions  
This section reports on the conclusions that emerged from the research findings obtained from 
the data analysis.   
These research outcomes emerged from an attempt to answer the following four Research 
Questions: - 
(g) What were the levels of seafarer occupational risk perception within the sample?   
(h) What are the issues that influence the levels of seafarer risk perception? 
(i) How can the dynamics of the seafarer work experience explain variations in concern 
about the risk of pirate attack? 
(j) Were vignettes a suitable empirical research instrument in a phenomenological research 
on ship crew as a hard-to-reach target group in a mobile workspace? 
  
6.3.1 Section A: Empirical Conclusions 
The empirical conclusions for this study pertained to three main aspects, namely: the variations 
in levels of seafarer risk perception, factors influencing the variations in perception of risk of 
pirate attack, and other seafarer work experience-related factors that shaped the dynamics of 
piracy risk perception.    
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(a) Variations in Levels of Seafarer Occupational Risk Perception 
The conclusion about levels of seafarer occupational risk perception referred to research 
findings that emerged from the bivariate data analysis of seafarer occupational risk perception 
described in chapter five.  The test results formed the basis for assessing the achievement or 
not, of Research Objective (1) and the response to Research Question (1) indicated below: 
 
Research Objective (1):  
To identify, describe and analyse variations in levels of occupational risk perception among a 
diverse sample of forty-four seafarers. 
Research Question (1) 
What were the variations in levels of seafarer occupational risk perception within the sample?   
 
Based on results from Cross-tabulation and Chi-Square tests of association between the ages, 
nationalities, ranks and work experiences of the interviewees, this study arrived at seven 
conclusions regarding the variations in perception of risk among the interviewees.  Firstly, that 
ship collision/foundering/grounding, fire, injury, falling overboard and into the dock, pirate 
attack and explosion were the six seafaring occupational risks that the sample was concerned 
about.  Secondly, fear of pirate attack was a consistent major concern among all the age groups 
in the sample.  Thirdly, that there was no link between the age, nationality, rank and work 
experience nationalities of the interviewees and their ‘Top 3' risk factors. Fourthly, that there 
were differences perception of the risk-level associated with pirate attacks by three groups of 
interviewees, namely: All those in the Officers rank, individuals with less than 5 years of 
seafaring work experience; Fifthly that the differences in piracy risk-perception among the 
Officers could be regarded as subjective observations socially-constructed within the context 
of a hazardous occupation (Bailey and Walters, 2013,35). Sixthly, that different views about 
the risk to seafarers’ health and safety posed by pirate activities was beyond the scope of 
numbers, and therefore a quantitative study alone was inadequate in explaining the association 
between age, nationality, rank and   work experience in isolation of other work-related aspects; 
Seventhly, that there wasn’t sufficient evidence to make inferences about the whole seafarer 
population. 
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(b) Factors Influencing Variations in Perception of Risk of Pirate Attack 
 
The empirical research conclusions and recommendations concerning factors that influence 
variations in perception of the risk of pirate refer to research findings realized from the tests in 
Chapter Five and qualitative analysis in Chapter Six.  These findings were instrumental in 
gauging whether Research Objective (2) was achieved and the answer to Research Question 
(2). The two research objective and research question stated as follows: -  
 
Research Objective (2) 
To explain the factors that influence variations in the levels of seafarer risk perception  
Research Question (2) 
What are the issues that influence variations in the levels of seafarer risk perception? 
 
The following six conclusions emerged from the qualitative and quantitative analyses carried 
out with regards to Research Objective (2): Firstly, that there was no statistical evidence that 
the interviewees’ risk perception was related to the interviewees’ age, nationality, rank and the 
length of their work experience alone, in isolation of other work experience-related factors.  
Secondly, that risk perception was a complex world-view constructed from the convergence of 
multiple factors emanating from the seafarer work experience and environment; Thirdly, that 
the different levels of piracy risk perception were influenced by the piracy risk information 
received from  various regular streams of solicited and unsolicited verbal, print and electronic 
piracy reports, each reinforcing the view of pirate attack as a major problem; Fourthly, that the 
variation in perception of the risk of pirate attack resulted from the content of these messages 
that stated that portray seafarers as the targeted victims of pirate attacks, and the number of 
hostages was on the rise; Fifthly, that the different levels of concern about the threat of pirate 
attack were influenced by the interviewees concern for the consequences associated with the 
phenomenon, including the psychological toll that the piracy crisis was having on their families; 
And finally, that  that some interviewees were concerned about the possibility that the piracy 
crisis threatened their job security.  
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In summary, this study established that piracy narratives and images facilitated both the 
communication of piracy risk information and amplification risk perception the media plays an 
influential role in a globalised information age, as it both communicated and amplified the risk 
of pirate attacks in East Africa.  After the initial piracy risk information has been received by 
the interviewees, further media reports, piracy incident statistical updates and ‘stories’ narrated 
by colleagues further reinforced the fact that seafarers were ‘at risk’ of pirate attacks.  Therefore, 
regular and successive risk information facilitated a piracy risk perception ‘snowballing effect’.  
In this sense, ships functioned as mobile maritime piracy risk perception amplification centres.  
Based on these observations, this study concluded that the interviewees’ views of piracy ‘risk’, 
was ‘an image perspective’ (Jackson, 2006).  
 
(c) Explaining Dynamics of Perception of Pirate Attack 
 
The empirical research conclusions and recommendations about the factors that explain the 
dynamics of perception of pirate attack are discussed in view of Research Objective (3) been 
and in answer to Research Question (3).  These two research pillars stated as follows: 
 
Research Objective (3) 
To examine issues within the seafarer work experience underpinning variations in the 
interviewees’ concern about the risk of pirate attack. 
Research Question (3) 
How can the dynamics of the seafarer work experience explain variations in concern about the 
risk of pirate attack? 
 
An examination of the issues within the seafarer work experience that underpinned 
variations in the interviewees’ concern about the risk of pirate attack, identified the following 
six factors: that,  Ships functioned as maritime piracy risk amplification centres where piracy 
risk information is received, processed, communicated and amplified; Secondly, that a 
number of inter-related factors beyond the seafarers' control, combine together to influence 
the different lenses from which the sample's view piracy as an occupational risk factor was 
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socially-constructed; Thirdly, that structural changes in the shipping industry affected the 
way in which seafarer labour is managed and this  influences the power and discretion that 
individual seafarers exercise to negotiate  risks that they face. This affects their perception 
of piracy risks.  Fourthly, that the variations observed in the perception of seafaring risk, had 
a geospatial distribution, whereby some routes and regions were regarded as having a higher 
or lower piracy threat; fifthly, that ship-design and type are associated with higher 
vulnerability to pirate attack.  Sixthly, that personal experiences of confrontation with pirates 
offshore, or with sea robbers while docked in ports, and with land-based criminals while 
ashore, provided an explanation for the geographic distribution of the variations in the 
interviewees’ views about ‘risk’. Finally, that variations in the interviewees' perception of 
the risk, could be the result of a combination of factors originating in an interplay between 
are the disembedding processes of working in a globalised maritime industry, as well as 
uncertainties resulting from the structural changes in the shipping industry.    
  
6.3.2  Methodological Reflections 
 The deliberations regarding the research methods applied in this study, return to the Chapter 
Four: Research Design and Methodology to revisit the methods applied in the research design 
and data production.  Methodologically, this study was interested in attaining the following 
Research Objective (4) and Research Question (4): - 
 
Research Objective (4) 
 ‘To explore the suitability of vignettes as a research tool in a phenomenological 
research on ship crew, as a hard-to-reach target group in their mobile workspace. 
In order to attain this objective, this study sought to answer the following research question 
arising from this objective: 
Research Question (4) 
Were vignettes suitable as an empirical research instrument in a phenomenological 
research on ship crew, as a hard-to-reach target group in their mobile workspace? 
Vignettes proved to be an appropriate data-collection instrument in this study about the 
variations in seafarer risk perception, and especially when approached through a 
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phenomenological research paradigm.  The phenomenological methodological paradigm was 
best suited to my study, for it linked the research goal to the benefits of this approach by 
focusing on providing seafarers with an opportunity to talk about the occupational risk they 
face, and then identify emerging issues from their narratives. This combined phenomenological 
approach and emergent research design best suited my study of a deliberately selected and small 
sample size (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995; Lester, 1999, 1). Therefore, this approach was 
appropriate for the sample of forty-four seafarers who deliberately selected from among the 
wider group of potential interviewees present at the fieldwork site during the research period.   
This approach provided an effective line of inquiry that kept interviewees' perspectives as the 
focus throughout the research process.  This decision helped reinforce the primary goal of this 
study, which was to harness the views of seafarers about the risk of pirate attack.  That was the 
perspective that was missing from initial maritime piracy reports, as mentioned in section 2.1 
of Chapter 2.  As an analytical approach, phenomenological approach made it possible to use 
an interpretive dimension, such that the practical theoretical findings were based on the 
seafarers’ perspectives and not on normative assumptions.  In addition, this method it is easier 
to identify and make positive inferences in a small sample of participants (Lester, 1999, 1).  
The interview guide that was used during the data collection interviews served as an aide-
mémoire. It included two vignettes that made it easier for the researcher to establish rapport 
with the interviewees after they were identified through cold-contacting. Once the interviews 
got underway, the hypothetical scenarios painted through the vignettes guided the interviewees 
to focus on their memories about what they experienced or heard about maritime piracy. 
Focusing on this specific aspect of their lived experiences with the risk of piracy was 
instrumental in guiding them to provide detailed responses. Since seafarers’ perspectives were 
the central focus of the phenomenological qualitative research approach adopted in this study, 
such detailed explanations yielded a rich harvest of relevant qualitative data. Thus, vignettes 
were very helpful during the data collection as well as the data analysis phases of the study.  
When cold-contacting potential interviewees for face-to-face interviews, the suitability of 
vignettes as a data collection tool in a phenomenological qualitative research, hinged on its 
capability to facilitate a mental ‘zeroing-in’ by interviewees, to focus on a specific hypothetical 
situation of relevance and interest to my research.   
 
Most of the seafarers’ contract period was spent offshore. Therefore, they are a hard-to-reach 
target group.  Therefore, a robust research instrument and approach was required to make it 
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possible to collect as much data as possible during interviews conducted during their brief stints 
ashore.  Therefore, the inclusions of vignettes within in the qualitative research design 
generated synergy that facilitated meaningful interactions with the interviewees. Vignettes 
aided in gathering of ‘deep’, detailed and relevant information on the interviewees’ diverse 
levels of risk perception, within a short interview time, and thereby acting as a time-saver.  
During the data analysis phase, the robustness of vignettes enhanced the benefits of this 
phenomenological qualitative research approach, by aiding in the understanding about the 
subjective lived-experience of the interviewees.  In the absence of any personal seafaring work 
experience, the detailed interview responses provided me with important insights necessary 
understanding the complex process through which the interviewees’ views about ‘risk’ are 
constructed. 
 The crucial role of vignettes as an appropriate and crucial communication facilitator is best 
understood when considering that although the interviews were conducted in English, about 
50% of the interviewees hailed from countries in the near and Far East where English is not 
their first language.  Out of the sample of forty-four interviewees, only two were native speakers 
of English. Although the use of vignettes is not widespread, it is a very useful tools for 
generating data.  The vignettes acted as a communication facilitator, by reducing 
communication barriers between the researcher and the interviewees during the interview 
process.  This was crucial in allowing the interviewees to express themselves more fully as they 
expounded on their answers, without being self-conscious.  The vignettes, therefore, enabled 
the collection of elaborate responses on a single issue from a heterogeneous sample, from 
diverse cultural backgrounds (Harvard, 2012).  This intended use of the vignette was successful 
in enabling the interviewees to talk more freely about maritime piracy, which was a sensitive 
topic for seafarers at the point of time when the interviews were held.  
The decision to use vignettes was in part, due to its hailed ability to establish rapport, and tease-
out responses from a heterogeneous and multi-cultural sample (Barter & Renold, 1999; Harvard 
2012, 1). The vignette script, that used for the two vignettes comprised of brief stories depicting 
scenarios of typical circumstances associated with maritime piracy attacks. These were 
administered to the interviewees, some of whom had limited English ability and where 
interview time was limited. At the time this study was undertaken, empirical research targeting 
seafarers, to collect their views on maritime piracy, was a new setting in the use of vignettes. 
As this was my first time using vignettes, as an early career social science researcher, it was an 
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appropriate data collection instrument to collect detailed qualitative data from the interviewees 
(Simons, 2014).  
At the time when this study was launched, information available in the public domain about an 
increase in the number of pirate attacks made piracy a topical issue. Seafarers were concerned 
for their safety as they knew that they were the targets of these pirate attacks. Therefore, for 
ship’s crew piracy was a sensitive topic of discussion, because discussing it conjured negative 
emotions. In addition, reports in the media showed that ship managers were actively 
discouraging seafarers from talking about piracy, therefore Piracy was then referred to merely 
as the ‘P’ word.  In view of the interviewees’ level of English, the efforts to discourage seafarers 
from talking about piracy, piracy appeared to be a sensitive topic among seafarers. Therefore, 
it was necessary to use a data collection tool that would improve my chances of getting more 
valid and reliable responses. Vignettes were the instrument of choice as more experienced 
researchers recommended their use as a powerful data collection tool for this purpose 
(Alexander and Baker, 1978). 
Research can be regarded both as a learning process as well as a fact-finding activity. The 
inclusion of vignettes in the semi-structured questionnaire proved to be an extremely useful 
decision. This is because in preparing suitable vignettes and using them I learnt some lessons.  
These included learning how to design vignettes, establishing rapport with cold-contacted 
interviewees (Barter and Renold, 1999), and guiding the interview to focus on seafarer 
perception of risk, and learning to diversify the interview interaction while encouraging the 
interviewees to provide responses that are more detailed.  Employing vignettes enabled probing 
while overcoming linguistic barriers.  Each of these benefits was important in eliminating 
barriers that could have hindered the interviewees from expressing their views clearly, 
articulately and with ease.  
From the successful use of vignettes as a research tool in this study involving seafarers as a 
hard-to-reach target group, and for whom English was a second language,  the wider use of 
vignettes is recommended in the following research situations: For instance, in research projects 
where time limitations are a key factor, in participant observer research, for research involving 
young interviewees (Hazel, 1995) or when working with a target group for whom the language 
used in the research is not their first language, with vulnerable people including crime victims 
and possibly individuals with learning difficulties and communication challenges, and in 
academic and non-academic research on sensitive and/or taboo topics (Gould, 1996, 2008). 
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6.3.3 Policy Reflections: Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC.2006) 
 During the research period, seafaring remained a risky profession, fraught with a cumulative 
interplay between inevitable forces of nature in the maritime work environment, and human 
factors. Concern about the risk of pirate attack expressed by the majority in the sample, and 
their anxieties concerning the precarious nature of their work, are compounded by the 
inadequate enforcement of stipulated health and safety regulations. This convergence of 
vicissitudes exposes the seafarers to a very dangerous work environment. Nonetheless, 
seafarers remain a hardworking group and retain the stoic work culture for which they have 
been renowned. Perhaps it is this that has empowered them to endure the perils of the sea and 
other occupational hazards through the ages (Bloor, 2005). Social changes in modernity, 
coupled with structural changes in the shipping industry and the mobile nature of seafarers’ 
work environment could be regarded as changes increased uncertainties in the seafarers’ lives.  
Based on these observations, I arrived at three conclusions: firstly, that the major structural and 
administrative changes in the shipping industry in the last few decades and especially the lack 
of clarity on the line of demarcation between obligations of ship owners and seafarer 
recruitment companies, could cause seafarers some anxiety about who was responsible for the 
piracy ransom payments, information updates and financial remittances to their families should 
they be taken hostage, thus causing a disruption in their normal communication with their 
dependents. Secondly, that disembedding processes beyond the seafarers’ control could have 
given rise to a general sense of existential anxiety or ‘ontological insecurity’ (Giddens, 1991). 
Thirdly, that the general apprehensive mind-set about one’s safety and the interviewees’ 
perception of the risk of pirate attack, could be regarded as a side-effect of the convergence of 
multiple factors typifying modern communities. For instance, the evolving characteristics of 
the current less communal and more individualised and mobile population (Beck, 1992). This 
study recognised that meeting the aspects of Maritime Labour Convention 2006 would require 
some time to implement for seafarers to realise the full benefits of the convention. Meanwhile, social 
changes, disembedding processes and structural changes within the shipping industry would 
continue to impinge on seafarers’ perception of risk of pirate attack.  
6.3.4  Limitations of this Study 
The sample size of forty-four interviewees was a major methodological limitation if this study. 
This number was adequate for a simple bivariate analysis of the interviewees’ bio-data, and 
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also in providing detailed qualitative responses that yielded rich qualitative data. However, it 
did not provide sufficient evidence to make inferences about the whole seafarer population. If 
a sampling frame were available, and if a further qualitative study including a larger seafarer 
sample size was used, this could provide more statistical evidence that could be used to make 
research inferences about the seafarer population.  
As an academic endeavour, this was a time-bound research project. During the study, some idle 
time resulted from variations in potential interviewees’ availability at the fieldwork site. This 
was an unforeseen and thus unavoidable development that characterised the weeks following 
the 2011 Japanese Tsunami. This natural disaster that occurred in an area geographically far-
removed from the fieldwork site, had a ripple effect on this time-constrained study. For it 
affected the flow of goods to the UK and this saw a temporary drop in ships numbers docking 
into the port where the fieldwork site was located. This necessitated a two-month extension to 
the data collection stage of the research project .  Later in the study, ill health further reduced 
the time available for data analysis and thesis writing stages of this study.  
This study provided a snapshot of the impact of piracy based the varied views inferred from 
interview responses gathered from a sample of seafarers at a given point in time i.e. April to 
October 2011. Postgraduate academic research time limitations curtailed the ability to develop 
a Victimological discourse on the interviewees’ perception of their vulnerability to the risk of 
piracy.  This is recommended as a potential area for further study. An identification of ‘harm 
footprints’   lingering on in the seafarers, their families and the seafaring communities could 
provide information on the short and long-term impacts of piracy on the welfare of seafarers.    
  
6.4 Final Conclusion  
At the time when this study began, there was very little empirical research on how maritime 
piracy in East Africa was affecting seafarers. Furthermore, seafarers’ views about the risk of 
pirate attack were not included in the few documented reports available in 2010.  In addition, 
most documented piracy crime incident reports were in-house self-reports generated to inform 
tactical and strategic decision-making of the stakeholders in the shipping industry. However, 
during the course of this study, academic research reporting on different aspects of piracy began 
to trickle into open source electronic journals, blogs and peer-reviewed academic journals.  
Shipping industry-specific journals, newsletters, magazines and websites began including 
regular features on the piracy threat to shipping.  Maritime piracy began to emerge as a regular 
 
 
152 
 
feature on the agenda for transport security, maritime safety and organised crime-related events 
at global and regional levels.  Based on these general observations, this study concluded that 
maritime piracy had found its way into the academic discourse as a risk factor affecting ships, 
the global supply chain and the crew. 
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 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Summary of Online Literature Search 
 
The online literature search included use of the following combinations of search words to 
maximise the chances of identifying articles appropriate to this study.  
 
Seafarers + risk    
ship crew + injury + perception   
Crew + hazards + shipping   
Seafarers + kidnap + ransom    
kidnap + crew + Somalia 
Pirates + crew + extortion   
Seafarers + danger + Aden;       
crew + welfare + pirates 
Crew + ransom + East Africa   
Globalization + shipping + risks 
In addition, I registered online to receive automatic publication updates (new releases) on the 
following subject:  Maritime Piracy in East Africa. I received and critically reviewed numerous 
articles on piracy in East Africa.  
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Appendix 2: Multiple views about Piracy triggers in along the coast of East Africa 
 
Disclaimer: The researcher takes no responsibility for the views of the authors of these 
articles. They are included here as products of a literature search of articles posted on the  
internet as cited.  
 
This appendix includes a sample of articles obtained from open sources during literature 
searches for information on the following as triggers for maritime piracy in East Africa.  
 
 Illegal & Unregulated (Over) Fishing in national waters of Somalia 
 Dumping of toxic waste in national waters of Somalia (officially confirmed by UNEP) 
see* below 
 International Community and Organisations ignoring complaints by leaders of  
Somalia leaders 
 
Newspaper Articles 
 
1. Author: Ibtisaam Ashur, Think Africa Press (ARTICLE | 6 MAY 2011 )   
Piracy initially started off as a form of coastal protection undertaken by a handful of local 
seamen whose livelihoods were endangered by the dumping of toxic waste and trawlers 
illegally fishing in Somali waters.  A practice that began in self-defense has, however, spiraled 
into an immensely profitable piracy ‘business’.  
 
The Situation in Somalia 
 
Reference: Sabrina Grosse-Kettler, (2004), External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War 
Economy and its promoters. A report by Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Paper 39 
… accessed at: http://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/paper39.pdf on 15/08/2013 13:18 
 
The illegal maritime businesses actively encouraged by warlords in Somalia fuelled another 
security dilemma. Militias with speedboats attacked vessels that were found to engage in illegal 
fishing in Somali waters. These illegal fishers paid ‘protection money’ to the militia. 
 
The militia then reinvested the protection money they extorted “to pay militias and procure 
arms and ammunition” Both the fishing companies and the naval militias are operating in 
lawlessness, as none of their actions are controlled by a third, higher authority. Their 
arrangements are based on greed and contribute to individual enrichment on both sides. (ibid p. 
44).  
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Payment of protection money to militia is a commonly accepted practice on land where 
authority is based on military strength and trade capacity. The business of protection in the 
coastal zones appears to be a naval warfare (United Nations, 2003b, pp. 33-34). 
 
Source: Huffington Post, January 4, 2009 
Title: “You are being lied to about pirates” 
Author: Johann Hari 
Causes of piracy summarized (from various articles included below) 
• Overfishing in the region, and especially by foreign shipping vessels (china, korea, 
Japanese, Italian…),  
• dumping of toxic waste in Somali territorial waters,  
• ignoring of pleas by Somali leaders to international maritime regulating bodies IMO and 
UN for intervention and to manage Somali waters in the absence of a maritime authority  
• UN and International Community ignored their own experts reports on a worsening 
overfishing and toxic waste situation in Somali waters and instead have ganged up 
against Somali fishermen in an international counter piracy cartel 
 
Introduction: The muted truth about the genesis of Somali Piracy 
Somali Piracy: Result of chronic Negligence of Somalia by the International Community   
Author: Johann Hari 
 
The Origin of the Somali Piracy War  
 
The origin of the two piracies goes back to 1992 after the fall of the Gen. Siyad Barre regime 
and the disintegration of the Somali Navy and Police Coastguard services. Following severe 
draughts in 1974 and 1986, tens of thousands of nomads, whose livestock were wiped out by 
the draughts, were re-settled all along the villages on the long, 3300kms Somali coast. They 
developed into large fishing communities whose livelihood depended inshore fishing. From 
the beginnings of the civil war in Somalia (as early as 1991/1992) illegal fishing trawlers 
started to trespass and fish in Somali waters, including the 12-mile inshore artisanal fishing 
waters. The poaching vessels encroached on the local fishermen’s grounds, competing for the 
abundant rock-lobster and high value pelagic fish in the warm, up-swelling 60kms deep shelf 
along the tip of the Horn of Africa.  
 
The piracy war between local fishermen and IUUs started here. Local fishermen documented 
cases of trawlers pouring boiling water on the fishermen in canoes, their nets cut or destroyed, 
smaller boats crushed, killing all the occupants, and other abuses suffered as they tried to 
protect their national fishing turf. 
Later, the fishermen armed themselves. In response, many of the foreign fishing vessels 
armed themselves with more sophisticated weapons and began to overpower the fishermen. It 
was only a matter of time before the local fishermen reviewed their tactics and modernized their 
hardware. This cycle of warfare has been going on from 1991 to the present. It is now 
developing into fully fledged, two-pronged illegal fishing and shipping piracy conflicts.  
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According to the High Seas Task Force (HSTF), there were over 800 IUUs fishing vessels in 
Somali waters at one time in 2005 taking advantage of Somalia’s inability to police and control 
its own waters and fishing grounds. The IUUs, which are estimated take out more than $450 
million in fish value out of Somalia annually, neither compensate the local fishermen, pay tax, 
royalties nor do they respect any conservation and environmental regulations – norms 
associated with regulated fishing. It is believed that IUUs from the EU alone take out of the 
country more than five times the value of its aid to Somalia every year.  
 
Illegal foreign fishing trawlers which have being fishing in Somalia since 1991 are mostly 
owned by EU and Asian fishing companies – Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Russia, Britain, 
Ukraine, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Yemen, Egypt and many others. Illegal vessels 
captured on the Somali coast by Somali fishermen during 1991 and 1999 included Taiwanese 
trawlers Yue Fa No. 3 and Chian Yuein No.232, FV Shuen Kuo No.11; MV Airone, MV De 
Giosa Giuseppe and MV Antonietta, all 3 Italian vessels registered in Italy; MV Bahari Hindi, 
Kenyan registered but owned and managed by Marship Co. of Mombasa. A number of Italian 
registered SHIFCO vessels, Korean and Ukrainian trawlers, Indian, Egyptian and Yemeni boats 
were also captured by fishermen and ransoms of different sizes paid for their release. Many 
Spanish seiners, frequent violators of the Somali fishing grounds, managed to evade capture at 
various times.  
 
According to a report in the Daily Nation of October 14, 2004, even Kenyan registered fishing 
vessels are known to have participated in the rape of the Somali fishing grounds. In October 
2004, Mr Andrew Mwangura, Kenya Coordinator of the Seafarers Assistance Program (SAP) 
asked the Kenya Government to help stop illegal fishing in Somalia. “Since Somalia has been 
without government for more than 11 years, Kenya trawlers have been illegally fishing along 
the country’s territorial waters contrary to the UNCLOS and the FAO instruments, he said. SAP 
further reported that 19 Kenyan registered fishing vessels also operated illegally in the Somalia 
waters.  
 
In arrangements with Somali warlords, new companies were formed abroad for bogus fishing 
licensing purposes. Jointly owned mafia Somali-European companies set up in Europe and 
Arabia worked closely with Somali warlords who issued them fake fishing “licenses” to any 
foreign fishing pirate willing to plunder the Somali marine resources. UK and Italy based 
African and Middle East Trading Co. (AFMET), PALMERA and UAE based SAMICO 
companies were some of the corrupt vehicles issuing such counterfeit licenses as well as 
fronting for the warlords who shared the loot.  
Somali warlords Played a part too 
 
Among technical advisors to the Mafia companies – AFMET, PALMIRA & SAMICO - were 
supposedly reputable firms like MacAllister Elliot & Partners of the UK.  
Warlords Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidiid, Gen. Mohamed Hersi Morgan, Osman Atto and Ex-
President Ali Mahdi Mohamed officially and in writing gave authority to AFMET to issue 
fishing “licenses”, which local fishermen and marine experts call it simply a “deal between 
thieves”. According to Africa Analysis of November 13, 1998, AFMET alone “licensed” 43 
seiners (mostly Spanish, at $30,000 per 4-month season. Spanish Pesca Nova was “licensed” 
by AFMET while French Cobracaf group got theirs from SAMICO at a much discounted rate 
of $15,000 per season per vessel.  
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Not to be outdone, in October 1999 Puntland Administration, gave carte blanche to another 
Mafia group known as PIDC, registered in Oman to fish, issue licenses and to police the 
Puntland coast. PIDC in turn contracted Hart Group of the UK and together they pillaged the 
Somali fishing grounds with vengeance, making over $20 million profit within two years. The 
deal was to split the profits but PIDC failed to share the spoils with Puntland administration, 
resulting in revocation of their licenses. Having reneged on their part of the deal, PIDC/Hart 
quit the country with their handsomely won chips.  
 
 
Chronology of Somali Complaints and Appeals on Illegal Fishing & Hazardous Waste 
Dumping 
Early 1990s: In a proposal for action to the UNDP for Somalia in early 1990s, Mr. John 
Laurence, a fishery consultant with PanOcena Resources Ltd, reports the catastrophic and 
heartbreaking illegal foreign exploitation of the Somali seas. “With regards to the controlled 
exploitation of the Somali deep sea fishing grounds by the huge foreign factory ships and 
vessels it is our opinion that the UN must get involved. This area is recognized as one of the 5 
richest fishing zones of the world and previously unexploited. It is now being ravaged, 
unchecked by any authority, and if it continues to be fished at the level it is at present stocks 
are in danger of being depleted …. So, a world resource is under serious threat and the UN is 
sitting back doing nothing to prevent it”. “Secondly, the Somali people are being denied any 
income from this resource due to their inability to license and police the zone” and “ the UN is 
turning a blind eye to the activities of the fishing vessels whose operators are not paying their 
dues; which in any other circumstances would be enforced by any international court of law”, 
argues Laurence.  
*1992: UNEP WARNING Dr Mustafa Tolba, former Executive Director of UNEP, 
confirmed that Italian companies were dumping lethal toxic waste in Somalia which 
might “contribute to the loss of life in the already devastated country”. 
Dr Tolba added that the shipment of the toxic wastes from Italy that could also aggravate the 
destruction of the ecosystem in Somalia “earned a company, which ships the waste, between 2 
to 3 million dollars in profits”, (Sunday Nation, 06/09/92) -  a Kenyan newspaper. 
 
 
September 1995, leaders of all the Somali political factions of the day (12 of them) and two 
major Somali NGO Networks jointly wrote to the UN Secretary General, Dr Boutros Boutros 
Ghali, with copies to the EU, Arab League, OIC, OAU and to other involved parties: - 
• detailing the illegal fishing and hazardous material dumping crises in the Somali sea waters 
and 
• requesting the UN to set up a body to manage and protect these waterways.  
• They pointed out that since ICAO already manages the Somali airspace, so could IMO or a 
newly created organization run Somalia’s seas until an effective Somali national 
government is able to take control of it.  
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1998: In a letter to the SSDF dated January 1998, Mr. Dominic Langenbacher, UNDP Somalia 
Resident Representative, expressed his apprehension of the danger posed to the Somali marine 
resources and environment by foreign vessels. “The concern of the international community is 
that the threat of toxic waste dumping, pirate fishing by foreign vessels and over fishing of 
Somali stocks could adversely, and perhaps permanently, affect the ecosystem of the entire 
region” he said. “Furthermore, Somalia currently has no provision to deal with potential oil 
spills or other marine disasters and has no capability to monitor and control her coastal waters 
and, if necessary, provide sea search or rescue operations”, he added. 
From 1998 to 2006, consecutive Ministers of Fisheries of Puntland State of Somalia repeatedly 
appealed to the international community: UN, EC, African Union, Arab League and to 
individual nations, advising the members states of these organizations to help keep poaching 
vessels and crews from their countries out of the Somali waters. The Ministers also complained 
of oil spills, toxic and nuclear waste dumping in the Somali coast.  
FAO 2005: An FAO study, Somalia’s Fishery Review by Frans Teutscher, Nov. 11, 2005, 
states, “In the absence of legal framework and/or for capacities for monitoring, control and 
surveillance, extensive illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) is taking place and 
considerable quantities of non-targeted by catch are discarded because they cannot presently be 
utilized”. The report said that the foreign IUUs maximize their catch by fishing throughout the 
year without regard to the wider marine ecosystem, not respecting fish and crustacean spawning 
periods or irreparable damage done by their massive drift nets and use of explosives or the loss 
of local fishermen’s livelihood. 
 
2006: Somali fishermen in various regions of the country also complained to the international 
community about the illegal foreign fishing, stealing the livelihoods of poor fishermen, waste 
dumping and other ecological disasters, including the indiscriminate use of all prohibited 
methods of fishing: drift nets, under water explosives, killing all “endangered species” like sea-
turtles, orca, sharks, baby whales, etc. as well as destroying reef, biomass and vital fish habitats 
in the sea (IRIN of March 9, 2006). Fishermen in Somalia have appealed to the United Nations 
and the international community to help them rid the country's shores of foreign ships engaged 
in illegal fishing. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated 700 
foreign-owned vessels were engaged in unlicensed fishing in Somali waters in 2005. However, 
FAO said it was "impossible to monitor their fishery production in general, let alone the state 
of the fishery resources they are exploiting….there is also strong suspicion of illegal dumping 
of industrial and nuclear wastes along the Somali coast", IRIN 09/03/06.  
 
"They are not only taking and robbing us of our fish, but they are also trying to stop us from 
fishing," said Jeylani Shaykh Abdi, a fisherman in Merca, 100km south of Mogadishu. "They 
have rammed our boats and cut our nets", he added. Another Merca fisherman, Mohamed 
Hussein, said [Our] existence depends on the fish. He accused the international community of 
"talking only about the piracy problem in Somalia, but not about the destruction of our coast 
and our lives by these foreign ships." Jeylani noted that the number of foreign ships had 
increased over time. "It is now normal to see them on a daily basis, a few miles off our shores" 
(IRIN 09/03/06).  
 
Describing the activity as "economic terrorism", Somali fishermen told IRIN that the poachers 
were not only plundering the fish but were also dumping rubbish and oil into the sea. They 
complained the Somali government was not strong enough to stop it. "We want the international 
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agencies to help us deal with this problem," said Hussein. "If nothing is done about them, there 
soon won't be much fish left in our coastal waters." Musse Gabobe Hassan and Mohamud 
Hassan Tako of the Mogadishu Maritime and Fisheries Institute accuse foreign ships of illegal 
fishing and dumping of hazardous waste in Somali waters. “Somalia’s coastal communities 
who eke their livelihood from the sea are appealing to the international community for help stop 
the illegal fishing fleets from both the developed and developing countries that are robbing our 
marine wealth and destroying its habitats”, they added.  
 
Like the UN Security Council, Chatham House, an International Affairs Think-Tank, in a much 
publicized recent Paper on piracy in Somalia failed to present a balanced view of the issue and 
concentrated on the shipping piracy side of the coin. Roger Middleton, the author of the Paper, 
however, mentions in passing that European, Asian and African (Egypt and Kenya) illegally 
fish in the Somalia waters. In ignoring the principal IUU factor, the origin and the purpose of 
the shipping piracy, UN and Roger Middleton seem to be either misled or pressured to take this 
one-sided course by powerful interests who want to cover up and protect the profitable business 
of illegal fishing.  
2008: Mr. Ould Abdalla, UN Secretary General Special Envoy for Somalia, who should know 
better, continued to condemn Somali shipping piracy in a number of press statements and 
rightly so though biased. In his latest Press Statement of 11/11/08 on the subject matter, he 
warmly welcomed the agreement by European Union member states to send ships to combat 
piracy off Somalia. “I am extremely pleased by the EU’s decision,” said Mr Ould-Abdallah. 
“Piracy off the Somali coast is posing a serious threat to the freedom of international navigation 
and regional security”. But he forgot to condemn fishing piracy, mention the Somali fishing 
communities’ livelihood security or to propose concrete actions to deal with the two inter-
related piracies, which are like the two sides of the same coin.  
 
2009: Somali authorities, local fishermen, civil society organizations and international 
organizations have reported and warned of the dangerous consequences of these criminal 
actions. In a Press Statement dated 16 Sept 1991, the SSDF, which then administered the 
Northeastern Regions of Somalia, sternly warned “all unauthorized and illegal foreign fishing 
vessels in the Somali waters are prohibited, with immediate effect, to undertake any further 
illegal fishing and to stay clear of the Somali waters”. In April 1992, SSDF Chairman, Gen. 
Mohamed Abshir Musse wrote to the then Italian Foreign Minister, Gianni De Michelis, 
drawing his attention to the robbery of the Somali marine resources and ecosystem destruction 
by unlicensed Italian trawlers.  
 
Another major problem closely connected with the IUUs and illegal fishing is industrial, toxic 
and nuclear waste dumping in both off-shore and on-shore areas of Somalia. These crises of the 
illegal fishing, waste dumping, warlords/mafia deals and the loud complaints of the Somali 
fishermen and civil society have been known to UN agencies and international organizations 
all along. The UN Agencies and organizations, which have been fully aware of these crises, 
often expressed concern and lamentations but never took any positive action against these 
criminal activities. It appears as if they have also failed to inform the UN Security Council of 
this tragedy before it passed its resolutions 1816 and 1838 early this year.  
 
UN Strong Arming Somali Pirates provoked retaliation 
Surprisingly, the UN disregarded its own findings of the violations, ignored the Somali and 
international appeals to act on the continued ravaging of the Somali marine resources and 
dumping of hazardous wastes. Instead, the UN and the big powers, invoking Charter IIV of the 
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UN Charter, decided to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia……and ..…use, within the 
territorial waters of Somalia ….all necessary means to identify, deter, prevent, and repress acts 
of piracy and armed robbery, including but not limited to boarding, searching, and seizing 
vessels engaged in or suspected of engaging in acts of piracy or armed robbery, and to 
apprehend persons engaged in such acts with a view to such persons being prosecuted” 
(Resolution 1816).  
 
It should be noted that there is no mention of the illegal fishing piracy, hazardous waste 
dumping or the plight of the Somali fishermen in the UN Resolutions. Justice and fairness have 
been overlooked in these twin problems of FISHING PIRACY and SHIPPING PIRACY.  
 
The Illegality and Impracticality of the actions of the UN, NATO and EU  
 
This Global Armada is in the Somali waters illegally as it is not approved by the Somali 
Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). It is also unlikely it will achieve its stated objectives to 
curb the shipping piracy as it is now conceived. The TFP and the members of the European 
Parliament rejected these UN and European decisions to police the Somali seas (both the Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden) as both illegal and unworkable. At a Press Conference in Nairobi 
on October 18th 2008, the Deputy Speaker of the TFP, Mohamed Omar Dalha, termed the 
deployment of foreign warships to the country's coast to fight piracy as invasion of its 
sovereignty and asked the foreign warships to “move out of the Somali waters”. The Speaker 
questioned the intent of the deployment and suggested that the powers involved had a hidden 
agenda. He said if these powers were genuine in curbing the piracy they would have supported 
and empowered the Somali authorities, who would be more effective in stopping the menace. 
“If the millions of dollars given to the pirates or wasted in the warship policing there were given 
to us, we would have eliminated this curse”, he said.  
 
Several EU members of parliament (MEPs) called the EU naval mission to be deployed against 
pirates off the coasts of Somalia as a "military nonsense," "morally wrong" and having "no 
international legal basis." German green MEP Angelika Beer underlined the lack of 
international law to sustain the proposed European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) 
mission. "There is no clarity to the limitations of this mandate. Will the EU be able to sink ships 
and arrest pirates?" she asked. Portuguese socialist MEP Ana Maria Gomes gave a fiery speech 
on the "moral problem" of the EU mission, which, in her opinion, is only about "protecting oil 
tankers." "Nobody gives a damn about the people in Somalia who die like flies," she said (EU 
Observer of 15th October 2008).  
 
Conclusion  
 
The EU, NATO and US Navies can, of course, Rambo and obliterate the fishermen pirates and 
their supporting coastal communities but that would be illegal, criminal act. Yet, it may 
temporarily reduce the intensity of the shipping piracy but it would not result in a long-term 
solution of the problem. The risk of loss of life of foreign crews and ecological impact of major 
oil spill would be a marine catastrophe of gigantic proportions for the whole coastal regions of 
East Africa and the Gulf of Aden.  
In their current operations, the Somali fishermen pirates genuinely believe that they are 
protecting their fishing grounds (both 12-mile territorial and EEZ waters). They also feel that 
they exacting justice and compensation for the marine resources stolen and the destroyed 
ecosystem by the IUUs. And their thinking is shared and fully supported by the coastal 
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communities, whose protectors and providers they became.  
 
The matter needs careful review and better understanding of the local environment. The piracy 
is based on local problems and it requires a number of comprehensive joint local and external 
partners approaches.  
 
Firstly, practical and lasting solution lies in jointly addressing the twin problems of the shipping 
piracy and the illegal fishing piracy, the root cause of the crisis.  
 
Secondly, the national institutional crisis should be reviewed along with the piracy issues.  
 
Thirdly, local institutions should be involved and supported, particularly by helping to form 
coastguards, training and coastguard facilities. These may sound asking too much to donors and 
UN agencies. But we should ask what it meant those who paid tens of millions dollars of ransom 
and their loved ones held hostage for months.  
 
Fourthly, a joint Somali and UN agency like the present ICAO for the Somali airspace should 
be considered. 
 
THE TWO PIRACIES IN SOMALIA: WHY THE WORLD IGNORES THE OTHER?  
By Mohamed Abshir Waldo  
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Title: “The Two Piracies in Somalia:  Why the World Ignores the Other” 
Author: Mohamed Abshir Waldo 
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The Shipping Piracy as an additional Invasion of Somali Seas 
 
 
 
The crises of the multiple piracies in Somalia have not diminished since my previous article 
(above) , “The Two Piracies in Somalia: Why the Word Ignores the Other,” was written in 
December 2008. All the illegal fishing piracy, the waste dumping piracy and the shipping 
piracy continue with new zeal. Somali fishermen, turned pirates in reaction to armed foreign 
marine poachers, have intensified their war against all kinds of ships in the Gulf of Aden and 
the Indian Ocean.  
Much of the world’s attention is currently focused on the Somali sea lanes. The navies of big 
and small powers are converging on the Somali waters in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. 
The recent hijacking of the Saudi oil tanker and Ukrainian MV Faina, laden with arms for 
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Kenya, off the coast of Somalia by Somali pirates captured world media attention. War has 
been rightly declared against this notorious new shipping piracy. But the older and mother of 
all piracies in Somalia - illegal foreign fishing piracy - in the Somali seas is ignored, underlining 
the international community’s misunderstanding and partiality of the underlying interdependent 
issues involved and the impracticality of the proposed actions to find ways to effectively resolve 
the piracy threat.  
 
A chorus of calls for tougher international action resulted in multi-national and unilateral Naval 
stampede to invade and take control of the Somali territorial and EEZ waters. The UN Security 
Council, a number of whose members may have ulterior motives to indirectly protect their 
illegal fishing fleets in the Somali Seas, passed Resolutions 1816 and 1838, giving a license to 
any nation who wants a piece of the Somali marine cake. Both NATO and the EU issued Orders 
to the same effect and Russia, Japan, India, Malaysia, Egypt, Yemen and anyone else who could 
afford an armed boat and its crew on the sea for a few months joined the fray.  
 
For years, attempts made to address piracy in the world’s seas through UN resolutions have 
failed to pass largely because many of the member nations felt such resolutions would infringe 
greatly on their sovereignty and security and have been unwilling to give up control and patrol 
of their own waters. UN Resolutions 1816 and 1838, which were objected to by a number of 
West African, Caribbean and South American nations, was then tailored to apply to Somalia 
only, which had no strong enough Somali representation at the United Nations to demand 
amendments to protect its sovereignty. Also Somali civil society objections to the Draft 
Resolutions were ignored.  
 
This massive “Global Armada” invasion is carried out on the pretext to protect the busy 
shipping trade routes of the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean from Somali shipping piracy, 
which threatens to disrupt these international lifeline sea ways. While there are two equally 
nasty, criminal, inhuman and exploiting gangs of pirates in Somalia, only one of them is 
publicized by the western media: the Somali shipping pirates attacking merchant shipping in 
these sea lanes, where the illegal poachers are also actively operating.  
 
The Illegal fishing Piracy  
 
The other more damaging economically, environmentally and security-wise is the massive 
illegal foreign fishing piracy that have been poaching and destroying the Somali marine 
resources for the last 18 years following the collapse of the Somali regime in 1991. With its 
usual double standards when such matters concern Africa, the “international community” 
comes out in force to condemn and declare war against the Somali fishermen pirates while 
discreetly protecting the numerous Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing fleets 
there from Europe, Arabia and the Far East.  
 
Biased UN resolutions, big power orders and news reports continue to condemn the hijackings 
of merchant ships by Somali pirates in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. If response to 
both piracy menaces was balanced and fair, these condemnations would have been justified. 
European Union (EU), Russia, Japan, India, Egypt and Yemen are all on this piracy campaign, 
mainly to cover up and protect their illegal fishing fleets in the Somali waters.  
 
In all these piracy ballyhoo and campaigns, why is the other key IUUs fishing piracy ignored? 
Why are the UN Resolutions, NATO Orders and EU Decrees to invade the Somali seas fail to 
include the protection of the Somali marine resources from IUU violations in the same waters? 
Not only is this outrageous fishing piracy disregarded but the illegal foreign marine poachers 
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are being encouraged to continue their loot by as none of the current Resolutions, Orders and 
Decrees apply to the IUUs, which can now freely fish in and violate the Somali seas. The Somali 
fishermen can no longer scare away the IUUs for fear of being labeled pirates and attacked by 
the foreign navies unlawfully controlling the Somali waters. Even the traditional Somali trading 
dhows are in panic of being mistaken for pirates.  
 
a) The IUU Menace and Fish Laundering Practice  
 
There is no doubt IUU is a serious global problem. According to the High Seas Task Force 
(HSTF), IUU does not respect national boundaries or sovereignty, puts unsustainable pressure 
on stocks, marine life and habitats, undermines labor standards and distorts markets. “IUU 
fishing is detrimental to the wider marine ecosystem because it flouts rules designed to protect 
the marine environment which includes restrictions to harvest Juveniles, closed spawning 
grounds and gear modification designed to minimize by-catch on non-target species….In so 
doing they steal an invaluable protein source from some of the world’s poorest people and ruin 
the livelihoods of some legitimate fishermen; incursions by trawlers into the inshore areas 
reserved for artisanal fishing can result in collision with local fishing boats, destruction of 
fishing gear and deaths of fishermen” says HSTF. In its report, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal 
Fishing on the High Seas, HSTF puts worldwide value of IUU catches at $4 to $9 billion, large 
part of it from Sub-Sahara Africa, particularly Somalia. 
 
IUUs practice fish catch laundering through mother ship factories, trans-shipment and re-supply 
at sea. “This means that vessels can remain at sea for months, refuelling, re-supplying and 
rotating their crew. IUU fishing vessels never need to enter ports because they transfer their 
catches onto transport ships. Illegally caught fish are laundered by mixing with legally caught 
fish on board transport vessels”, writes HSTF. Apparently, fish laundering, which generates 
hundreds of millions dollars in the black market is not as criminal as money laundering! 
Countries used for Somali fish laundering include Seychelles, Mauritius and Maldives. 
 
As EU closed much of its fishing waters for 5 to 15 years for fish regeneration, as Asia over 
fished its seas, as international demand increases for nutritious marine products and as the fear 
of worldwide food shortage grows, the rich, uncontrolled and unprotected Somali seas became 
the target of the fishing fleets of many nations. Surveys by UN, Russian and Spanish assessors 
just before the collapse of the Barre Regime in 1991 estimated that 200,000 tonnes of fish a 
year could be caught by both artisanal and industrial fisheries and this is the objective of the 
international fishing racket  
 
There is no doubt that the actions of the shipping pirates are reprehensible and this paper does 
not seek to justify or explain their odious actions. They must be stopped. But the notorious 
shipping piracy is unlikely to be resolved without simultaneously attending to the fraudulent 
IUU piracy, too.  
 
Dumping on the Somali fishing community  
 
Toxic Waste Behind Somali Pirates 
Source: The news that didn’t make news PROJECT CENSURED 
http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/3-toxic-waste-behind-somali-pirates 
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Allegations of the dumping of toxic waste, as well as illegal fishing, have circulated since the 
early 1990s, but hard evidence emerged when the tsunami of 2004 hit the country. The United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) reported that the tsunami washed rusting containers of 
toxic waste onto the shores of Puntland, northern Somalia. 
Nick Nuttall, a UNEP spokesman, told Al Jazeera that when the barrels were smashed open by 
the force of the waves, the containers exposed a “frightening activity” that had been going on 
for more than a decade. “Somalia has been used as a dumping ground for hazardous waste 
starting in the early 1990s, and continuing through the civil war there,” he said. “The waste is 
many different kinds. There is uranium radioactive waste. There is lead, and heavy metals like 
cadmium and mercury. There is also industrial waste, and there are hospital wastes, chemical 
wastes—you name it.” 
Nuttall also said that since the containers came ashore, hundreds of residents have fallen 
ill, suffering from mouth and abdominal bleeding, skin infections and other ailments. 
“What is most alarming here is that nuclear waste is being dumped.  
Radioactive uranium waste that is potentially killing Somalis and completely destroying the 
ocean,” he said. 
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the UN envoy for Somalia, says the practice helps fuel the eighteen-
year-old civil war in Somalia, as companies pay Somali government ministers and/or militia 
leaders to dump their waste. “There is no government control . . . and there are few people with 
high moral ground . . . yes, people in high positions are being paid off, but because of the 
fragility of the Transitional Federal Government, some of these companies now no longer ask 
the authorities—they simply dump their waste and leave.” 
In 1992 the countries of the European Union and 168 other countries signed the Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal. The convention prohibits waste trade between countries that have signed, as well 
as countries that have not signed the accord, unless a bilateral agreement had been 
negotiated. It also prohibits the shipping of hazardous waste to a war zone. 
Surprisingly, the UN has disregarded its own findings, and has ignored Somali and 
international appeals to act on the continued ravaging of the Somali marine resources and 
dumping of toxic wastes. Violations have also been largely ignored by the region’s maritime 
authorities. This is the context from which the men we are calling “pirates” have emerged. 
Somali Piracy triggered by International Illegal Overfishing 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fleets 
Source: The news that didn’t make news PROJECT CENSURED 
http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/3-toxic-waste-behind-somali-pirates  
Sources:- 
Al Jazeera English, October 11, 2008 
Title: “Toxic waste behind Somali piracy” 
Author: Najad Abdullahi 
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Huffington Post, January 4, 2009 
Title: “You are being lied to about pirates” 
Author: Johann Hari 
The international community has come out in force to condemn and declare war on the 
Somali fishermen pirates, while discreetly protecting the illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fleets from around the world that have been poaching and dumping toxic 
waste in Somali waters since the fall of the Somali government eighteen years ago. 
In 1991, when the government of Somalia collapsed, foreign interests seized the opportunity to 
begin looting the country’s food supply and using the country’s unguarded waters as a dumping 
ground for nuclear and other toxic waste. 
 
According to the High Seas Task Force (HSTF), there were over 800 IUU fishing vessels in 
Somali waters at one time in 2005, taking advantage of Somalia’s inability to police and control 
its own waters and fishing grounds. The IUUs poach an estimated $450 million in seafood from 
Somali waters annually. In so doing, they steal an invaluable protein source from some of the 
world’s poorest people and ruin the livelihoods of legitimate fishermen. 
 
Everyone agrees they were ordinary Somali fishermen who, at first, took speedboats to try to 
dissuade the dumpers and trawlers, or at least wage a “tax” on them. They call themselves the 
Volunteer Coast Guard of Somalia. 
 
One of the pirate leaders, Sugule Ali, explains that their motive is “to stop illegal fishing and 
dumping in our waters. . . . We don’t consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits 
[to be] those who illegally fish, and dump waste, and carry weapons in our seas.” 
 
Author Johann Hari notes that, while none of this makes hostage-taking justifiable, the “pirates” 
have the overwhelming support of the local population for a reason. The independent Somalia 
news site Wardher News conducted the best research we have on what ordinary Somalis are 
thinking. It found that 70 percent “strongly support the piracy as a form of national defense of 
the country’s territorial waters.” Instead of taking action to protect the people and waters of 
Somalia from international transgressions, the UN has responded to the situation by passing 
aggressive resolutions that entitle and encourage transgressors to wage war on the Somali 
pirates. 
It should be pointed out that both the IUUs and waste dumping are happening in other African 
countries. Ivory Coast is a victim of major international toxic dumping. 
It is said that acts of piracy are actually acts of desperation, and, as in the case of Somalia, 
what is one man’s pirate is another man’s Coast Guard. 
Full Article: ‘You are being lied about pirates’  
 
Source:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-being-lied-to-
abo_b_155147.htm lBy Johann Hari, a writer for the Independent Newspaper 
Summary by Hari: “Do we expect starving Somalians to stand passively on their beaches, 
paddling in our nuclear waste, and watch us snatch their fish to eat in restaurants in London and 
Paris and Rome? We didn’t act on those crimes—but when some of the fishermen responded 
by disrupting the transit-corridor for 20 percent of the world’s oil supply, we begin to shriek 
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about “evil.” If we really want to deal with piracy, we need to stop its root cause—our crimes 
—before we send in the gun-boats to root out Somalia’s criminals.” 
Full Article: ‘You are being lied about pirates’  
Source:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/johann-hari/you-are-being-lied-to-
abo_b_155147.htm l  
Who imagined that in 2009, the world's governments would be declaring a new War on Pirates? 
As you read this, the British Royal Navy - backed by the ships of more than two dozen nations, 
from the US to China - is sailing into Somalian waters to take on men we still picture as parrot-
on-the-shoulder pantomime villains. They will soon be fighting Somalian ships and even 
chasing the pirates onto land, into one of the most broken countries on earth. But behind the 
arrr-me-hearties oddness of this tale, there is an untold scandal. The people our governments 
are labeling as "one of the great menace of our times" have an extraordinary story to tell -- and 
some justice on their side. 
Pirates have never been quite who we think they are. In the "golden age of piracy" - from 1650 
to 1730 - the idea of the pirate as the senseless, savage thief that lingers today was created by 
the British government in a great propaganda-heave. Many ordinary people believed it was 
false: pirates were often rescued from the gallows by supportive crowds. Why? What did they 
see that we can't? In his book Villains of All nations, the historian Marcus Rediker pores through 
the evidence to find out. If you became a merchant or navy sailor then - plucked from the docks 
of London's East End, young and hungry - you ended up in a floating wooden Hell. You worked 
all hours on a cramped, half-starved ship, and if you slacked off for a second, the all-powerful 
captain would whip you with the Cat O' Nine Tails. If you slacked consistently, you could be 
thrown overboard. And at the end of months or years of this, you were often cheated of your 
wages.  
Pirates were the first people to rebel against this world. They mutinied against their tyrannical 
captains - and created a different way of working on the seas. Once they had a ship, the pirates 
elected their captains, and made all their decisions collectively. They shared their bounty out in 
what Rediker calls "one of the most egalitarian plans for the disposition of resources to be found 
anywhere in the eighteenth century." They even took in escaped African slaves and lived with 
them as equals. The pirates showed "quite clearly - and subversively - that ships did not have 
to be run in the brutal and oppressive ways of the merchant service and the Royal navy." This 
is why they were popular, despite being unproductive thieves. 
The words of one pirate from that lost age - a young British man called William Scott - should 
echo into this new age of piracy. Just before he was hanged in Charleston, South Carolina, he 
said: "What I did was to keep me from perishing. I was forced to go a-pirating to live." In 1991, 
the government of Somalia - in the Horn of Africa - collapsed. Its nine million people have 
been teetering on starvation ever since - and many of the ugliest forces in the Western world 
have seen this as a great opportunity to steal the country's food supply and dump our nuclear 
waste in their seas. 
Yes: nuclear waste. As soon as the government was gone, mysterious European ships started 
appearing off the coast of Somalia, dumping vast barrels into the ocean. The coastal population 
began to sicken. At first they suffered strange rashes, nausea and malformed babies. Then, after 
the 2005 tsunami, hundreds of the dumped and leaking barrels washed up on shore. People 
began to suffer from radiation sickness, and more than 300 died. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the 
UN envoy to Somalia, tells me: "Somebody is dumping nuclear material here. There is also 
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lead, and heavy metals such as cadmium and mercury - you name it." Much of it can be traced 
back to European hospitals and factories, who seem to be passing it on to the Italian mafia to 
"dispose" of cheaply. When I asked Ould-Abdallah what European governments were doing 
about it, he said with a sigh: "Nothing. There has been no clean-up, no compensation, and no 
prevention." 
At the same time, other European ships have been looting Somalia's seas of their greatest 
resource: seafood. We have destroyed our own fish-stocks by over-exploitation - and now we 
have moved on to theirs. More than $300m worth of tuna, shrimp, lobster and other sea-life is 
being stolen every year by vast trawlers illegally sailing into Somalia's unprotected seas. The 
local fishermen have suddenly lost their livelihoods, and they are starving. Mohammed 
Hussein, a fisherman in the town of Marka 100km south of Mogadishu, told Reuters: "If nothing 
is done, there soon won't be much fish left in our coastal waters." 
This is the context in which the men we are calling "pirates" have emerged. Everyone agrees 
they were ordinary Somalian fishermen who at first took speedboats to try to dissuade the 
dumpers and trawlers, or at least wage a 'tax' on them. They call themselves the Volunteer 
Coastguard of Somalia - and it's not hard to see why. In a surreal telephone interview, one of 
the pirate leaders, Sugule Ali, said their motive was "to stop illegal fishing and dumping in our 
waters... We don't consider ourselves sea bandits. We consider sea bandits [to be] those who 
illegally fish and dump in our seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas." 
William Scott would understand those words. 
No, this doesn't make hostage-taking justifiable, and yes, some are clearly just gangsters - 
especially those who have held up World Food Programme supplies. But the "pirates" have the 
overwhelming support of the local population for a reason. The independent Somalian news-
site WardherNews conducted the best research we have into what ordinary Somalis are thinking 
- and it found 70 percent "strongly supported the piracy as a form of national defence of the 
country's territorial waters." During the revolutionary war in America, George Washington and 
America's founding fathers paid pirates to protect America's territorial waters, because they had 
no navy or coastguard of their own. Most Americans supported them. Is this so different?  
On international response, foreign governments, international organizations and mainstream 
media have been united in demonizing Somalia and described its fishermen as evil men 
pillaging ships and terrorizing sailors (even though no sailors were harmed). This presentation 
is lopsided. The media said relatively little on the other piracies of illegal fishing and waste 
dumping. 
The allied navies of the world—fleets of over forty warships from over ten Asian, Arab, and 
African countries as well as from many NATO and EU member countries—stepped up their 
hunt for the Somali fishermen pirates, regardless of whether they are actually engaged in piracy 
or in normal fishing in the Somali waters. Various meetings of the International Contact Group 
for Somalia (ICGS) in New York, London, Cairo, and Rome continue to underline the 
demonization of the Somali fishermen and urge further punitive actions without a single 
mention of the violation of illegal fishing and toxic dumping by vessels from the countries of 
those sitting in the ICGS and UN forums in judgment of the piracy issue. 
 
  
 
 
168 
 
Appendix 3:   Sample Piracy and Armed Robbery Reporting Form 
Source: International Maritime Bureau (IMB) website.  
ICC-INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU  
 (PIRACY REPORTING CENTRE) 
 
PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY ATTACK REPORT 
The ICC - International Maritime Bureau (IMB) was established in 1981 to act as a focal 
point in the fight against all types of maritime fraud, malpractice and piracy. The United 
Nations (UN) International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its resolution A 504 (XII) (9) 
adopted on 20 November 1981, has among other things urged all governments, interests 
and organizations to exchange information and provide appropriate co-operation with the 
IMB. The IMB also has an observer status with the International Criminal Police 
Organization (ICPO – INTERPOL). 
 
VESSEL PARTICULARS / DETAILS: 
1 NAME OF SHIP: 
2 IMO NO: 
3 FLAG: 
4 TYPE OF SHIP: 
5 TONNAGES:  GRT:                             NRT:                                    DWT:  
6 OWNERS (ADDRESS & CONTACT DETAILS): 
7 MANAGERS (ADDRESS & CONTACT DETAILS): 
8 LAST PORT/NEXT PORT: 
9 CARGO DETAILS   (TYPE/QUANTITY) : 
 
DETAILS OF INCIDENT 
10 DATE & TIME OF INCIDENT:                                                    LT                                          
UTC 
11 POSITION:   LAT:                                             (N/S)  LONG:                                         
(E/W) 
12 NEAREST LAND MARK / LOCATION: 
13 PORT /TOWN / ANCHORAGE AREA: 
14 COUNTRY /NEAREST COUNTRY: 
15 STATUS (BERTH /ANCHORED / STEAMING): 
16 OWN SHIP’S SPEED : 
17 SHIP’S FREEBOARD DURING ATTACK : 
18 WEATHER DURING ATTACK (RAIN/FOG/MIST/CLEAR/ETC, WIND 
(SPEED AND DIRECTION), SEA / SWELL HEIGHT) : 
19 TYPES OF ATTACK (BOARDED/ATTEMPTED): 
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20 CONSEQUENCES FOR CREW, SHIP AND CARGO: 
ANY CREW INJURED / KILLED: 
ITEMS / CASH STOLEN : 
21 AREA OF THE SHIP BEING ATTACKED: 
 
DETAILS OF RAIDING PARTY 
22 NUMBER OF PIRATES / ROBBERS: 
23 DRESS / PHYSICAL APPEARANCE: 
24 LANGUAGE SPOKEN: 
25 WEAPONS USED: 
26 DESTINCTIVE DETAILS: 
27 CRAFT USED: 
28 METHOD OF APPROACH: 
29 DURATION OF ATTACK: 
30 AGGRESSIVE / VIOLENT: 
 
FURTHER DETAILS 
31 ACTION TAKEN BY MASTER AND CREW: 
32 WAS INCIDENT REPORTED TO THE COASTAL AUTHORITY ? IF SO TO 
WHOM? 
33 ACTION TAKEN BY THE AUTHORITIES: 
  
34 NUMBER OF CREW  / NATIONALITY: 
35 PLEASE ATTACH WITH THIS REPORT – A BRIEF DESCRIPTION / FULL 
REPORT / MASTER – CREW STATEMENT OF THE ATTACK / 
PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN IF ANY. 
 
ADDRESS: ICC-INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU,  PIRACY REPORTING 
CENTRE,  
P. O.  BOX 12559,  50782 KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA.  
CONTACT DETAILS:  TEL:603 2031 0014 (HELP LINE)       
FAX: 603 2078 5769   TELEX: MA 34199.  
E-MAIL:imbkl@icc-ccs.org; piracy@imbpiracy.org. WEBSITE: www.icc-ccs.org  
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Appendix 4: Maritime Labour Convention (2006)   
 
The specific sections of MLC (2006) discussed in this thesis are as follows: - 
 
Title 4:  Health Protection, Medical Care, Welfare and Social Security Protection 
Regulation 4.1 – Medical care on board ship and ashore  
 
Regulation 4.2 – Ship Owners’ liability  
 
Regulation 4.3 – Health and safety protection and accident prevention  
 
Regulation 4.4 – Access to shore-based welfare facilities  
 
Regulation 4.5 – Social Security  
 
For the full details on each of the Maritime Labour Convention (2006) Regulations 4.1 to 4.5, 
visit http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_090250.pdf  
Title 4: pp. 54 – 70 
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Appendix 5: SWOT Analysis of potential Fieldwork Sites 
 
Purpose of SWOT Analysis:  
To assess the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats presented by each potential 
fieldwork sites, in order to facilitate informed decision-making on researcher’s safety during 
the data collection stage. The sites considered included Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) , Rotterdam 
(The Netherlands) , Portsmouth (England) and Mombasa (Kenya).   
 
Dar es Salaam 
Strengths Opportunities Comments 
• Familiarity: culture and 
surrounding: Researcher lived 
here for ten years as a student 
• Located within Eastern Africa – 
the piracy target   geographic 
region  
• Cost  effective: accommodation 
easily available 
• Transport: relatively cheap if 
combined with home leave 
flight ticket from Nairobi 
• Daily local transport: cheap 
public transport 
• Security: generally a safe city 
• Access: contacted 
Seafarer Mission  
• Respondents:  possible 
slow ship turnaround 
time providing access to 
a variety of  seafarers  
 
• Access request letter 
posted in May ‘10 
• July 2010: still no 
response to May letter, 
attempts to establish 
contact by phone fail 
(no answer at number 
indicated on website). 
• Sept 2010: MtS contact 
liaison sought & 
feedback expected by 
20/12/10 
• Suggestion: To visit 
Seafarer Mission in Dec 
2010 to establish assess 
if it functions and its 
suitability for the 
planned fieldwork. 
Weaknesses Threats 
• Local mobility difficult in 
Feb to May high humidity & 
long rains season, (Feb- 
march) 
• laid back work culture 
• Malaria zone. 
 
 
 
Rotterdam  
Strengths Opportunities Comments 
• Busy port: Second biggest port 
in the world 
• Transport to R: available 
alternatives from Cardiff 
• Big busy port with 
Seafarers hostel – 
possible fieldwork site 
• Access: contacted 
Seafarer Mission  
• Access request letter 
posted in May ‘10 
• July 2010: still no 
response to May letter, 
attempts to establish 
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• Language in R: Researcher 
speaks local Dutch language -  
easy to move around 
• Familiarity with R city 
language and culture: for ease 
of  moving around 
• Cost  effective: local transport 
and accommodation 
alternatives available   
 Security: generally safe 
 Busy work culture 
• Respondents:  crew 
change over port, many 
& variety of  seafarers  
• Time: crew change, more 
interview time? 
contact by phone fail 
(no answer at number 
indicated on website). 
• Sept 2010: MtS contact 
liaison sought & 
feedback expected by 
20/12/10 
• Suggestion: To visit 
Seafarer Mission in Dec 
2010 to establish assess 
if it functions and irs 
suitability for fieldwork. Weaknesses Threats 
• Busy tourist city with many 
distractions  
 
•  
 
Portsmouth 
Strengths Opportunities Comments 
• Mick familiar with site 
• Cost effective: within UK, 
no visa required 
• Accom: local B & B easily 
available 
 
• Access: through Mich 
• Many seafarers available 
awaiting next job 
• A very good site in terms 
of obtaining access and 
due to Mick’s familiarity 
with site 
• Major consideration: 
obtaining a car to use for 
daily transport 
Weaknesses Threats 
• No public transport to 
mission  
• Will require a car 
 
• Long distance from port to 
accommodation 
• Security during evenings 
still not known 
 
Mombasa 
Strengths Opportunities Comments 
• Located within the Eastern 
Africa piracy hotspot 
research target geographical 
region. 
• Interview of piracy victims 
possible through liaison 
with Seafarer Assistance 
Program   
• Kenyan researcher prior 
work experience n the city 
• A busy port but possibly 
slow vessel turnaround 
time thus possibility for 
meeting a number of 
seafarers  
• Liaison for local-based 
seafarers contacts/database 
access could be sought 
through the Seafarer 
Assistance Program 
• Earlier SWOT carried 
out while pirates were 
being tried in Kenya, 
thus site was deemed to 
be unsafe. 
• W.e.f. September 2010 
National Constitutional 
amendment, pirates no 
longer being tried in 
Kenya. All pirates 
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thus familiar with the city 
and local culture 
• Transport: Ease of 
movement using local 
public transport 
• Cost effective: a variety of  
relatively cheap 
accommodation available 
• Possibility of Cold Calling 
local seafarers on the 
contacts list 
 
released and 
repatriated to Somalia.  
• Pirates ‘diaspora’ 
previously encamped 
in the city for court 
trials have moved out 
of Msa for Somalia & 
security has greatly 
improved.  
• Suggestion: 
Researcher to seek to 
establish contact with 
Msa Seafarer Mission 
and Seafarer 
Assistance Program in 
Dec 2010 to assess 
suitability of the site  
  
Weaknesses Threats 
• Busy tourist city with 
many distractions  
 
• Relatively short time 
available to obtain access 
through Msa Seafarer 
Mission and local Seafarer 
Assistance Program  
• Malaria zone 
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Appendix 6: Sample Interview Guide 
  
Part 1: Personal/Professional Information 
1.1 How old are you? 
 
Age range:  
□ Under 30yrs    □ 31-40yrs    □ 41-50yrs     □ 51-60    □ above 60yrs  
 
1.2 What is your nationality? 
 
Origin: 
□ Eastern Europe  □ Africa  □ South Asia (India, Shrilanka, Pakistan,  
□ Western Europe    □ China  □ Asia (Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, etc) 
□ N/S American  □ India    □ Philippines  
□ Others (State) _______________ 
 
1.3      What is your marital status?  
          □ Single   □ Married  □ Separated □ Divorced  □ Widowed 
1.4     Seafarer Work Experience:  
         □ 0-5 yrs    □ 6-10 yrs  □ 11 – 20 yrs    □ over 20 years 
1.5      What is your current position on the ship you are working on?  
 
1.6 What type of ship are you working on at the moment? 
□ Oil tanker    □ Passenger & cruise ship   □ Car carrier     
□ Bulk carrier   □ Liquid bulk carrier    □ Petroleum product carrier   
□ Container carrier   □ Chemical/gas carrier  
□ other ships: (please state) e.g. Navy 
 
Type of ship(s) you have worked on in the International Trade in the last 10 years:  
□ Oil tanker    □ Passenger & cruise ship   □ Car carrier     
□ Bulk carrier   □ Liquid bulk carrier    □ Petroleum product carrier   
□ Container carrier   □ Chemical/gas carrier  
□ other ships: (please state)  
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1.6 Have you worked on a ship as it passed off the East African coast? □Yes  □No 
 
Part 2: Perceptions of Piracy - (Fears/Anxieties Vs other occupational risks) 
2.1 What are some of the risks of your job?  
□ On board isolation from colleagues     □ feeling homesick     
□ fatigue  
□ Ship collision/foundering/grounding  □ fire  □explosion       
□ injury 
□ falling overboard & into the dock                □ being attacked by pirates    
□ serious illness  
□ what other fears do you have  
2.2 (a) How safe do you feel going about your daily life when on shore?  
           □very safe  □ a little safe  □ neither safe nor unsafe   
             □ a little unsafe  □ very unsafe 
Explain why you feel that way  
 
2.2 (b) How safe do you feel in general when you are at sea?  
□very safe      □ a little safe  □ neither safe nor unsafe   
     □ a little unsafe     □ very unsafe 
 Elaborate on why you feel that way at sea  
2.3 What have you heard about maritime piracy?  
 
2.4 If you have experienced piracy then describe your most recent experience in a bit of detail. 
 
2.6 Do you know anyone who has experienced a piracy attack? If yes, describe what did the 
said happened  
 
2.7 How concerned are you about maritime piracy?  Could you please elaborate on your 
answer  
 
2.8 Please assign a rank from 1 to 5 to the following circumstances you might encounter 
while working on a ship with 1 being the one you are LEAST worried about and 5 being 
the one you are MOST worried about:   
□ ship collision/foundering/grounding □ fire         □ injury 
□ falling overboard & into the dock    □ attacked by pirates        □ explosion 
□ What other fears do you have  
 
 
176 
 
 
2.9 Explain why you rank piracy in the way you have  
 
2.10 Based on what you have heard on piracy, is there any type of ship you would avoid? 
Explain why you would avoid that type of ship 
2.11  How do you feel when you know that your ship will pass off the coast of East Africa? 
 
2.12 What do you think about the payment of Risk Allowance to ship crew members when 
their ship passes along East Africa coast?  
 
 
Part 3: Vignettes  
3.1 Rajesh is a 30 year old Indian fitter on a 15 year-old liquid bulker. This is his first 
assignment at sea. He is a widower and the only source of income for his two children. 
His cousin who is also a seafarer has been held hostage for 3 months after pirates 
boarded his ship off the East African coast and his whereabouts are still unclear. 
Rajesh’s ship will be stopping briefly in Alexandria. 
 
Do you think Rajesh will be concerned about his own safety?  
If you are in Rajesh’s position what would you do? Elaborate on your answer  
3.2 Bjorn is a 53 year- old Norwegian master on an 8 year-old container ship. He has been 
a seafarer for  more than 20 years. Last week he returned from home leave where he 
celebrated 30th wedding anniversary with his wife, children and grandchildren. A few 
minutes ago he learnt that the ship he last worked on was attacked by pirates last 
week, the crew are still held hostage and one of the crew was shot dead last night in a 
failed rescue attempt. His ship will be passing off the coast of East Africa in one 
hour’s time. 
Do you think Bjorn could be concerned about the possibility of a pirate attack on his 
ship?  
If you are in Bjorn’s position what would you do? Elaborate on your answer 
3.3  Is there anything else you would like to add to what you have already said that would 
help me to better understand how piracy may be affecting seafarers’ welfare?  
 
Thank you very much for sparing some time to answer my questions. 
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Appendix 7: Sample Ethical Approval Application  
  
 Cardiff School of Social Sciences  
Ethical Approval Form 
Staff, MPhil/PhD, Professional Doctorate & Integrated PhD Research Projects 
 
Must be submitted at least TWO WEEKS before a SREC meeting to:  
Deborah Watkins, Research and Graduate Studies Administrator 
(WatkinsD2@cardiff.ac.uk / Extension: 79051 / Room 0.10 Glamorgan Building) 
PLEASE NOTE BEFORE COMPLETING YOUR APPLICATION: 
1. Illegible handwritten applications will not be processed so please type if necessary 
2. Do not submit an application to the SREC if your research is with the NHS or NHS -
linked – refer instead to NHS Local Research Ethics Committee 
3. You should not submit an application to the SREC if your research involves adults 
who do not have capacity to consent. Such projects have to be submitted to the 
NRES system. 
4. Staff undertaking minor projects as part of a course of study (e.g. PCUTL) do not 
need SREC approval unless the project involves sensitive issues. This exemption does 
not apply to Masters dissertations or Doctoral research. 
5. APPLICATION ATTACHMENTS: Please attach the following, without which your 
application decision will be delayed: 
- Full project proposal 
- Participant information form and Consent form (final approval will only be 
 given when these have been provided.) 
- Details concerning external funding  
6. The School Research Ethics web pages can be accessed via: 
http://www.cf.ac.uk/socsi/research/researchethics/index.html 
7. Information on data management, collecting personal data: data protection act 
requirements, can be accessed via: http://www.cf.ac.uk/cocom/index.html 
8. Information on Research Ethics (including Ethical Issues in Research – informed 
consent etc.) can be accessed via the University’s Research and Commercial Division 
web pages via the “Research Ethics” link on: 
http://www.cf.ac.uk/racdv/index.html 
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Title of Project:  
“Analysis of Maritime Piracy in Eastern Africa between 2000 and 2010 and its Impact on 
Seafarers’ Welfare”. 
 
Name of Researcher: Sarah Agnela Simons 
Application Date: 18/02/2011 
Signature of Lead Researcher:              
Student Project (PhD Data Collection) 
Project Start Date: 1 March 2011         Student No. 0938502 
Project End Date: 10 August 2013       Email Address:  
Supervisor(s): Professor Michael Bloor BloorMJ@cf.ac.uk 
                         Professor Trevor Jones  JonesTD2@cardiff.ac.uk, 
  
 
Recruitment Procedures  
  Yes No N/A 
1 Does your project include children under 16 years of age?  X  
 If so, have you consulted the University’s guidance on child 
protection procedures? 
  X 
2 Does your project include people with learning or communication 
difficulties? 
 X  
3 Does your project include people in custody?  X  
4 Is your project likely to include people involved in illegal activities?  X  
5 Does your project involve people belonging to a vulnerable group, 
other than those listed above? 
 X  
6 Do you have an up-to-date Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check? 
Last check June 2010. Not needed for this project. 
 X  
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7 Does your project include people who are, or are likely to become 
your clients or clients of the department in which you work? 
  
X 
 
8 Does your project provide for people for whom English / Welsh is 
not their first language?  
The study involves interviewing in the UK in English 
 X  
 
 
Consent Procedures 
  Yes No N/A 
8 Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary? X   
9 Will you obtain written consent for participation? X   
10 If the research is observational, will you ask participants for their 
consent to being observed?  
  X 
11 Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research 
at any time and for any reasons? 
X   
12 Will you give potential participants a significant period of time to 
consider participation? 
X   
 
Possible Harm to Participants 
  Yes No N/A 
13 Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing either 
physical or psychological distress or discomfort? 
 X  
14 Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing a detriment 
to their interests as a result of participation? 
 X  
 
If there are any risks to the participant s you must explain in your proposal how you 
intend to minimise these risks 
Data Protection 
  Yes No N/A 
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15 Will any non-anonymized and/or personalised data be generated 
and/or stored? 
All interview transcripts will be anonymized 
 X  
  Yes No N/A 
16 Will you have access to documents containing sensitive1 data about 
living individuals? 
If “Yes” will you gain the consent of the individuals concerned? 
 X  
   
Researcher Safety 
  Yes No N/A 
17 If relevant to your research, have you taken into account the Cardiff 
University guidance on safety in fieldwork / for lone workers ? 
X   
 
If there are any other potential ethical issues that you think the Committee should 
consider please explain them on a separate sheet. It is your obligation to bring to the 
attention of the Committee any ethical issues not covered on this form. 
1 Sensitive data are inter alia data that relates to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, sexual life, actual and 
alleged offences 
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Appendix 8: Sample Consent form and Participant Information Sheet 
 
“Analysis of Maritime Piracy in Eastern Africa between 2000 and 2010 and its Impact 
on Seafarers’ Welfare” 
 
Introduction: The Seafarers International Research Centre 
The Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) is part of the Cardiff University School of 
Social Sciences in the UK. SIRC was established in 1995 with a view to conducting research 
on seafarers. The Centre has a particular interest in issues of occupational health and safety. It 
is the only international research facility of its kind and has built up unparalleled experience of 
research in this field. For further information please see the SIRC website @ www.sirc.cf.ac.uk   
 
This Research 
This project is an academic research study undertaken by a student Mrs Sarah Simons to collect 
information for a PhD degree while based at SIRC. The research aims to explore seafarers’ 
perceptions of the risks posed by maritime piracy to their health and safety in relation to other 
risks they face in their work.  
During this study, the views of Seafarers will be collected to seek to gain an understanding of 
how Maritime Piracy in Eastern Africa in the last decade may be affecting them. For this 
purpose, the researcher will interview seafarers in face to face meetings and the interviews will 
be recorded on audio tapes.  
 
Research Participant Confidentiality 
All information gathered in the course of this study will continue to be collected and managed 
in compliance with Cardiff University research Data Protection Act requirements and guidance 
on safety in fieldwork. The research report will not include the personal and identifiable 
information about the seafarers interviewed. Thus, the research findings will be presented 
anonymously and where it may have been necessary to use quotations or phrases used by the 
interviewees, this will be presented in such as way that the views will not be traceable back to 
the individual seafarer or their organisation.  
 
Dissemination of Findings 
Any questions about this study and requests for the research report once finalised should be 
sent to The Researcher: Sarah A. Simons, Seafarers’ International Research Centre, 52 Park 
Place, Cardiff CF10 3AT. Email: SimonsSA@cardiff.ac.uk  
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Participants Consent Form 
 
 
The nature and the purpose of this study has been explained to me  
and I consent to be interviewed.             
 
I understand that the tape of this interview will be destroyed after  
Transcription and I consent to being recorded during the interview.             
 
I understand that the interview transcription will be anonymized  
and destroyed after six years and consent to the transcription being 
safely stored.                               
  
I understand that I can withdraw my consent at any time over the                               
period of the study.                
 
Signature of the Interviewer: _______________      Date: _____________ 
 
Print Name of the Interviewee: ______________     Date: _____________ 
 
Signature of the Interviewee: _______________      Date: _____________ 
 
 
 
Supervisors  
 
At the time the fieldwork stage of this research was undertaken, the candidate’s supervisors 
and their contacts were as follows:  
 
Professor Trevor Jones JonesTD2@cardiff.ac.uk, 
Cardiff Centre for Crime, Law and Justice, Cardiff University, United Kingdom                
 
Professor Michael Bloor BloorMJ@cf.ac.uk 
Seafarers International Research Centre, Cardiff University, United Kingdom                
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        
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Appendix 9: Preliminary Data Analysis (Coding Schematic Index) 
 
 Content Section Question Coding/key words 
(Interviewee) 
 
 
 
 
sample 
description 
 
 
bio data 
age 1.1 oldest = 43, youngest = 
20 
nationality 
(by geog. 
region) 
1.2 E. Europe (8), W. Europe 
(5), N. America (1), S. 
Asia (6), Filipines (24) 
marital status 1.3, 3.1 Single (16), married (26), 
separated (2) 
 
work 
experience 
work 
experience 
duration 
1.4 longest (29yrs Chief 
Engineer) 
shortest (1yr Cadet) 
current 
position 
1.5  
 
various current ship 1.6 
previous 
ships 
1.7 
 
occupation
al risks 
E. Africa 
voyage 
1.8 
 
 
 
 
fearful 
situations 
ranking 
seafaring 
risks 
2.1(a), 2.2, 
2.5, 2.6, 2.7 
Pirates are dangerous ( ),  
Hijacked by pirates a risk 
(23 out of forty - four) 
other fears 2.1(b), 2.12 from nature 
 
 
fearful 
situations 
 Man made 
 
feel safe at 
sea 
2.1 2.2, 2.7, 
3.1 
Modern tech = 
safety(36), safety 
measures training (forty - 
four,37, 32), God keeps 
us safe (13), etc  
 
feel safe 
ashore 
2.1 2.2, 2.7, 
3.1 
Fewer risks (40,20) feet 
on land (39), near help 
(33, 30), relaxed mood 
(12,14), no pirates (13,9), 
no big waves, no bad 
weather (23,10) etc 
feel unsafe 
ashore 
2.1 2.2, 2.7, 
3.1 
Depends on many factors 
(8,1,1,25,41) 
Neither safe nor unsafe 
(41,31,11,3,21,18,27) 
Fewer risks 
(37,35,19,29,34), etc 
feel unsafe at 
sea 
2.1 2.2, 2.7, 
3.1 
Afraid, scared, seafarer’s 
life is 50:50 
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maritime 
piracy 
1.8,  2.4,  
2.5, 2.7, 3.1, 
3.2 
dangerous 
 
 
 
 
 
maritime 
piracy 
 
 
 
 
piracy 
information 
sources 
 
personal 
(attempted & 
failed pirate 
attempts) 
 
 
2.4, 2.5 
They chased our 
ship/tried to board (6, 7), 
they attempted to board 
(8, 34, 32), they 
boarded… we fought 
them for our lives/ there 
was a confrontation 
(42,19,29, 43, forty - 
four),etc 
 
indirect 
experience 
2.4, 2.5 Colleagues 
(8,20,43,38,41,26,23), 
family members (forty - 
four, 27,30,31,24,21), 
fellow nationals (28, 
37,41), many of my 
friends (34, 35) 
 
Media 
2.4 TV/News (36,35, 33, 
31,25,16, 13,10, etc,), 
alerts on VHS radio (19),  
reports/updates 
(31,39,41,) 
 
Formal 
Forums 
2.4 Maritime Academy (40, 
21), Pre-departure drills 
& briefing(40, forty - 
four, 38, 37, 36,22,24), 
etc 
 
 
Fears of, 
or 
concern 
about… 
 
 
 
worried, 
afraid, 
concerned 
about piracy 
 
1.8,  2.4,  
2.5, 2.7, 3.1, 
3.2 
Pirates are v. 
dangerous/use big 
guns/violent 
(14,13,24,39), I can get 
killed /crew were killed 
(13, 3,33, 9,19,10,31,21), 
pirates fired on their ship 
(31), they were held for 
months (27,18), ship still 
being held captive after 1 
year (20), held captive by 
different groups (18), 
company can claim 
bankruptcy(42,33), 
abandoned them while 
held hostage (11),  jobs 
can be lost (3, 20,), any 
seafarer can be attacked 
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(18,19,21,22,23), worries 
my family (24,31,18,19, 
 
 
 
not 
concerned 
1.8,  2.4,  
2.5, 2.7, 3.1, 
3.2, 2.9 
Our ship is escorted (16), 
we have armed guards on 
board (35,40), my ship 
only goes to in Baltic, 
Europe/Mediterranean, 
no piracy there 
(41,32,24,26,38, 25, 42), 
never passed through 
piracy area (4), trained 
and know what to do if 
attacked (36, 35),  
  
Never 
experienced 
but worried 
 
 
2.9 
My ship does not go there 
but it happened to my 
brother (forty - four), 
messages are alarming 
(43), just worrisome (5), 
if ?I had an assignment to 
Gulf of Aden I would be 
fearful (25) 
 
 
Response 
to 
imminent 
Piracy 
attack 
 
Uncomfortable
e.g.  
anxiety 
 
1.8, 2.11, 
3.1, 3.2 
Scared (23,40 ), Nervous 
(24,40,15  ), worried 
(31,22,12,17,19,27,26,19
,20,21,), very concerned 
(32), afraid (38,28,11), I 
can’t sleep in pirate area 
(9), etc. 
  
confront 
pirates 
 
2.11 
We have enough fire 
power to beat back 
pirates(35), we do drills, 
raise security level (35), 
secure yourself, be ready 
(26), 
mutual 
support 
3.1 I would send money to 
his family; I would visit 
his family… 
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